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    Regional preparatory meeting on Aid Effectiveness
    Recommendations form Arab CSO
    May 24 - 27, 2008

    Called for by the Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND), in partnership with the Civil Society Council- League of Arab States, and in cooperation with the Reality of Aid Network, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the Bahraini Association for Human Rights,
    CSOs held a regional meeting in preparation for the Third High-Level Forum (HLF) on Aid Effectiveness in Manama-Bahrain between the 23rd and 27th of May 2008. It was attended by sixty eight participants from sixteen Arab countries (KSA, Qatar, Yemen, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, Iraq, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco), in addition to representatives of international and regional networks (Reality of Aid Network, Social Watch, Eurostep, OECD, Montreal International Forum, Habitat international coalition, Bank Information Center, International Federation of Arab Workers, and International Islamic Relief), as well as regionally-active international partners such as Diakonia (Sweden), Oxfam (UK), Canadian International Development Agency, and German Agency for Development (GTZ).
    Two days were dedicated for discussing working papers on aid effectiveness, mainly Paris Declaration, Civil Society Position Paper, Accra Action Agenda, as well as participating country presentations. Besides, Paris Declaration main principles were addressed, especially “aid ownership”, accountability, alignment, harmonisation, and managing for results.

    In this context,

    Participants express their appreciation of the efforts exerted by countries and international donor agencies to formulate mechanisms that contribute to financing development and supporting developing countries in realising MDGs. They also appreciate the invitation of CSO representatives to organise a parallel process as well as to the HLF III in Accra next September.
    Participants also support efforts within the framework of the Accra Forum and look forward to actively participating in it.
    The outcomes of this meeting, as well as those of the Forthcoming forum in Accra, are to be submitted to the “Arab Summit for Economic and Social Development” organised by the league of Arab States in Kuwait in January 2009, in coordination with Civil Society Council- League of Arab States.
    In addition, CSOs thank the Advisory Group and the International Steering Committee for their support by providing resources, documents and working papers, and by participating in the regional meeting.
    Participants stress the importance of strengthening cooperation with the civil society as a major partner in the development process. They also emphasise that concurrence among democracy, justice, peace, development, fighting poverty and gender equity within the framework of aid is important, as it defines the latter’s success and effectiveness.

    At the end of the meeting, participants issued the following remarks and recommendations:

    1. Paris Declaration lacks a vision that bases on human rights and democracy at the level of aid, a fact that might aggravate economic and social crises. Participating organisations thus stress that aid effectiveness should be measured through the ability to achieve MDGs, taking into consideration harmonisation between aid processes and results on one hand and social justice, gender equity and human rights on the other.
    2. Mechanisms that ensure the implementation and the follow up of Paris Declaration and require all concerned entities to apply associated criteria and goals are absent. Hence, effective participation and transparency mechanisms ought to be adopted.
    3. Specificities of developmental and humanitarian work during conflicts should be taken into consideration, as well as the pivotal role played by organisations in this respect. Besides, relief is to be linked to the developmental process through building a comprehensive vision that attends to conflict resolution, just and comprehensive peace building and civil concord in the region. Partnerships between international relief agencies and local ones are to be also ensured.
    4. Stress the importance of strengthening democratic ownership that is realised through the participation of concerned entities in the development process.
    5. Secure the right of access to information in order to activate the participation of all entities, including civil society. This involves establishing an effective mechanism to ensure recognising this right.
    6. Provide the legal, political and administrative environment that enables civil society and strengthens their independence, ensures aid effectiveness, contributes to achieving MDGs, and thus supports the role of donor organisations and Arab funds in realising development in the region.
    7. Strengthen communication and interaction among all entities involved in national strategy formulation. This covers the diverse civil society, parliaments, private sector and government, where each entity is to maintain its independence and role.
    8. As stipulations impede aid effectiveness, their occurrence should focus on human rights and parity among partners. Aid agreements and contracts ought to incorporate mutually-adhered to clauses on human rights and gender equity. Besides, aids should not be used as means to justify breaches, aggression, occupation and domination over national resources.
    9. Participants express satisfaction with the growing role of donor organisations in the Arab region, such as governments and development/specialised funds. They however call for not only commitment to the principles and recommendations of aid effectiveness forums, but also active partnership in development processes in terms of adopting comprehensive developmental visions that take into consideration regional needs and regional integration requirements. Tackling these developmental challenges and realising social justice and gender equity are also among participants’ demands.
    10. Focus on human resource development and capacity building, and also empower local communities at the level of participation and productive sectors, especially agriculture, in order to provide for citizens’ basic needs. In this context, reforms should be carried out in a manner that responds to internal needs and challenges. This entails that these reforms are comprehensive within a state of rights, justice, law and institutions.
    11. Spread and strengthen the concept of social responsibility as key for supporting development processes, as well as involve the private sector as a responsible party.
    12. Corruption, in all its aspects including the aid-associated, is an obstacle to development. Designing suitable mechanisms for accountability is thus of utmost importance.
    13. In order to ensure aid effectiveness, organisations stress the importance of developing impact and performance indicators, adequate for local environments. Producing indicators related to gender equity is to be taken into consideration in this respect.
    14. CSOs participating in the meeting call for establishing an effective mechanism for monitoring and following up on the implementation of pledges, in the framework of aid effectiveness, as per Paris Declaration and other ratified agreements.

  • Financing for Development in the Arab Region; A Case of a Region at Crossroads

    Prepared by Ziad Abdel Samad and Kinda Mohamadieh

    Background

    The Millennium Summit in the year 2000 set out a global development plan based on a set of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), to which countries worldwide committed. The International Summit on Financing for Development in 2002 convened for the purposes of looking into mechanisms to finance this development process. It resulted in the Monterrey Consensus that highlighted several key issues including: points of action for mobilizing domestic financial resources, mobilizing international resources for development including foreign direct investment, addressing the flows of international trade as an engine for development, increasing international financial and technical cooperation, addressing issues of external debt, and addressing the coherence and consistency of the international monetary, financial, and trading systems. During the UN World Summit that convened in September 2005, donor countries renewed their commitment to improve aid effectiveness, through harmonization of procedures and alignment of aid with developing countries priorities, and to scale-up development assistance (i.e. Aid for Trade, to build national capacities, prioritizing least developed countries (LDCs) and countries afflicted with crisis and the HIV/AIDS pandemic).

    However, two main approaches could be highlighted among developed and developing countries in drawing upon the issues under discussion. Developed countries promote a link between more aid and trade liberalization policies. Developing countries stress the need for more unconditional aid. Their major concern is the elevation of conditionalities imposed by the World Bank and the IMF through aid flows. Accordingly, the pledge made by developed countries at the Hong-Kong 6th WTO Ministerial Meeting (December 2005) for an aid for trade package for LDCs was highly questioned. Developing countries expressed their concern that this package would significantly constrain them in their negotiations process. Also they were concerned that this aid will be administered through the international financial institutions, which would allow for more conditionalities imposed through these institutions.

    The core challenge is to reconfigure the structure of aid flow and management, by increasing the linkages of aid to human development needs. Through enhancing this linkage and the efficiency of the used mechanisms, aid will be more responsive to national needs and governments will be more accountable to the expected results from aid flows.

    It is worth noting that aid and debt have been tackled by the MDGs through targets 13 and 15 of goal eight. Target 13 includes addressing the special needs of the LDCs which includes: tariff and quota free access for LDCs’ exports; enhancing program of debt relief for highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs) and cancellation of official bilateral debt; and making available more generous official development aid (ODA) for countries committed to poverty reduction. Target 15 includes dealing comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term. These items make some links between the international development framework and the debate around aid and debt, however the targets do not address main points in the aid issue. When discussing more generous aid for countries committed to poverty eradication, it does not clarify which poverty reduction strategies it means; is it that based on the approach of the international financial institutions and used to exert pressure on developing countries or one based on genuine national goals and needs? It also does not clarify nor provide guidance as to the kind of national and international measures that may be considered linked to debt sustainability. This ambiguity allows developed nations and international institutions to still link debt alleviation to other constraining measures such as enforcing economic liberalization, privatization, and other structural adjustment measures.

    One of the main challenges facing aid efficiency is that aid flows are highly linked to international political considerations. Donors’ pledges are not consistent from year to year and highly fluctuate based on political considerations and emerging priorities. Also, aid cannot be viewed in isolation from the conditions imposed by the international trading system and developed nations’ foreign policy. Developed nations and international institutions give with one hand- aid- and take with another –costs of forced integration in the international trading system- which creates an aid system that is superficial at best and manipulative at worst. All these factors have resulted in a failure by most developed countries to meet their pledge to commit 0.7% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to official development assistance which they have held since the 1970s . According to OECD figures, the US have dedicated just above 0.2% of its GDP or 27.5 billion USD to official development aid (ODA) in 2005. Only the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Luxemburg, and Denmark exceeded the 0.7% of their GDP and reached 0.8% and beyond. Japan dedicated around 0.3% or 13.1 billion USD. Italy and Spain dedicated the same percentage which amounted to 5.1 and 3.1 billion USD respectively. France and Britain came closer to 0.5% of their GDP representing 10.1 and 10.8 billion USD respectively.

    This paper will tackle the status of financing for development in the Arab region. It will focus on two main initiatives of aid flow into the region; the American Middle East Partner Initiative (MEPI) and the European Middle East Development Assistance (MEDA) program. The paper will try to engage in a preliminary analysis of their objectives through looking at factors shaping the US and EU policy in the Arab region. It will shed light on the gaps in the US and EU approaches and understanding of aid policy and how it is presented within their general reform initiatives in the Arab region.

    Introduction; Shaping the US and EU aid policy towards the Arab region

    The International Summit on Financing for Development convened in a period when several considerations in the global and regional policy-making process, and on the economic, political, and security fronts, were being rearranged upon the attacks of 11 September 2001. In fact, it was indicated in the Monterrey consensus that after the attacks of 9/11, “it is more urgent to enhance collaboration among all stakeholders to promote sustainable economic growth and to address long-term challenges of financing for development”. The UN General Assembly, gathering on 16 November 2001, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, concluded that terrorism must be addressed in parallel with poverty, underdevelopment, and inequality .

    In this context, the Arab region has been the subject of heightened international attention, especially from the US and the EU. Various initiatives have been proposed as solutions or gates for change and democratization in the region. The perception was growing that terrorism threats are rooted in radical Islamic movements that are entrenched in the Arab region. The high influence of these movements has been attributed to lack of good governance and democracy as well as weak developmental conditions and high levels of poverty.

    Accordingly, the US and the EU policies focusing on democracy in the Arab region have clearly adopted “the idea of using development assistance as a foreign policy tool ”. Yet, disregard of the Millennium Declaration adopted by 189 head of States in September 2000, both the US and the EU ignore the need to interrelate peace and security along with democracy and poverty eradication. These initiatives call for peace building and peaceful conflict resolution. At the same time, they practice and support foreign occupation of land, expansion of military bases, and consistent double standards in the implementation of international laws and resolutions related to the rights of citizens in the Arab region, whether in Palestine, Iraq, or Arab countries with foreign military basis. Accordingly, their policies established to face terrorism, and push for development and democracy in the Arab region do not reflect upon one of the main factors behind the rise of terrorism, which is linked to the feelings of humiliation and despise that some citizens of this region accumulated due to the above-mentioned measures.

    In February 2002, the US Senate resolved that “the United States foreign assistance programs should play an important role in the global fight against terrorism to complement the national security objectives of the United States” . During 2004, the American administration presented its new strategy entitled “The Greater Middle East Initiative”. The initiative was proposed as a tool for achieving political reform and facing Islamic fundamentalism, which was considered, according to the initiative itself, as the roots of increasing terrorism in the world. In addition, there were several European initiatives, including the EU’s “Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East”, which is based on the Euro-Mediterranean partnership known as the Barcelona Process . During the 2004 Summit of the G-8 countries, the “Greater Middle East Initiative” that was named “Partnership for the Future”, was further developed upon as a result of skepticism and suggestions from the EU. The elaborated initiative, now called the “Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative”, included some new rhetoric. It referred to the Palestinian conflict and the occupation of Iraq as major problems that need immediate solutions. It also highlighted that democratization cannot be a process from abroad, but it needs to be an internal dynamic taking into consideration local participation and reflecting local needs and cultural aspects. Moreover, the EU’s initiative was further developed into the “European Neighborhood Policy”, which was proposed after the EU’s enlargement. This policy is supposed to be based on national action plans covering a number of key areas for specific action: political dialogue and reform; trade and measures preparing partners for gradually obtaining a stake in the EU’s Internal Market; justice and domestic affairs; energy, transport, information society, environment and research and innovation; and social policy and people-to-people contacts. However, this rhetoric is still not reflected in efficient mechanisms in neither of the initiatives.

    It could be noted that all these proposals and reform initiatives (The US initiative, the Euro-med partnership initiative, and that of the G8 countries) included three main issues:

    a) The promotion of democracy and good governance (including topics such as free elections, parliamentary exchange, freedom of expression and independent media initiatives, freedom of association and civil society enhancement, …)
    b) The building of a knowledge society (through a basic education initiative), expanding economic opportunities, creating forums, launching trade initiatives, and financing for growth initiatives.
    c) Expanding economic opportunities, creation of forums, trade initiatives, and finance for growth initiatives.

    MEPI and MEDA; Case Studies of Aid Initiatives for the Arab Region

    The two main active aid arms of the US and the EU reform initiatives in the Arab region are MEPI and MEDA respectively.

    About MEDA

    MEDA has been in place since the 1995 Barcelona Convention and was developed from MEDA I to MEDA II in 2000. Since its launch, MEDA has invested $250 million in more than 350 programs to support political, economic, and educational reform efforts and women’s empowerment in the Middle East countries. Under the 1996 ‘MEDA I’ Council Regulation, more than 3,400 million Euros were committed for the period 1995-1999. An indicative figure of 5,350 million Euros has been earmarked by Ministers for MEDA II. In addition, the European Investment Bank (EIB) provides 7,400 million euro in loans for the Euro-Mediterranean area .

    During the period 1995-1999, some 86% of the resources allocated to MEDA were channeled bilaterally to the partners (this relates to Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Palestinian Authority, Turkey and Israel). The other 12% of the resources were devoted to regional activities of which all Mediterranean Partners and the EU Member States are eligible to benefit. Two percent were set aside for technical assistance offices. The European Parliament had launched the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIHDR) in 1994. Currently, the EIHDR is funded at 132 million Euros for activities worldwide; of which approximately 10 percent goes to the Middle East. The EIHDR functions as a unit within EuropeAid which was established by the European Commission in 2001 . It is worth noting that MEDA funding is used primarily for government programming, while the EIHDR line item (the relatively insignificant sum of 1.3 million euros for the Middle East) is used to fund NGOs . According to a study published by the US Institute for Peace , the EU have not been accorded a high priority to contacts with Arab NGOs, and funding has been given only to those groups with a decidedly secular, pro-Western outlook and to apolitical organizations such as environmental groups.

    The eligibility criteria used for selecting countries to receive support for economic transition and the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area under MEDA II included undertaking a reform program approved by the Bretton Woods institutions or implementing programs recognized as analogous, in coordination with those institutions, but not necessarily financially supported by them in accordance with the scope and effectiveness of the reforms . Moreover, the connection between the level of democratization and reform in a country and the funding it receives is not explicit. For example, “Egypt, despite its poor record on reform, has received a disproportionate amount of aid over the years because of its critical role in the Middle East peace process” . Also, Tunisia is considered as a model for the partnership by several European governments, despite the clear violations of democratic processes and human rights that it consistently undertakes. For example, it was clear that these conditions were dismissed by the French president in his press briefing upon his visit to Tunisia in December 2003, whereby he saluted “the progress and radical changes in this country (Tunisia) ….and the efforts the Tunisian authorities have set to ….modernize Tunisia” .

    According to the above, it is clear that the flow of aid is directly linked to the extent to which recipient countries accept and integrate policies and conditionalities imposed by the World Bank and IMF, which are based on market liberalization approaches and prioritization of privatization policies and interests of multinational institutions.

    Notably the Euro-Mediterranean partnership divides the ‘Arab Region’; it includes countries of the Middle East and North Africa (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, and Egypt) and excludes the Gulf and Iraq among other Arab countries. Jordan has been included in the partnership without any clear justification or criteria; the geographic aspect is not evident, neither is the cultural aspect which is not prioritized by the partnership, nor is there any economic advantage for Jordan while considering the complementarities aspect among the Southern Mediterranean countries. On the other hand, Libya was excluded from the process. The embargo imposed on Libya by the US and EU was reviewed when the Libyan leadership changed its international policy to better suit the US and EU agendas, especially in relation to its nuclear policy. Moreover, European countries that are not on the Mediterranean, such as the UK, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Netherlands, and others, are part of the partnership.

    These questions left unanswered leave the partnership open to subjective calculations, which are often based on the interests of the European partners and not the region as a whole. This artificial geographic definition of the Euro-Med region, which is clearly driven by the geo-political interests of European states, helps to increase the divisions between Arab countries instead of creating a more equitable playing field for all involved countries and facilitating cooperation and coordination between them.

    Although the Euro-Mediterranean partnership has set three main tracks of action including the issues of peace and security, economics and free trade, as well as development and cultural aspects, progress since 1995 have been concentrated in the economic aspect. Bilateral trade association agreements were signed and ratified with all the partner countries (except Syria) with the aim at creating a free trade area. It is worth noting here that the assessments of the association agreements have shown negative short-term and medium-term impacts on the southern partner countries. The Sustainability Impact Assessment Study (SIA) for the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA) indicates that, due to be established in 2010, EMFTA might only generate slight net gains in regional economic welfare, but significant social and environmental costs in the Arab nations and Turkey . It is clear that without adequate economic preparedness as well as ability to sustain successful development policies and a stable and secure environment, governments are not able to set adequate economic and national policies that allow them to benefit from free trade agreements. Accordingly, the priority from the European perspective was related to their economic and trade interests and not building true and sustained partnership.

    Moreover, one cannot disregard the European tendencies to integrate “peace building” within the partnership given that the New European Neighborhood policy includes the Mediterranean Arab countries and Israel in common plans towards the year 2010. The EU position on Middle East peace process states that its main objective is: “ A two-State solution leading to a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on implementation of the Road Map, with Israel and a democratic, viable, peaceful and sovereign Palestinian State living side-by-side within secure and recognized borders enjoying normal relations with their neighbors in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, 1397, 1402, and 1515 and on the principles of the Madrid Conference” . However, the EU does not react to the double standards in the implementation of international laws and resolutions related to the Middle East conflict, particularly to the rights of the Palestinians. It also ignores the need to introduce radical political, economic and social reforms in the region as a whole. Accordingly, it is evident that the European initiative does not aim at spurring reform, but at buying stability and avoiding massive illegal immigration. The Barcelona process started by focusing almost exclusively on aid and trade ; this is still reflected in today’s European policies towards the region.

    About MEPI

    MEPI was launched in 2002 as a US presidential initiative and with support from its Congress. It is operated through the United States Department of State. MEPI set in motion more than 350 programs in 15 countries of the Middle East and the occupied Palestinian territories. It works through partners including local and international non-governmental organizations, businesses, universities, international institutions, and in some cases, the governments of the region. According to the official website of the program, to date, the U.S. Congress has committed around $300 million to MEPI over four fiscal years. MEPI's funding comes in addition to the bilateral economic assistance that the United States provides annually to the Middle Eastern countries.

    MEPI channels funds into projects tackling four main pillars; democracy covering democratic elections, free media, and independent judicial systems; economics including foreign direct investment, local investments, and job creation; education covering trainings, improving curriculum contents, and promoting employable skills; and women empowerment.

    The US strategy was initially aiming at tackling democracy issues within the framework of the ‘Broader Middle East Initiative’. While the initiative re-divides the region and brings in Israel as part of one framework along with Arab countries, its strategy neglects the need for stability and development, whereby it does not tackle core issues that could serve peace building. It maintains the bias towards Israel, and neglects the provocations caused by the Israeli occupation. It also maintains the double standards in implementing international laws; for it is obvious that many UN resolutions were forced to be respected and implemented using all tools including military action, while others have been suspended for decades without implementation.

    ‘Partnership for the Future’ which is the US initiative adopted by the G8 with modifications, obviously lacks the real sense of local participation especially from civil society organizations. Furthermore, it, fails to address core issues aiming at fighting poverty and development. For the US funding directed towards civil society organizations, unlike other foreign funding, creates a significant level of tension among these organizations in the Arab region. This is evident in certain Arab countries more than others. This situation is related to the belief by some groups that the funding received from the US does not serve the priorities set by Arab civil society groups, but leads these groups to be implementers of an agenda set according to US priorities in the region. In this context, the funding administered to civil society groups via the G8 initiative is leading towards de-fragmentation of local civil society participation to various parallel initiatives in partnership with civil society organizations from the G8 countries. These initiatives focus on governance and transparency issues, dialogue for democracy, participation of women, judiciary reform, etc. Coordination lacks among these initiatives. Moreover, local civil society groups are becoming mere implementers of policies set by the funding groups without a local and participatory consultation process. This raises issues related to the relevancy of capacities and expertise of local civil society entities implementing the proposed programs and activities. Consequently, this puts serious questions on the effectiveness of the outcomes and expected results of this work.

    The Connection of Aid to Militarization and Terrorism

    The US was the first to draw upon the connection between militarization, terrorism and aid. It imposed upon countries and institutions that benefit from its aid programs a condition whereby the beneficiary must commit not to work with organizations and individuals that are judged by the US administration as linked to terrorism.

    The EU is also linking aid to fighting terrorism, with European ministers warning countries that their relations with the economically powerful bloc will suffer if they fail to cooperate in the fight against terrorism. An EU official was quoted to say, “Aid and trade could be affected if the fight against terrorism was considered insufficient”, leading to accusations of “compromising the neutrality, impartiality, and independence of humanitarian assistance” . It is worth mentioning that in May 1995, the European Union developed a democracy and human rights clause governing relations with third countries that stipulated the suspension of aid and trade in the event of serious human rights violations (COM 95(216)23 May 1995) . In practice, these two approaches could come is serious opposition to each other as will be explained later in this section.

    The categorization used to link aid to terrorism is not based on a specific, clear and objective definition of terrorism and terrorists. It is thus of a high importance to call upon the United Nations to adopt a fair definition that take into account all the factors, realities and circumstances that generate terrorism. Not only are the links between terrorism and development not fully explored or explained by the US and the EU, but also the definition currently adopted by the UN focuses on individual terrorism and neglects state terrorism; it focuses on the violation of human rights and the international and domestic laws at the individual level, but does not talk about the violation of the international rights and laws by the states.

    What Anti-terrorism measures mean to the Arab region?

    The work on fighting terrorism in the US has been reflected in measures that were judged as restricting civil liberties and individual freedoms and thus impacting civic and political rights of American citizens. Now, the US and EU are trying through their aid programs to their partners, which include the Arab countries, to impose counter-terrorism measures as “key elements of political dialogue”. This was stated in the declaration that resulted from one of the EU Foreign Ministers meetings in Brussels in March 2004.

    As judged by several development and humanitarian NGOs, this could impact the EU’s aid policy, risking having aid as a tool in the war on terror (as stated by Howard Mollet, policy analyst at the British Overseas NGOs for Development). Through trying to achieve coherence between development policy and foreign policy, the EU is not able to guarantee boundaries against co-optation and subordination and there are no guarantees that these purposes will not be financed through existent development funds .Arab governments, with their long track record of human rights violations will use the security demands of the US and the EU to continue and impose additional restrictions on individual freedoms, including freedom of association and expression in the Arab region. The EU’s and US’s current policies bolster Arab government’s ability to violate basic human rights of their citizens. The EU has indicated that counter terrorism concerns will be integrated into “all relevant external assistance programs.”

    On the other hand, countries as Turkey, Jordan, Pakistan, Indonesia, and the Philippines, which are considered critical in the ''war on terror'', see significant increases in credits and aid, some of it from the Economic Support Fund (ESF), a category of security assistance used during the Cold War to give support to key geo-political allies . The increases in military and ESF funding come largely at the expense of humanitarian and development assistance, whose core programs, such as education and child and maternal health, were estimated to be reduced by about 400 million dollars in 2005, according to a budget analysis by Inter Action, a coalition of 160 U.S. relief and development groups.

    All these measures are being implemented with little attempt to examine the root causes of terrorism and the factors that generate it. This will never lead to win the war against terrorism. Moreover, reducing social and economic aids will increase the lack of basic needs and poverty which is a main factor behind criminality, delinquency, and terrorism.

    Aid and Relations with Israel

    For the United States, the concept of 'opening-up' (to neighboring countries) goes hand in hand with a resolution of the conflict with Israel. The relation with Israel is an indicator for the relation with the rich and ‘civilized’ world. Following their peace agreements with Israel, economic aid to Egypt and Jordan increased dramatically. Israel and Egypt remain the largest bilateral recipients, accounting for nearly five billion dollars in aid. It is worth noting here that most of the three billion dollars earmarked for Israel goes to military credits.”

    In the Palestinian case, within the negotiations milieu of an 'agreement at all cost', Palestinian moderation is rewarded with a lot of promises, but trickles of support. This has created an atmosphere of intimidation and doubt following any attempt for an independent position on the peace process . The double standards and subjectivity of the processes and aid mechanisms were clearly reflected in the latest developments after Hamas was democratically elected by the Palestinian people, while the US and EU have been threatening to stop the flow of aid to Palestine due to that result. Although the US has always been an advocate and a preacher for democracy, the Palestinian elections did not gain its recognition due to Hamas’s obvious conflict with Israeli interests.

    The 2007 foreign aid bill approved by the US House of Representatives Appropriations Committee includes $2.46 billion for Israel, of which $2.34 billion goes to military aid and the rest to civilian aid. US aid for Israel is calculated according to a formula set in the late 1990s which aims at eliminating US civilian aid to Israel. This is based on assumption that the US Congress would not support civilian aid for long to a country with a developed economy like Israel’s. Under this formula, US military aid for Israel would increase by $60 million a year to a ceiling of $2.4 billion a year, beginning in 2009. Israel will receive its last $60 million of US civilian aid in the 2008 US fiscal year. Egypt will be receiving the second largest aid amount from the US, including $1.7 billion of which $1.3 billion are dedicated to military purposes. It is worth noting that the US House, whose foreign aid will total $23.1 billion in 2007, will dedicate a limited amount of $3.4 billion to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria; $522 million for stabilization efforts in Iraq; and $962 million for Afghanistan .

    The Impact of Aid Flow as Currently Administered

    Monterrey equally stressed on three pillars that serve financing for development; (1) more free trade including foreign direct investment but with a more democratic transparent and fair trading system, (2) more aid, with main focus on quality of non-conditional and non-tied official development assistance, and (3) sustained debt relief. However, through a quick analysis of the aid policy towards the Arab region, one can easily conclude that it is highly linked to strategically-calculated political decisions and it focuses on enhancing free trade that remains one of the main objectives for any aid channeled to the region. This aid policy is hardly conducive to development because trade alone cannot guarantee growth and sustained development. It is worth noting that trade policies, conducted by the US and the EU, do not reflect any serious willingness to help developing countries since they insist on subsidizing agriculture, misusing antidumping measures, abusing intellectual property rights, and modifying the rules of trade in services. This was reflected in the trade negotiations in the consecutive Ministerial and mini-Ministerial meetings of the World Trade Organization in Doha, Cancun, Hong Kong, and Geneva. Moreover, economic reforms being tied to much of the ODA flow is perceived by different governmental stakeholders and decision makers, whether foreigners including international financial institutions or even local governments, as a matter of economic and trade liberalization and more privatization. This assumption highly limits the role of the state in economic regulation and reduces the available policy options. Moreover, it shrinks social reforms to the mere establishment of safety nets to face the negative effects resulting from these economic reform policies. Furthermore, ODA is increasingly being conditioned by the ’War on Terror’ and the reaction to the results of the elections in Palestine is an interesting example. Moreover, the debt issue was never seriously negotiated; it remains, like in the case of Lebanon, a way to exert more conditionalities towards liberalization and privatization.

    The United Nations General Assembly repeatedly stressed the inter-linkage between security, development, and human rights particularly in the September 2005 World Leaders’ Summit. The correlation between security and development is the basic principle of modern political and sociological thought. Problems of security and development can only be tackled together, in a comprehensive effort to face conditions that, on one hand, cause stability and instability, and, on the other, stimulate or hinder development .

    The areas into which aid is being channeled by the donor society do overlap with several areas that civil society organizations in the Arab region are concerned about and work to change and strengthen, such as good governance, freedom of expression, sound electoral systems, the independence of the judiciary, legal environment, empowerment of women and several other areas. However, the surrounding environment being enhanced by the donor countries themselves is hampering the process of change in the Arab region. Three main factors have a direct and negative affect on the impact achieved by aid flows for the purposes of financing for development in the region. These are:

    1. The double standards of the US and the EU with the UN resolutions addressing the rights of the Palestinian people and the decision of the International Court in 2004 are maintained. Moreover, Israeli nuclear weapons remain a taboo, while the insecurity in the region and the tendencies towards militarization and enhancing defense policies persist

    2. The link between aid and terrorism is weakening the ability to sustain an efficient and effective flow of aid based on the national needs and not on foreign policy demands of rich countries. This is also finding new explanations for the prioritization of defense and security policies at the expense of development and social security, which has been for long the main dilemma in the Arab region.

    3. The undemocratic regimes in the Arab region, which continue to repress freedoms, violate rights, and limit the space of civil society organizations are continuously being supported by various donor countries for reasons related to energy and oil sources or military bases located in several of the Arab countries

    All efforts will not help the Region unless the rights of all people are protected according to the international rights, laws, and the UN related resolutions. Change necessitates the introduction of radical reforms at different levels, political, economic, social and cultural. Any reform agenda that could lead to success and be effectiveness should be comprehensive and should take into consideration all the three above-mentioned dimensions. These reforms should lead to establish regimes which respect human rights and democracy and adopt policies leading to social justice. From the perspective of Arab civil society organizations, there is no opposition to the content of any initiative calling for democracy and the respect of human rights. Peace, security, and adequate socio-economic policies in addition to democracy and the respect of human rights will be the main factors behind their success. Moreover, change needs the implementation of a fair and comprehensive solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and a real and effective end of any form of foreign occupation in Iraq.

    Accordingly, aid should complement local development plans. This requires addressing 'national' obstacles hindering these plans, such as lawlessness, the absence of democracy, and the prevalence of corruption, in addition to the lack of expertise and scarcity of technology. If conditionality is on issues such as the freedom to vote, the right of expression and belonging, and the independence of the judiciary, rather than being on privatization and the removal of subsidies that support basic services, then, the aid regime could become the developmental lever needed badly by poor countries. Local development plans should answer the needs of the majority of the population that live below the poverty line in most countries of the Region. Foreign aid to these plans will contribute to raising the living standards of real people, and not merely raising general economic indicators that, effectively, only serve a minority in the upper classes, mainly because of the lack of a fair redistribution of wealth. It is essential to stress that foreign aid should be related to poverty reduction policies, dependant on the harmonization of the development assistance agencies’ policies, practices, and procedures, and dependant as well on the national public capacities in absorbing, managing and distributing this aid.

    Thus, in all the abovementioned, the role of civil society would be a crucial factor in the process of reforming aid mechanisms, guaranteeing their outreach, and making them more adequate to local and national needs, and, accordingly, more sustainable within the development policies of developing countries.

  • Social Security in the Arab Region: The challenging Concept and the Hard Reality (Prepared for the Social Watch Reprot 2007)

    Ziad Abdel Samad and Diana Zeidan

    Introduction

    The question of human security has received growing attention from governments and intergovernmental forums in recent years. In the last decade the underlying concept of security has been changing from that of preserving the nation through military, political and diplomatic measures, to one of including individual human elements in the equation. This broadened concept encompasses a state of well-being in which an individual or group has the assurance of protection from physical and mental harm, freedom from fear and anxiety, freedom from want, and the right to live life with dignity.
    International Federation of University Women

    The International Labor Organization has extended the definition of social security to a series of social policies undertaken by the public authorities and has therefore encompassed the duty of the State in establishing appropriate social security mechanisms. This includes "the protection which society provides for its members, through a series of public measures, against the economic and social distress that otherwise would be caused by the stoppage or substantial reduction of earnings resulting from sickness, maternity, employment injury, unemployment, invalidity, old age and death; the provision of medical care; and the provision of subsidies for families with children."
    International Labor Organization-1999

    The Interlink between human security and social security became obvious and integrated in the new paradigm of national security at large. Yet, social security is a prerequisite for both international and national security and reflects the link between state security in general and individual (citizen) security in particular. Moreover, it refers to the quality of life of individuals and to the respect of their human rights.

    Social security should be perceived as part of a comprehensive system of political, economic, social and cultural strategies aiming at protecting national security including human security and political stability within the society.

    Although the traditional understanding of social security has developed during the last three decades, still there is confusion between social security as described above and social protection as the "provision of generalized basic social support for all citizens, regardless of contribution or employment history."

    Social security has double objectives: the first one is to improve living conditions and to create an enabling environment and to bring poor to an acceptable level of minimum consumption (Zafiris and Hindousa), the second one is to reduce risk of the non poor of becoming poor and for the poor of becoming poorer. Reducing risks should be sought as well in the the macro-economic policies and the functioning of the labor market to create wealth and employment.

    Yet, even the most enabling environment would never eliminate risks, and social security programs can play a useful role in catering for the needs of those who do not fully share the benefits of growth or job creation.

    The state plays a central role in the development of an adequate system of social security. Access to public services and income protection must be guided by legislation that establishes rights instead of discretional policies or favoritism (http://www.art-us.org/node/66). The central objective of the state should be to ensure just and sustainable development for all, including emergency or compensatory assistance for specific groups.

    Furthermore, The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) represent an attempt to articulate, in a comprehensive way, the priority areas of social and economic development. They are an important tool to assess the progress achieved in providing social services for basic human well-being. It is highly important to make the link between the eight millennium goals and the human rights framework in general.

    The countries of the Arab region often lack comprehensive development strategies, especially the social policies component of such strategies. Obviously, there is an urgent need in the Arab region to develop a new comprehensive social security system that supports the achievement of socio-economic rights, and preserves the overriding human rights values.

    This article will analyze the need to develop social security schemes in the Arab countries through a rights-based approach. It goes through the risks to social security in the context of the regional challenges. It highlights some of the partially succeeded social protection policies and points out to the structural problems that Arab countries need to overpass. This article contradicts all the statements claiming that the current regimes in power have fully provided the rights of their citizens by adopting social policy and ensuring adequate social security in the Arab countries.

    Social Security Risks in the Arab Region

    Enhancing social security is a challenge that Arab societies are facing. It is obviously related to many external and internal challenges. Among these challenges are the instability of national security in general, the fact that development indicators are very low, and the confusion between the understanding and the function of charity, welfare, and human rights. These are challenges that contribute to confusion in setting national priorities and adopting relevant social strategies.

    a) National Insecurities;
    Lack of peace and security are permanent challenges and factors of continuous threats in the Arab region, yet they are not properly addressed.

    The cost of war and conflicts, in terms of lost lives, displacement, and setbacks to development, continues to be high. This is particularly evident in Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon and in countries marred by internal conflict and strife for over a decade, namely some Gulf countries, Algeria, Somalia, and Sudan.

    War and conflicts in the region continue to destroy human and natural resources and negatively impact the social fabric, while diverting government budgets towards military expenditure instead of investment in social security programs. Political tensions and conflicts in the Arab region show little sign of abating, highlighting the challenges of undertaking sustainable development objectives under crisis conditions. These conflicts express themselves not only in terms of stunted economic growth, but also in dislocated social and political realities.

    The region is the main field of demonstration of the so called “war on terror”. This in turn is the pretext used to explain the prioritization of defense and security policies at the expense of development and social security. Expenditures on military and security establishments overcome socio-economic and developmental expenditures. This trend of wasted resources will probably persist in the short run as states increase their spending on coercive institutions. In this context, the “war on terror” was launched to address the results of violent tendencies and acts instead of targeting their root causes. Yet, it is obvious that the main reasons generating frustration and violence are the failure to reach just and sustainable peace and to prioritize finding solutions to the economic and social disparities and gender discrimination, in addition to the lack of freedom and the continuous violation of human rights in particular the right to self-determination and to the freedom of expression and thoughts.

    b) Lack of respect to human rights;
    The most universal understanding of social equity is based on the internationally acknowledged set of human rights that encompass the right of each citizens to equal opportunities and fair share of development dividends. Therefore, it is highly important to approach the concept of social security from a human rights lens.

    The freedom deficit in the Arab region undermines human development and is one of the most painful manifestations of lacking political development. Moreover; citizenship is defined by the nature and the framework of the relation between the citizen and the state. It is a set of rights and duties. Among these rights is the right to enjoy social services such as health, education, housing, employment and adequate income. These services should be seen as rights and not as gifts provided by the ruling power. The provision of these services should not allow nepotism, clientelism, and corruption. Among these rights, the right of associations should be respected. The latter can secure the space for establishment of unions representing various interest groups. These have the major role in claiming the rights of workers and citizens to adequate social security and in monitoring the implementation of social security schemes.

    Yet, in most of the Arab countries, human rights and the rule of law lack. Accordingly, some of the main prerequisites for developing a comprehensive and adequate social security system, which serves social justice objectives, are absent. This major gap represents a basic obstacle in the process of adopting adequate rights-based approach to addressing national social strategies.

    c) Low indicators of human development;
    Despite the little progress achieved across the region and within various Arab countries, it is unlikely that the Arab region as a whole will succeed in eradicating poverty and hunger, particularly in the least developed and non-oil countries .

    The 2007 MDG report for the Arab region points out to worrying numbers: 18.2 % (2004) of the population in the Arab region lived in extreme poverty, and in 12.7% (2000) of children less than five years old were underweight. The report also indicates that 8.6% (2002) of the population was below the minimum level of dietary energy consumption and 20% (2005) of Arab children were not enrolled in primary education. In addition, nearly 18 % (2004) of the whole Arab population lacked access to safe water, and nearly 28% (2004) lacked access to safe sanitation in the same year.

    These indicators, among many others, reflect the urgency to address development challenges with a comprehensive approach, and to adopt national strategies for social security in order to improve the social and economic situation.

    d) An overarching tendency towards neo-liberal economic policies;
    Social security policies should not be seen as temporary programs to be implemented during the transition phase while implementing structural adjustment strategies or economic reforms. This reduces social security to safety nets programs, which is the case in many Arab countries.

    Moreover, it has been proven that economic growth cannot serve the purposes of employment, sustainable development, and social equality without adopting active policy processes by governments. These policies should aim at securing fair redistribution and avoiding uncalculated crisis, in addition to securing a sustained growth rate and adequate treatment of social needs for various local communities.

    However, favoring free-market oriented strategies tends to promote in alignment a reduction in the role of the state and tends to promote an increase in the role of the multinational institutions by privatizing and liberalizing public services.

    e) The cultural aspect;
    Within a society where religion and the clans-based web of relations play an important role in the daily life, the latter can be seen as a positive factor in terms of filling the gaps when it comes to the availability of social services. This can be seen as an alternative to the efficient and adequate public social security system. But this reality enhances the welfare and faith-based approach rather than the human rights based approach and understanding of social security.

    Despite the positive result that charity and social assistance can bring to society by contributing to poverty alleviation and providing some basic needs, they can distort the real meaning of citizenship. They can strengthen nepotism clientelism, tribal, communitarian, and religious belonging, over citizenship itself.

    Social Security in the Arab Region

    In the last decade, Arab States allocated quite high figures of public expenditure to the social sectors. But too much of them have gone to develop the infrastructure and to pay the salaries of the disproportional large number of public employees serving in these sectors. In some countries, social expenditures (mainly on health and education) exceed 20% of the GDP. These are considered as inefficient and wasteful, especially in terms of their quality, their failure in targeting the groups in real need, and their inability to provide basic social services to the majority of the population .

    Globalization has added to the social risk factors in Arab societies as a result of the major restructuring of macro-economic policies, including labor markets. This mainly aimed at lowering government spending on social services and reducing the cost of existing mechanisms for social protection. In addition, many Arab states (especially non-oil countries), like other developing countries, have been left with insufficient funds to face the challenges of unemployment, including the ability to provide adequate public health care services, developed vocational training and education systems in accordance with the new global workplace, and protection of the retired elderly and people with disability.

    Social security systems ought to be legally mandated, work-based, mostly contributory and state-run; in the Arab countries, they are generally noncontributory, means-tested, based on availability of funds, and run by a mix of public, civil society, and individual actors without adequate complementary and efficient coordination . Over the past decade, the mix of public and private responsibility for social security began to shift toward reducing the role of the public sector, as many Arab countries introduced market-oriented measures under the rising fiscal pressures, in addition to the pressure exerted by the international financial institutions in this regard. This led to reduce efficiency and lower social expenditures. It is worth noting in this regard that the right to social security cannot be adequately served with the lack of an adequate national system of social security; especially if it is based on mere profit-oriented interventions by private sector or random interference by non-governmental organizations.

    Civil society organizations often provide crucial support. They started in many countries to develop their own social assistance initiatives with private local and international support. Many act as executing agencies of public expenditure programs. However, these services are being mainly provided by philanthropic, faith- based organizations, basically focused on a charity and welfare approach instead of a human rights based approach. These strategies and policies should go far beyond poverty alleviation towards a comprehensive developmental vision and approach.

    Finally, as already mentioned above, the lack of freedom prevents people from establishing unions advocating for their rights to social security. Only democratically elected trade unions, labor organizations and professional associations can pretend relevant representation of the different interest groups. They can thus lobby for the establishment of an adequate social security system; furthermore, they can monitor the implementation of such a system.

    By analyzing and comparing social protection schemes in four Arab countries, Selim Nasr derived main characteristics of the social insurance systems in Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco and Jordan . These include:

    - Incomplete protection against major social risks
    - Unequal treatment of individuals: “The segmentation reflects the ranking of each category in the power structure.”
    - Limited coverage of the concerned population: These gaps arise because many private employers do not feel obliged to actually pay contributions or provide benefits. Also, the States’ administrative and judicial capacities are often too weak or sometimes too corrupt to enforce accountability and ensure universal coverage within the laws.
    - Low level of real benefits: For most workers of the region, pensions promise 70 to 80 per cent of the ending wage, but actual benefits are significantly lower. This is because of the lack of formal indexation mechanisms, national inflation rates and governmental discretionary adjustments.
    - Relatively costly and inefficient administration due to the social insurance systems in the high administration and transaction costs in the region, shortages of needed financial, technical and administrative skills in the institutions, weak monitoring, divided supervision of programs across ministries and public institutions, and better coverage and identification of eligible recipients in urban areas than in rural ones.
    - No financial sustainability. Sustainability is an emerging issue for social insurance systems in the region, and the financial viability of the public funds is a growing concern In addition, the demographics of the concerned countries are shifting, and systems will come under more financial strain as people have fewer children and live longer, pension benefits grow, more elders need medical care, and there are fewer workers to support them.

    Social Security Reform for Poverty Alleviation in the Arab Region: Limited Success versus Mounting Challenges

    Several reports and calculations treating issues related to social security indicate that few of the government-funded social security programs have actually been effective:

    - Tunisia, relative to other Arab countries, has made significant strides in the sphere of social advancement and social progress. According to a policy paper published by the Economic and Social Commission of West Asia (ESCWA) in 2004, it has taken advanced steps in order to liberate women and promote their role by ensuring gender equity through the Constitution and the Personal Status Law since 1956. Furthermore, the importance attributed to policies addressing poverty, unemployment and social marginalization and measures undertaken in these spheres are indeed welcomed by civil society actors as well as international institutions. A comprehensive poverty eradication policy has been adopted in Tunisia in order to address the geographic, social and economic aspects of poverty.

    However, the comprehensive aspect of social security policies was a top-down reform process that was not implemented in consultation with social partners and civil society organizations Moreover, social security schemes in Tunisia are far from being equitability distributed among the regions . Regional disparities are obvious especially through the existing gap between the prosperous industrial zones located at the coasts and the poor interior of the country. Moreover, the country faces the same challenges in creating adequate social security system as other developing countries, especially those challenges concerning the overlap among the institutions providing the same service.

    By linking the outreach of social security to its poverty eradication strategy, the Tunisian government has established three new sources of financing for poverty eradication programs. The National Solidarity Fund, the National Employment Fund, and the Tunisian Solidarity Bank were established in order to achieve this aim.

    It is worth adding that the development of the social security system was not paralleled, and with the same pace, by the development of political and civil rights. The Tunisian government, while focusing on the social aspect, is tending for more economic liberalization and is completely neglecting the political reform agenda.

    - In Lebanon, there have always been large disparities of safety nets’ distribution between the regions. The successive Lebanese governments have all tried to improve the social indicators and promote social development. The new social action plan proposed by the Lebanese government in January 2007 and a study conducted by Hyam Mallat in 2004 all acknowledge that governments’ spending on improving social services is not sufficient. The Ministry of Social Affairs spends about 13 per cent of its total budget on food and housing subsidies to vulnerable social groups such as orphans, handicapped and some homeless; and about 26 per cent of its budget on educational and vocational training allowances for the same special categories and some very low-income individuals in low-income areas . The Ministry also contributes to health care for poorer and vulnerable categories, channeled through 89 health care centers it supervises directly and through subsidies to health facilities run by civil society groups, which provide free care for the poor and special vulnerable groups. In its turn, the Ministry of Health spends around 10% of its budget on primary health care and public health expenditures.

    Despite the implementation of some social security programs, the inefficiency of social spending is due to the lack of a clear and comprehensive national social strategy. Such a strategy needs to address the current total absence of coordination among the concerned ministries and stakeholders leading to duplication of efforts and waste of resources.

    Moreover, the social security system in Lebanon faces lots of challenges due to the political, legal, and administrative corrupted system, particularly the inefficiency of the National Security Social Fund which is under the mandate of the Ministry of Labor.

    - In Morocco, Selim Nasr shows that despite increasing emphasis on social development during the 1990s, social protection policies are facing many challenges due to the slow economic growth that have been the main cause of rising unemployment, poverty, and vulnerability. There has been no single adequate solution till date to improve the efficiency and the coverage of the social protection system and to tackle the various groups in both rural and urban areas. Most of the government programs are targeted towards the urban areas, Although social security outlays have doubled since 1990, the current pension system does nothing to address the safety net problems of the neediest.

    The country has seen effective reforms concerning the basic social services sectors, like education and health, by reallocating expenditures toward primary education in order to achieve universal primary enrollment and by increasing public expenditure for health care in rural areas. However, the lack of coordination between ministries remains a major challenge . Moreover, social security in Morocco is still following a charitable path and has not been integrated into a national social plan. Furthermore, the dwindling resources impair the action plans of ‘L’Entraide Nationale’ which assists orphans, the elderly, and the handicapped. As elsewhere, such targeted assistance programs are too small for major national impact.

    - Egypt, Magdi Abdel Hamid highlights the link between macroeconomic policies adopted by the government during the last three decades and the deterioration of the social security system . This also affected the socio-economic situation of the Egyptians. It is reflected in the figures showing the increase of unemployment, poverty, and social and regional disparities particularly between the rural and urban areas.

    It is worth noting that the Egyptian social security fund depends on the budget of the Ministry of Finance. The later is borrowing from the fund its surplus in order to cover the deficit in the public budget. This raises big questions about the sustainability of the fund and its future ability to secure services to the people.

    Moreover, and despite the large proportion spent on social protection (more than a fifth of the GDP), Egyptian social security remains inefficient. It still does not tackle the most vulnerable, while benefiting the higher and middle classes . Furthermore, social security distribution reflects the high stratification of the Egyptian society and therefore there are six different social insurance schemes for six different groups of unemployed. But these schemes only provide pension, while only 40% of the working population is ensured against diseases and injuries related to their work, and only 16% of them get unemployment benefits (Markus Loewe).

    - Some oil rich and mineral-exporting Arab countries have been successful in providing adequate social security support for their citizens. Gulf countries such as Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have used part of their enormous oil dividends to provide free education, health services, family allowances, and sometimes guaranteed employment to their nationals. These countries have also introduced social insurance schemes that provide for injury compensation, maternity, sickness benefits, and old age pensions for the majority of the workforce.

    However, an important number of immigrants (mostly coming from South Asia and other Arab countries) live in the Gulf countries with their families but do not profit of the same services. These benefits have not been extended to those emigrants who carry out most of the low-skilled work as well as occupy a significant proportion of skilled jobs.

    The key to the success of some oil and mineral-exporting countries in providing social services on a universal basis is the centralized role of the state. However, the rentier aspect of the state has transformed social security schemes into services provided by the ruling families to the citizens who do not pay taxes. This situation was described by the former executive secretary general of the ESCWA Hazim El Bablawi by the following: “no taxation, no representation”, which tries explains the problem behind the undemocratic process in oil-rich countries. There, the government is not held accountable for its actions while the citizen does not have to struggle for his/her rights, especially basic social rights.

    According to the above, and despite the achievements in some of the countries, the majority of the population in the region remains vulnerable and is not well protected against major social risks that might occur. Many middle-income and a few low-income countries have made substantial progress, but even in these countries, significant groups suffer from hunger or malnutrition and lack of access to basic health, education, sanitation and shelter, especially in least developing countries (LDCs). Moroever, the destitute in most Arab countries are politically marginalized, deprived from the right to participate, and have little say on the allocation of national resources.

    The major obstacles to meeting these needs are political and administrative; it is often not related to the financial capacities but to the inadequate use of the existing financial, human, and natural resources. Most countries, except for LDCs, have adequate resources to mount programs that can eventually meet most of these needs. However, there is a need to shift government spending from current patterns, focusing on security, “war on terror”, and military expenditure, to new priorities.

    Highly indebted Arab countries face shortage in public expenditures, mainly those directed to social programs. Moreover, the market-oriented policies adopted in almost all the Arab countries lead to inadequate liberalization and privatization of services without distinction between strategic and other basic social services. Moreover, these countries lack national macro-economic policies that integrate the aim of empowerment and support of national productive sectors. They tend to accept support from foreign donors disregard to the conditionality imposed through that in different forms and with purposes and objectives that do not meet the needs and priorities of local communities. Moreover, often foreign donors seek to ensure political stability in the receiving countries, which pushed them to provide support to the existing political regimes run by dynasties, dictators, and undemocratic political power.

    CONCLUSION AND ENDING NOTES

    Social security in the Arab region has features and weaknesses, some of them are similar to those faced by many developing countries, but some others are specific to the region. Social security systems in the Region are obviously inefficient as real benefits are often low and administrative costs are very high; this poses serious concerns over the long-term financial sustainability of these systems.

    According to current trends, the prospects in the Arab region appear to show less protection and further marginalization of the unemployed, the abject poor, and workers in the informal sector. Such negative projections stems from the persistence of existing budgetary constraints on social security systems and inefficient public expenditure.

    Moreover, the security agenda in most of the Arab countries lacks of two main prerequisites: human rights orientation and long-term human development vision. Inadequate privatization and rapid liberalization of national economies, in addition to the influential role of charity and informal social ties tend to be behind the undermining of the urgency to review and set comprehensive national agendas for social security.

    It is ultimately the responsibility of the states to ensure social security. States should effectively mobilize national resources in order to secure the adequacy and the outreach of social security systems. In the Arab countries, social solidarity reflected by family and community relations in addition to civil society organizations schemes tend to be an effective alternative for a social insurance model targeting people lacking coverage. However, these actors can only complement the role of the state within a comprehensive national strategy; they can never be able to replace it.

    In this regards, it is paramount for Arab states to adopt a rights-based approach when formulating and implementing national strategies for social development. The protection of human rights should be among the main factors strengthening the rise of nations. Therefore, social security should not be perceived as a service provided by a rentier state to its clients, but as an unconditional right to its citizens. Furthermore, the right to social security should not only be stated in constitutions and human rights conventions, but must be effective through public laws and legal securities. In this regards, social security should be the top priority in national policy-making.

    References:

    - Nasr Selim, Issues of Social Protection in the Arab Region, a four countries overview, Cooperation South, number 2, 2001
    http://tcdc1.undp.org/CoopSouth/2001_2/31-48.pdf

    - Dharam Ghai, Social security priorities and patterns: A global perspective, International Institute for Labour Studies Geneva, 2002
    www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/dp14102.pdf

    - Samer Jabbour, Critical Reflections on Health and Development in the Arab World, Newsletter of the Economic Research Forum, for the Arab Countries, Iran & Turkey, Volume nine - Number two - Summer 2002
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    - Hyam Mallat, La politique de protection sociale au Liban. Evolution, situation et perspectives, Janvier 2004
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    - Victor Billeh, Educational Reform in the Arab Region, Newsletter of the Economic Research Forum, for the Arab Countries, Iran & Turkey, Volume nine - Number two - Summer 2002
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    - ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR WESTERN ASIA, CENTRAL ISSUES RELATED TO SOCIAL POLICIES: COMPARATIVE STUDY AND GUIDELINES FOR THE FORMULATION OF SOCIAL POLICIES IN THE ESCWA REGION, Social Policy Series, No. 9, 2004
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    - Iman Bibars, Do Social Safety Nets Catch Women? Women’s Social Security Entitlements in the Arab World, paper commissioned by UNDP's Regional Bureau for Arab States
    www.pogar.org/publications/gender/iman/ssecurity.pdf

    - Timothy Besley, Robin Burgess and Imran Rasul, Benchmarking Government Provision of Social Safety Nets, Social Protection Unit Human Development Network, The World Bank, 2003
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    - ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR WESTERN ASIA, TOWARDS INTEGRATED SOCIAL POLICIES IN ARAB COUNTRIES. FRAMEWORK AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, 2005
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    - Turner, J. and Lichtenstein, J.H. , Social security reform in the Middle East, Journal of Aging and Social Policy, Vol. 14, 2002

    - Zafiris Tzannatos, Social Protection Middle East and North Africa Region, Heba Handoussa and Zafiris Tzannatos (eds), Employment Creation and Social Protection in the Middle East and North Africa. The American University in Cairo Press, New York and Cairo: 2002
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    - S. Al-Qudsi, Effective distribution of social safety nets in Arab economies, Arab Planning Institute, Kuwait, 2002.

    - United Nations and the League of Arab States; the Millennium Development Goals in the Arab Region 2007: A Youth Lens (an overview), June 2007.

    - Ridha Kechrid, Health care coverage in Tunisia: Present euphoria and future challenges
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    - Kingdom of Morocco: Social Protection Note, Document of the World Bank, 2002
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    - Markus Loewe, Social Security in Egypt: An analysis and Agenda for policy reform, June 2002;
    http://www.erf.org.eg/html/blabor7.pdf

    - Ziad Abdel Samad, and Kinda Mohamadieh, MDGs in the Arab region: a tool and a challenge, Social Watch Annual report 2005; http://www.socialwatch.org/en/informeImpreso/informe2005.htm

    - Magdi Abdel Hamid , Egyptian Social watch report 2007;

    - Hazim Beblawi, “The Rentier State in the Arab World,” in eds. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, The Rentier State (London: Croom Helm, 1987),

  • A Case Study on Interaction between Emerging Regional Networking and Global Civil Society

    By Ziad Abdel Samad and Kinda Mohamadieh

    I. Formation of Conceptions behind Global Civil Society
    With the rise of the debates and studies around global civil society, there have been certain basic assumptions used for the explanation of this phenomenon which is becoming influential but also controversial. Many thoughts and positions tend to describe the formation, the role, and the impact of this global force. These efforts aim at exploring the potential of this force as a tool for mass mobilization and awareness, a space for exchange and elaboration of alternatives, and an agent for democratic change.
    Among other definitions, ‘global civil society is claimed to be the international transnational analogue of that which is called civil society in a settled domestic democratic society’ . Civil society institutions that are part of the social fabric of such a society are able to play the role of single-minded advocates- organizations with an axe to grind and a social mission to accomplish.
    In this line of thought, it can be noted that the progress of democratic systems and spaces has definitely took part in enhancing the role of civil society organizations. The flourishing of the global civil society concept and its realization is often linked to the democratization of the international system. Indeed, in the Global Civil Society report 2004/5, Anderson and Reiff went on to challenge the whole ideological rhetoric surrounding global civil society based on the claim that global civil society is stuck in a system that lacks democratic spaces.
    In addition, one of the main discourses explaining global civil society is the rise of processes of economic globalization with all its institutions, legislations, and transnational business bodies. In this context, global civil society is seen as a rising force to protect the rights and interests of the world’s peoples against the narrow interests of the international business community. It is worth noting that civil society has taken on different roles and types of mobilizations in this area. Protests and mass mobilization is the most visible strategy, especially when the street protests in Seattle and other cities contributed to the collapse of the multilateral negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO). But spaces for civil society participation are becoming increasingly available in the international institutions, events, and meetings. Civil society groups are increasingly taking on a consultative role with international institutions and are becoming more capable of addressing the details of highly complicated negotiations schemes, and even presenting and advising governments on alternative scenarios. The challenges remain in how to make these spaces as opportunities to influence economic globalization.
    In this context, global democratic governance is one of the main objectives and struggles of global civil society. Democratic governance is essential because it is core for enhancing sustainable development, social justice, and global peace. Global civil society actors struggle for democratic governance, which is based on fair and democratic participatory processes in the decision making of global institutions, and the implementation of their strategies, policies, and decisions. Yet democratic participatory processes necessitate equal and independent participation of national governments and civil society actors at the global level. Hence, the global civil society is supposed to support the national civil society to assure the national governments’ participation reflecting national interests.
    Based on the above, this article tends to relate some of these assumptions to the reality of civil society organizations in the Arab region, in a quest for explaining where Arab civil society groups stand from taking part in a rising global civil society. This in turn leads to explain some of the complexities and challenges that a regional networking process faced in the Arab region.
    Civil society in the Arab region; where does it stand from the emergence of Global Civil Society?
    The above chapter sheds the light on some obstacles and missing factors facing the emergence of a prosperous civil society in the Arab region; the latter being an added-value to global civil society processes.
    Among these obstacles are the following:
     The emergence and predominance of the strong state
     The limited space available for the emergence of civil society
     The nature of the priority challenges for civil society in the Arab region
     The kind of linkages to the international system and global governance dynamics
     Structural and contextual complexities with the role of Arab civil society groups
     Lack of common platforms

     The emergence and predominance of the strong state in a democracy deficit
    The democracy deficit in the Arab states have set high limitations on the progress of the role of civil society organizations, which have been struggling for their right to association and existence instead of developing an advocacy role for social change and development of rights-based policies. Moreover, the breakdown of the labor and popular movements, due to the economic decay abundant in the region, deprived all secular and progressive trends of the broad social support needed to construct vibrant and effective civil societies . This has contributed to the isolation of groups in the region from processes at the international level.
    It is worth noting that states in the Arab region are the result of a struggle against the colonial system which replaced the Ottoman Empire after World War I (WWI). This struggle took place during the period between WWI and WWII, leading to the creation of several independent states. This process was paralleled by the emergence of the new state of Israel. This reality that has caused instability in the region as a whole has had negative consequences. Indeed, instead of launching the efforts to empower the newly emerging nation states and invest in development, and social and economic justice, the main agenda of these emerging states was the national liberation as “the mission” to end the occupation in Palestine. Accordingly, there was justification for the rule of “the strong state”; this situation led to the emergence of one-party regimes, closer to be totalitarian and dictatorships, where the militarization of the state and security in its very narrow understanding were the dominating aspects.
    These emerging states largely restricted the role of local societies and forbid the emergence of independent civil society institutions, leading to limitations on forms of democratic participation. It is worth noting that, to a certain extent, Arab societies supported these regimes with the assumption that this was the way to achieve the people’s aspirations for economic growth, development and national liberation. Yet, the more the prevalent model of the Arab states failed in meeting the challenges - whether in accomplishing national liberation by ending the occupation of Palestine, or in achieving economic and social justice and development - the more they tended to limit freedoms and restrict democracy. (This was the case in several countries such as Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen)
    Where democracy lacks, there is a need for a more active role of civil society in the struggle to open more space for participation, change and respect of diversity and human rights. Consequently, the lack of democracy per se is an important agenda for the civil society to struggle against. Furthermore, the struggle for democracy encompasses a wider agenda including social and economic along with political and cultural challenges. Claiming space for participation brings along the test for presenting alternative visions and perspectives for change. This situation challenges civil society in the elaboration of alternatives or at least features for alternative policies and strategies.
    Moreover, the lack of democratic practices in Arab societies can be linked to the threats to national identity, deriving from:
     On the one hand, foreign occupation in Palestine and parts of other countries such as Syria, Egypt, Lebanon and the West Bank and Gaza in 1967; and the lack of security due to the fear from the Israeli expansionist tendencies reflected in the willingness to establish the “Greater Israel in the Middle East”
     On the other hand, the nationalistic tendencies that called to over-pass the belonging of a nation-state for a wider pan-Arab belonging across the region
    These two factors constituted a permanent feeling of threat to national security and national sovereignty in the Arab states.
    When analyzing the state of democracy in the region, it is also important to take into consideration the rise of “Islam as a solution”. Establishing Islamic regimes was denounced by the ruling elites and the popular mass due to the mistrust in the nature of the Islamic movements (Political Islam) and their objectives in the region. Consequently Islam and democracy are seen as two antagonistic paradigms.
    All of the above mentioned factors can also explain why the space for tolerance and respect for differences and diversity remains highly limited and tension-full, while clashes and even civil wars are prevalent in many Arab countries.
     Space for the emergence of civil society
    The theories of global civil society assume that civil society becomes the advocate for the people of the world in the time when transnational forces, whether economic or other, are taking advantage of the current erosion of national sovereignty and while global governance processes are still weak . This approach assumes availability of space for civil society’s role to rise while there is lack of state power on certain policy-making areas. However, in most of the Arab region, the role of the state has been dominating the policy-making scene and the issues behind sovereignty have been used at its worst , often exploited to protect regimes that oppress their own people.
    Earlier, the link between the tendency towards strengthening the power of the state and limiting the spaces for freedom and democracy was highlighted. Yet, empowering the state in the Arab region became a way to protect the narrow interests of the ruling elites instead of achieving the goals of sustainable development and social justice. The main agenda of these elites became their own safety and security instead of national security. This was always paralleled with a strong repression over civil society. In this context, the prevailing stream among civil society remained accommodating -and not challenging- the regimes in their struggle against foreign threats and those deriving from the emergence of religious tendencies, more specifically the Islamic movements.
    Consequently, the space available for civil society organizations in the Arab region is questioned; are civil society groups proactive in enhancing and gaining more space and influence in their societies or are they simply operating in the spaces made available to them by national governments? In light of this, are civil society groups moving away from mechanisms of enhancing democracy and democratic governance through linking up to citizenry while becoming an elitist force that is more accommodating to the states’ agenda than fighting for the priorities and justice of local communities?
    Moreover, national sovereignty as it is understood by the ruling regimes in the Arab region, led governments to accuse civil society organizations benefiting from foreign financial support of threatening national sovereignty. In this regard, the dominance of faith-based donations mainly directed to charitable programs and organizations weakened them and forced them to look for financial support and aid from foreign donors; the lack of grants provided by the public institutions to civil society groups is also a reason that contributed to their weakness.
    It is worth noting that weak civil society that is reliant on foreign aid will be more exposed to the threats of adopting and implementing the agenda of foreign donors that are not necessarily in compliance with the national agenda and priorities. This might be due to the lack of experience and knowledge about local sensitivities, traditions and realities. The danger around civil society organizations, from Southern and former communist-ruled countries, becoming monopolized by western-styled and western-funded NGOs have been debated in several articles . However, an aware and capable civil society empowered by a clear vision and concrete mission, strategies, and policies, with internal good governance, will be able to preserve focus on local priorities and resist any kind of foreign agenda.
     Priority challenges for civil society in the Arab region
    Arab governments have often tried to keep their people concerned with struggles around sovereignty and identity, while keeping social and economic concerns as a secondary priority. Although these anxieties have been shaping the international system, they have not been a priority to the region as a whole, including both governments and peoples. This is clearly reflected in the reports published by the international institutions, mainly the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program .
    Choices facing local civil society organizations became highly antagonistic; they question the identity, in its national, pan-Arab, and even Islamic dimensions. Other related strategic choices in the region include choices regarding the role of the state, the relation between the public and the private sectors in light of the transition from a dominant role of state to an open market economy. In addition there are some queries on the objectives of foreign investments and their contribution to the development process within the condition of the dominant rental and cliental economic model in most of the Arab countries
    Moreover, although, transnational economic powers have been invading the region as in other developing countries, civil society organizations in the Arab region are still not taking any significant role within the global movement struggling in that regards. Here, the lack of interlink between political, economic, social and cultural agendas in the region, and the dominance of the political discourse within the framework of a weak political movement, contributed to the weakening of the civil society organization’s role
    In this context, issues of peace and security remain the central challenges for the Arab civil society organizations. It often dominates other threats that are considered priority issues in other regions and are forming the basic grounds for common fights and missions that bring global civil society together.
    The Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which is at the core of peace, security, and stability concerns in the region, has become an identity forming issue and a religious challenge. Political motives particularly those related to the Palestinian national struggle provided the main impetus for mobilization in the Arab region of the anti-globalization movement and accordingly of global civil society .
    Moreover, the Iraqi problem started to rise as a conflict with a global dimension since the early nineties, with the beginning of the sanctions imposed by the United Nations on the country. Decades of sanctions led to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its occupation, which in turn became a source of an internal conflict threatening the stability of the whole region. This case was also another main topic raised by the Arab civil society, reflecting the unfairness, bias, and double standards of the international community when it comes to its role in the region.
    In fact, the participation of Arab organizations in the World Social Forums (WSF) is more focused around the Palestinian, and most recently the Iraqi causes, than any other issues; it is the issue they find themselves most concerned with and the easiest for them to relate through with organizations from other regions.
     Linkages to the international system and global governance dynamics
    People in the region have been frustrated with the current international order and double standards in the implementation of international laws, and see no space or capability in investing towards the change of this system. Accordingly, perceptions of global civil society in the Arab region are influenced by a sense of alienation which is rooted in the Arab relationships with the present international system .
    The invasion of Iraq raised another dimension of the problem related to the ability of foreign interference to change the reality in the region. This issue was always a subject of an internal debate among civil society. The challenge deriving from this dilemma was mainly among the need to use the foreign support in order to change powerful regimes controlling societies and the ability to conserve local agendas and priorities.

    It is worth noting that the global community has rushed to push initiatives concerning political changes in the region in response to the rise of violent tendencies in several Arab countries, which have been linked to the rise of terrorism globally. However, the main reason for these violent tendencies is directly related to peace and security, the double standards in implementing international laws, and the degraded social and economic realities. The international community interfered through launching the so called “war on terror” as a strategic military choice, marginalizing other types of interventions tackling the root causes of terrorism. This in turn strengthened violent tendencies and marginalized the capacities of local societies, particularly civil society organizations and social movements, and limited their potentialities to be effective actors in deterring violence.

     Structural and contextual complexities with the rise of the role of civil society groups in the Arab region

    Civil society in the Arab region is referred to as the “indigenous sector” (Kandil 1994). The use of this terminology reflects the nature of societal relations, which is dominated by tribal, clan, family and religious ties and links. In several Arab countries, these relations are more important than the relation of the citizen to the state . Besides being a main contributor to the production of “social capital,” which is those bonds of trust and reciprocity that have been found to be critical preconditions for democracy and economic growth , civil society organizations are also a result of a healthy relationship among communities and between them and the state.

    In the Arab societies, there is a weakness of the notion of citizenship. Accordingly, we witness that the third sector (civil society) in the region is dominated by welfare and charitable understandings, and is mainly involved in service provision and social assistance and welfare. The focus on services’ provision and the lack of a flourished role in advocacy limits the capacities of civil society organizations in the region to take part in social change and policy-influencing dynamics.

    This could explain why many global campaigns often lack contacts and effective counterparts in the Arab region. The sector suffers increasing limitations put on non-governmental organizations, lack of emergence of effective social movements including peasants, students, and women movements, in addition to neutralization of the role of unions which are being co-opted by the government.

    Moreover, the inconsistency of development processes and lack of development policies in the Arab countries, in addition to the impact of war and instability on those processes, is a challenge facing the consistency of the work of civil society organizations in the region. In addition, the lack of a democratic culture among civil society organizations themselves, due to structural problems in the emergence, vision, and mission of these groups, forms an obstacle for their civic efforts to bring greater democracy and participation to society at large .
     Common issues, debatable conceptions, and lack of common platforms
    The rise of global civil society is built around having common interests, fights, goals, and messages in addition to global forums at which leaders develop shared social agendas. Yet in the Arab region, civil society remains weak on creating national and regional common platforms which necessarily limits their ability to take an active part in global platforms.
    Among other issues, religion is a dividing issue among civil society in the region. Since the failure of the liberal and socialist projects in the last century in accomplishing independence and establishing the modern nation–state in the Arab region, religious tendencies and movements have risen as alternative providers of change and social justice. Yet, the role of religion and its relation with the state and civil society remain an issue of debate and often divide as mentioned earlier. This is a major debate in the current spheres of civil society institutions and is increasingly creating an obstacle for the emergence of a more coherent and effective role for civil society institutions in the Arab region.
    In the new paradigm of global civil society, the religious dimensions are discussed as genuine variables. The fact that religious actors are present in the global arena including the World Social Forum confirms that the ‘religious’ can no longer remain rigidly contrasted with the ‘civil’ .
    In the Arab region, religious tendencies are diversified with a wide range of agendas. Some of them recognize the democratic political processes as ways for change. Even though many of them are involved in the political process in several countries of the region, they do not hide their willingness to establish the Islamic system as a solution. Thus, they struggle for the Islamic system which is not seen by many other actors among civil society organizations as a democratic system that could lead to constructive and substantial participation. Moreover, many of these tendencies believe that violence is a way for change, which can explain the military clashes and conflicts in several countries. (Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Sudan, Somalia, Iraq and most recently in Tunisia)
    On the issue of democracy, many nationalistic tendencies, some of them with leftist backgrounds, are not convinced with the western model of democracy that is currently being pushed into the region through various reform initiatives. These stands lead them to reject any form of partnership and coordination with foreign actors. It also leads them to accuse any calls for democracy of holding foreign agendas and supporting foreign interferences. Although these nationalistic forces are secular, however they do not mind partnering with the existing Islamic groups in their struggle against what they refer to as “colonial and hegemonic western tendencies”. It is worth noting that both, Islamic and nationalistic tendencies are the dominant forces among the Arab civil society.
    This was obvious throughout the experience and efforts to organize the Arab Social Forum. In fact these efforts were strongly restricted due to the above mentioned antagonistic and complicated tendencies among civil society. Diversity could be a factor of strength and richness to the process of organizing the social forum, yet the lack of experience and mainly the lack of tolerance among Arab civil society organizations was behind the inability to manage these differences. The inability to accept differences and to launch a public debate about strategic choices is a factor preventing the strengthening of social capital and the rise of social movements in many Arab countries.
    An important area for future examination would be how different global agents negotiate across the secular-religious divide and how they achieve an overlapping consensus. Together with clashes in cultural understandings and perceptions, these questions and divides are increasing worldwide. However, does this negatively impact the rise of the processes of global civil society or does it strengthen it? Answers to this question could shed light on commonalities and differences among trends of global and Arab civil societies.
    Regarding the global level, there is a claim that assumes that civil society organizations in the Arab region lack common interests and threats with international groups, thus causing a limited participation of the former in global civil society dynamics. However, the anti-war movement rallied behind causes that originate from the struggle of people’s of the region, whether in Iraq, Palestine, or Sudan. Considering that, we ought to question whether Arab civil society groups’ role, contribution, and leadership in this movement was limited due to the lack of common interests or due to other structural limitations stemming from the nature of the civil society groups themselves, including their vision, policies, strategies, and work mechanisms used.
    This leads to another very important question regarding the relation between resistance, armed struggle, and the anti-war movement. This question is not only shaping the global anti war movement but it is strongly dividing the Arab civil society. It is worth noting in this regard that the resistance against foreign occupation is legitimate and approved as a non-contested right of people to self determination. But the question is what do we understand by foreign occupation? Is the Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza considered foreign occupation, but not in the 1948 territories? What concept can be used to justify this reason? Is it the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181; issued in November 29, 1947? Can the Palestinians recognize the State of Israel without being recognized by Israel as an independent and sovereign state themselves? Are the multinational forces in Afghanistan not considered as foreign occupation because their presence was justified by a UN Security Council resolution, which deprive the Afghani people from their right to resist? Isn’t the presence of the American army and its allies in Iraq foreign occupation? Whatever, does the struggle against foreign occupation justify targeting civilians and civil objectives? Does fighting foreign occupation mean targeting all political and economic interests around the world, which explain the 9/11 attacks beside others in Saudi Arabia and Egypt and else where? All these are questions that often divide civil society in the Arab region.
    We can conclude that a combination of factors influence the prosperity of civil society in the Arab region as a force that can actively be part in a rising global process ; this includes the lack of democracy, the lack of an adequate legal framework, restrictions imposed by the ruling regimes and the highly centralized systems, in addition to restrictions stemming from cultural and social realities all. Moreover the very low indicators of development, the prevalence of illiteracy, the lack of communication and transportation contributes to the weakening of civil society and lack of progress on developing and empowering its role for change.
    The above mentioned challenges highly affect the environment where the Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND) operates; the following are the main strategies that ANND is undertaking in order to face these challenges and to enable civil society to improve its role and to increase its impact in the regional and global policy making scene?
    In the following part of this paper, we will try to go through the role and the activities of ANND in the region and at the global level in trying to respond to some of the challenges explained above.
    II. The Experience of ANND; networking in the Arab region
    The previous chapter clearly underlined how a combination of factors hinder Arab civil society organizations from joining the rising trends of global civil society, from developing goals, building networks, and proposing strategies for common work among organizations in the Arab region itself. This reality reflects itself in the daily work on any networking initiative that emerges in the region.
    Often Arab groups lack a coherent and organized participation in international affairs and summits; this can be obviously the result of the following three reasons:
    - First, the numbers of participants are limited; this is due to many factors including limited financial capacities as well as the limited interests and lack of experience and knowledge
    - Second, competition often deters coordination among them, which is due to the antagonistic positions on several issues in addition to the lack of tolerance and the lack of democratic culture and practices
    - Third, their positions remain on the passive front with no clear, targeted, and aggressive change agenda.
    This can also be clearly reflected in the limited numbers of Arab organizations with consultative status with international agencies, such as the United Nations Economic and Social Commission among others.
    In fact, the initiative behind the establishment of the ANND was taken in light of the preparations for the 1995 Summit on Social Development. Given the lack of coordination among Arab groups participating in the Summit, and the inability to take active stands in regards to the agenda of the Summit, a group of Lebanese and Tunisian organizations initiated a coordination process that ended up with a consensus on the need for a consistent coordination body to emerge in the region.
    ANND is a regional network that aims at letting the voice of Arab civil society organizations be heard at the international foras, enhancing mobilization of civil society both regionally and internationally, thus presenting more space for coalition-building and coordination, such as is the case through the WSF and the Euro-Mediterranean Civil Forum. Moreover, there has been increasing attention towards the Arab region in general, specifically concerning issues of democracy and reforms, human rights including the rights of women, the participation of civil society, and solidarity campaigns especially with Iraq and Palestine. These create additional spaces for civil society to influence policy-making. In this context, ANND perceives that the increase of spaces with the rise of global civil society could offer a brilliant opportunity for the voicing of Arab protests against injustices seen to be inflicted upon the Arab region by the present international system .
    ANND thus used such opportunities to empower and enhance the participation of Arab civil society organizations. This was not only by supporting their participation in global foras, but also in bringing global civil society to the region through organizing various kinds of events and mobilizations. For example, ANND organized the Global Forum on Trade and Globalizaton in 2001 in preparation for the fourth WTO Ministerial Meeting held in Doha in 2001, the General Assembly of the Social Watch in 2003, and the Global Meeting of the Global Call to Action against Poverty in 2006. In addition, ANND supported the organization of the Moroccan Social Forum in Rabat, Morocco in 2004.
    All these events and occasions contributed to enhancing and empowering the participation of civil society organizations from the Arab region in the global arena.
    III. Cases of ANND’s involvements at the global level
    ANND is benefiting from its active participation in global networks, which opens opportunities to exchange experiences and to expand the learning processes. ANND is a proactive member of several international networks, where it aims at shedding the light and bringing the attention to the challenges in the Arab region, with a particular focus on the role of civil society and the difficulties it faces.
    ANND is strategically involved in Social Watch, a global network advocating for issues related to development and monitoring the implementation of the UN commitments and goals. ANND actively contributes to the yearly report issued by Social Watch, both at the national and global levels. ANND also translates the global report into Arabic in order to make the information available and to encourage civil society groups to use it as a tool for advocacy campaigns. The process of preparing national reports and the dissemination of the global report in the different countries of the region is a tool to engage additional groups and to raise their awareness on developmental issues and challenges.
    ANND is also a member of Civicus; World Alliance for Citizen’s Participation, which contributes to the empowerment of civil society by working on the Civil Society Index and the Civil Society Watch Report. ANND sees in these programs important tools to strengthen Arab civil society and support their struggle for their rights and freedom. Enhancing the participation of additional Arab groups in the world assemblies organized by Civicus is another strategy adopted by ANND in order to strengthen the global engagement of the Arab civil society.
    The WSF is another space where ANND carries the challenges of the Arab region and Arab civil society, and shares it with other partners and colleagues from around the world. The WSF can be also a forum for mobilizing more solidarity and a very important learning process to bring along knowledge and sharing of experiences.
    As mentioned above, ANND succeeded in organizing a Global Forum on Globalization and Trade in 2001, with the support of the Our World Is Not for Sale, which is a global network that challenges trade and investment paradigms that threatens the interests of the people and the environment. This Forum contributed to enhance the debate around the World Trade Organization and other trade agreements in the Arab region and increased the engagement of civil society organizations with this highly important and challenging topic. ANND is still active in this network and tries to create an interactive debate on trade issues among Arab civil society in a process of advocacy and lobbying on the Arab governments.
    ANND acts as a regional focal point for the Global Call to Action against Poverty (GCAP). It succeeded to mobilize civil society in several countries and supported the establishment of national coalitions actively working on issues related to poverty eradication strategies. Two GCAP regional meetings (May 2005 in Cairo and August 2006 in Khartoum) and another global meeting (March 2006 in Beirut) were organized by ANND. These meetings contributed to enhancing the participation of organizations in the Call, and highlighted the potential power of the civil society in the Arab region.
    An additional role of ANND is to participate in the Millennium Campaign by promoting the Millennium Development Goals and involving Arab civil society groups in the efforts to monitor and push for the achievement of these goals. Civil society in the Arab region is a potential partner to meet the challenges of development, but this needs the empowerment of civil society organizations and the elaboration of a civil society agenda. That’s what ANND is trying to contribute to work on through the participation in the GCAP and the Millennium Campaign.
    The Euro-Mediterranean NGO Platform is another fora where ANND contributed to enhance and expand the participation of civil society organizations from several Arab countries. There is now an ongoing active debate tackling the New European Neighborhood Policy through the Euro-med NGO platforms that have been initiated in various countries of the Mediterranean. The three dimensions of Barcelona process; (1) political (peace and security and democracy and human rights), (2) economic (bilateral agreements and free trade zone) and (3) cultural (cultural exchange and dialogue) make of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership an opportunity for the Arab civil society, particularly in the involved country, to work on a comprehensive agenda in relation to the interlink among these three challenging dimensions. ANND thus sees the Euro-Mediterranean Civil Platform as a space for a real exchange among societies on concrete issues and topics. Through its engagement in the platform, ANND aims at promoting the participation of the Arab civil society and facilitate shaping the future of the partnership.
    ANND consistently works on developing an interactive website that can contribute to providing Arab civil society with the needed resources and information. A website that facilitates the exchange of ideas and experiences among various civil society groups within and outside the region. ANND perceives a necessity in using all available resources, including information and communication technologies, to improve the performance and productivity of civil society. This can help the latter to enrich its experience and improve the outreach to groups with minimum time and efforts. It also contributes to elaborating a strategy for the use of information and communication technologies for the purposes of development.
    IV. Analyzing the obstacles: Where do they lie?
    The lack of national policies in many areas in the first place and the lack of trust in the ability to affect policies due to undemocratic political systems and regimes lead civil society organizations in the Arab region to de-trust advocacy and policy-oriented work and invest in direct service provision where outcomes tend to be more tangible on the quantitative side.
    On the other hand, there is a strong polarization of perspectives on key issues within the Arab societies and especially concerning issues of reform and democratization as well as the role of religion. Yet, an emerging paradox is evident with the accusations to local civil society groups of holding foreign agendas when they struggle for more space for an effective political participation, and they advocate reforms and human rights. Democracy and human rights are seen by some civil society groups as a product of globalization and therefore are rejected. Accordingly, the severe opposition in perspectives on these issues, especially the factor of foreign interference and the position from dealing with resistance and occupation, as explained earlier in this paper, increase the division between organizations and limit cooperation and partnerships.
    This reality feeds into increasing the artificial space available to civil society mobilization in the region. Not only do states put limitations on the space available to public participation and make it look very formal, but also civil society organizations are often taking positions that do not support an increase in dialogue and negotiations. On the contrary, it put more pressure on democratic debates . This is mainly the result of the mistrust between the state and the society and the fear of civil society organizations from being co-opted and thus loosing their independence and freedom to maneuver.
    In many countries, engaging civil society in negotiations and dialogue with the government is highly criticized and seen as a cooption and dominance by the government over the society. In many other countries, the rejection of participation is from both sides, the government wants to set the frames and the rules of the participation, but also the civil society organizations are in turn negatively responding to this participation. This raises another question about the understanding of the role of civil society organizations and the ways of achieving effective engagement leading to positive change.
    The main issue in this regard is the need for the elaboration of a clear vision with alternatives. This will be followed by the creation of national coalitions able to conduct internal open debate on various issues and topics leading to the elaboration of an alternative agenda. Then advocacy campaigns and lobbying can be organized using different means and tools, including also negotiations and active participation and engagement.
    The main question revolves around the ability of civil society organizations in the Arab region to actually engage in suggesting alternatives, especially when they are faced with so limited space of maneuver and work on the national as well as regional level. In this regards, it is important to see the rise of global civil society as an additional support and space for their causes.
    The more internet use and information sharing, in addition to spill-over from issues of the Arab region on the international politics, the more will civil society groups from the region address global linkages of issues they work on and link up with other actors at the global level.
    Accordingly, with the realization of new threats as priority areas of work, new trends of work and networking will be emerging. Moreover, the more civil society organizations in the Arab region realize certain international threats as priority over regional and national problems, the more common platforms and strategies will be shared with global civil lead society. In this process, it is important to work towards limiting the tendency for competition while enhancing the culture of partnership, networking, and fostering complementarities.
    This interaction between civil society in the Arab region and that at the global level contributes to enlarge the former’s vision on various issues and facilitate the adoption of a more comprehensive approach to face the challenges and the threats facing the region.

    V. Conclusion
    ANND is aware of the above mentioned objective and subjective challenges that civil society in the Arab countries is facing. Its regional agenda is therefore aiming at empowering civil society and highlighting the need to engage a proactive agenda with a clear perspective for change.
    Although reform agendas debated by the Arab governments and adopted by some of the Arab civil society groups, particularly human rights organizations, is more focused on the political reforms, which is important and is definitely a priority, this should not distract civil society organization from working on economic, social and cultural reforms in parallel to the political ones.
    Consequently, ANND adopted advocacy around social and economic rights as a main strategy. It is also committed to work on governance issues and the follow-up of the implementation of related declarations and statements issued during the UN summits. ANND focuses on the commitments undertaken by the Arab governments to improve the social and economic conditions of the people of the region.
    ANND is aware that free trade policies and agreements affect the ability of governments to implement fair and just development strategies and policies. Accordingly ANND focuses on the social and economic impacts of the trade liberalization policies and various related agreements, particularly those undertaken within the framework of the World Trade Organization, the free trade agreements with the United States, the bilateral agreements with the European Union and the Pan-Arab free trade agreements.
    In this context, ANND consistently invests in the creation of national and regional coalitions around specific topics in order to implement advocacy campaigns on the abovementioned priorities. In the quest of strengthening this campaigning, ANND believes there is a necessity to establish civil society resource centers and think tanks with strong global relations and exchange. ANND invests efforts in that direction in order to further contribute to exchanging and engaging with various global experiences and networks.

  • Foreign Aid and the National Reform Agenda - The case of Lebanon

    Ziad ABdel Samad

    Lebanon witnessed a 15 year civil war (1975-1990) that caused massive physical destruction and huge human losses. During the post war reconstruction period (1990-2007), Lebanon became a highly indebted country, whereby debt currently constitutes almost 200% of the GDP.
    Since September 2004 Lebanon is witnessing an ongoing deep structural and political crisis. In July 2006, Israel launched a war against Lebanon causing huge direct and indirect losses estimated to reach over 9 billion US dollars.
    The donor community convened in “Paris III Conference” during early 2007 and pledged more than 7.6 billion US dollars to support Lebanon realizing three main objectives: (1) to provide direct support for the post war reconstruction plan, (2) to secure cash for the due debt services and (3) to cover the budgetary deficit. A new reform program was promised by the government in return to these pledges; it includes significant economic and structural reform including privatization, tax increases, labor law reform, and reforms to the social security system. This program was the result of national public efforts supported by a World Bank team. The International Monetary Fund was delegated to monitor the implementation of the reform process and the multinational Booz Allen Hamilton was contracted to provide technical assistance to the public administration and oversee the coordination of efforts within the reform process. These evidences show how obvious and important is the role of the international institutions.
    In exchange, Lebanon pledged to increase growth rate by promoting foreign investment and enhancing competiveness. This implies the integration of Lebanon in the global economic system and the promotion of trade liberalization. Unlikely this is perceived as a target in itself instead of being understood as a factor towards enhancing development, thus adopting it within the framework of a national developmental strategy.
    In order to reduce the budgetary deficit, the government tends to increase public revenues by reforming the tax policy, mainly based on increasing the VAT. This is because Lebanon adopted a new tariff rate in the year 2000 which halved custom revenue. Unfortunately, these law tariff rates (mostly ranging between 5% and 10%) were adopted as well under Lebanon’s obligations in its accession package to the World Trade Organization.
    On the other hand, the government is working towards privatizing two major sectors in the near future: communications and power. The main objectives of this privatization are: (1) to secure cash flow to pay the due debt services, (2) to overcome the inefficiency of the public administration and (3) to enhance competitiveness. Hence, privatization cannot reach these targets under the circumstances of the country.
    The social action plan proposed within the reform process is focused on safety nets programs aiming at alleviating the negative social impact of the reform agenda especially during the transition period between the application of the reform agenda and its “promised positive” effects.
    Lebanon can serve as a clear case study where aid is interlinked to the reform agenda which is not necessarily the result of a dialogue reflecting national priorities but it is a strategy serving the donors vision.

  • Civil Society in the Arab Region: Its Necessary Role and the Obstacles to Fulfillment

    By Ziad Abdel Samad

    Preface

    Civil society in the Arab region today is weak. Can this weakness be attributed to badly formulated laws governing the civil society sector, or is it due to structural flaws in Arab civil society organizations (CSOs)? If it is the latter, have these flaws resulted in poor strategies and insufficient capacities to respond to the challenges facing the region?

    A culture of charity prevails in Arab societies, in part because charitable giving to the poor is one of the five pillars of Islam. Charitable giving is placed at the same level as the other four pillars: faith, prayer, fasting for self-purification during Ramadan, and, for those who are able, pilgrimage to Mecca. Given the social importance of charitable donation, why is civil society as weak as it is in Arab countries?

    This paper seeks to explore the reasons that civil society in the Arab region has not fulfilled its potential. It analyzes the objective barriers limiting CSOs’ abilities to increase their impact and improve their roles in society.

    The culturally embedded value of charitable giving may not be sufficient to create a thriving CSO sector, just as lack of development in the region is not the only reason why the sector is as weak as it is. This paper considers other objective barriers limiting CSOs’ abilities to increase their impact and improve society. These other factors may be external, such as lack of democracy, inadequate legal framework, or other restrictions imposed by the ruling regimes. Similarly, there may be relevant restrictions stemming from cultural and social realities. Or there may be internal limitations that result from poor organizational vision, policies and strategies, as well as from a lack of human and financial resources, sustainable or reliable funding, and access to information.

    This paper incorporates new research that evaluates the results and effectiveness of CSOs in eight Arab countries. Section I establishes the definitions and CSO sector classifications used throughout this paper; Section II provides an overview of external and internal issues pertinent to CSOs in the Arab region; Section III focuses on the results of the survey; Section IV presents case studies of Lebanon and Palestine to illustrate how the obstacles identified in this paper have shaped civil society in each country, and Section V offers proposals and solutions.

    Although more in-depth analysis and follow up is needed, the results of the research give a clearer idea about the real factors affecting the role of CSOs in Arab countries. The research is therefore useful in setting priorities for interventions aimed at empowering CSOs and increasing their effectiveness and efficiency. These priorities necessarily vary to a certain extent from one country to another according to specific local factors and challenges.

    Acknowledgments

    This research was mainly supported by the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law. While the author was a fellow in Washington, DC, President Douglas Rutzen and Program Director Catherine Shea provided extensive support. A special thanks to Kareem Elbayar, Civil Society Legal Intern at ICNL, who served as a research assistant during the period of my work at the ICNL offices, and to Office Manager Sylvia Staggs for her logistical support. Thanks also to Wafa Yassir, to Ziad Majed, to Natasha Shawarib who provided great support. I would also like to thank Program Manager Kinda Mohamadieh, Program Coordinator Cynthia Abi Rashed and Executive Secretary Hanan Younis of the Arab NGO Network for Development. They helped in conducting the survey and analyzing the data. Finally, special thanks to all our colleagues from the twenty-five NGOs that completed the questionnaires and sent them back on time.

    Ziad Abdel Samad
    Washington, DC, May 2006

    I. The Definition, Classification and Role of Civil Society in the Arab Region

    A definition of the CSO sector is important in order to find the commonalities in the sector. The definition should be flexible enough to encompass the changing nature of a non-profit sector that is linked to changing market and state forces, allowing an increase in popular understanding of this sector and its role in the process of enhancing democratization. Similarly, a classification is needed in order to shed light on the differences between CSOs. Together, definition and classification permit an improved understanding of the various types and roles of the entities forming the third sector and the challenges that they are facing. This task is necessary for an evaluation of the role of the sector and the legal systems that govern it.

    It is commonly agreed that all forms of structures that do not belong to the state or to the market are considered CSOs. These structures include non-governmental non-profit organizations, including welfare, charitable, developmental, and environmental organizations. They may be professional and worker’s trade unions, farmer and peasant groups, or social movements that reflect the needs of groups such as youth, students and women. According to some researchers, they may include political organizations and parties. The CSO sector historically provided social services; it now also operates in the realm of societal development and sometimes national strategies and structures.

    Turning first to the question of a definition, in the cross-national analysis presented in the Johns Hopkins University Non-Profit Sector Series, Salamon and Anheier (2004) take on the challenge of clearly defining the non-profit sector. They consider definitions from four different perspectives of legal, economic, functional, and structural/operational. Salamon and Anheier (1997) argue convincingly for an approach based on considerations of structure and operation, and encompassing indicators related to the organization’s relation to government, distribution of profit, governance, and participation. Specifically, this definition looks at the level of institutionalization of the organization, either through the formal incorporation charter or through the regularity of their structured work. It looks at the separation of the organization from government, although government support, funding, and participation are included in permitted kinds of relations with government. It also looks at the distribution of profits of the organization, its governance structure (particularly its ability to control its own activities) and whether participation is voluntary.

    The use of the structural-operational definition of civil society serves well across nations, including developing societies where the role of the state and the private sector are unstable and the surrounding context is highly politicized, such as the situation in many Arab countries. This definition helps cover the gaps of a narrow legal definition that cannot encompass the diversity and continuously changing nature of the third sector, and which is highly influenced by the changing role of the state and that of the private sector.

    Civil society is situated between state and market, monitoring their powers and roles to assure a balance between them. However, especially in developing countries, it is important to consider the family as a third border to civil society (Anheier 2004), distinguishing between civil society and tribal or religious society. This issue raises additional challenges in defining civil society in developing countries such as those of the Arab region. Structures built on family relations, i.e., tribal, clan, and religious considerations, are not considered civil society. Accordingly, as civil society is expected to monitor the power of the state and market, it also has the potential to observe tribal and clan relations in order to assure balance among market, state, and family.

    Within the Arab region, civil society is referred to as the “indigenous sector” (Kandil 1994). The use of this terminology reflects the intertwining of the CSO sector and societal relations, which are dominated by tribal, clan, family and religious ties. In several Arab countries, societal relations are more important than the relation of the citizen to the state. This stems from the weakness of the notion of citizenship in Arab societies.

    Moreover, the CSO sector in the Arab region is dominated by welfare and charitable concepts, and is primarily involved in service provision and social assistance and welfare. The structural-operational definition successfully includes the indigenous sector as well as other “borderline” cases of civil society groups, which are abundant in developing countries due to factors such as vague relations with the government or to unclear fundraising systems and funding sources.

    Regrettably, in no case does the law governing CSOs in the Arab region take these elements into consideration. All organizations, even if they are purely ad hoc and temporary, could be considered the same under the law when applying for registration; currently, for example, no distinction is made between grant-making foundations and charities that provide services. In short, governments in the Arab region have not considered the CSO sector from an analytical point of view when creating legal structures, which has been an obstacle to the sector’s development.

    In addition to an appropriate and fitting definition, a classification system is required to analyze the variety of types of organizations. In the study of civil society organizations, the definition alone does not present an adequate tool for explaining the role and development of the sector. Civil society organizations are not homogeneous, and often countries enact different laws for different types of organizations with different references in public administration . In creating a classification system, the legal framework is often limited by what the state considers non-profit organizations, which often does not cover many of the structures and entities functioning as non-governmental organizations. For example, at the present time, human rights organizations in Egypt are not allowed to be freely registered as NGOs. Thus, identifying the various classes of organizations may help in determining the appropriate legal framework to regulate their relations with the state and the market. Additional elements worth considering when designing the legal framework of civil society within a country are the structure of the organization, its relationship to the government, its financial structure, its governance and operation, and its contribution to enhancing social capital.

    The role of civil society is growing internationally as a result of the decreasing ability of the state to provide services and assure social justice. In addition, contemporary societies are witnessing the development of social capital, increased interaction between people internationally, and increased awareness and tools for the protection of human rights. The CSO sector often steps in to fill the gaps in these areas, and is often paid to do so by governments. This is a privatization of welfare, developmental, and environmental services of sorts; it certainly promotes public-private partnership and may serve as a middle way between giving primacy to the market or asking the state for a greater role (Anheier 2004). For a variety of reasons, civil society in the Arab region has not realized this potential. However, Arab CSO leaders have been engaged in a debate about the relationship between civil society and the state. Some activists claim that a relationship with the government is irrelevant, while for many others, the value of this relationship is not so self-evident. In addition to the question of relevancy, there is the question of appropriateness. The view of this factor often varies according to the type of CSO. For example, service-delivery CSOs might find coordination with appropriate government agencies to be necessary part of doing business while advocacy CSOs might reasonably believe that cooperation with the state will undermine the goals of the organization.

    We are now equipped with the structural/operational definition of CSOs, with a sense of the scope of organizations that should be included in a classification system, and with a general concept of the role of civil society in the Arab region. Other issues specific to the region have been highlighted; namely, the strength of family, tribe and clan and the importance of including cultural and religious dimensions in understanding possible reasons for the weakness of the CSO sector in contemporary Arab countries. Next, we turn to an overview of the key external and internal obstacles faced by CSOs in the region.

    II. Civil Society in the Arab World: External and Internal Obstacles

    The obstacles faced by the CSO sector in the Arab region can be divided into two categories. The first are the external obstacles, some of which affect society as a whole, while others are more specific to the CSO sector. Second are the internal obstacles, those that may pose challenges for CSOs from within the organizations themselves.

    External Obstacles Facing the Arab Region

    The Arab region faces many challenges affecting its overall developmental process. These challenges are political, economic and social in nature. Globalization, a complicated phenomenon, has various expressions that are clearly reflected in the region – from militarization in all its forms to economic, social, and environmental challenges, in addition to challenges resulting from cultural and religious diversity and extremism.

    Additional external obstacles are peculiar to specific Arab countries, and include various problems that arise from the legal system and lack of rule of law. These types of obstacles include not only deficiencies in the laws themselves, but also additional dimensions and challenges that must be considered when drafting laws for the CSO sector. Among these dimensions, many can be mentioned such as the complexity of societal relations, the political environment, the level of development, the concentration of power, the behaviors of this power regime vis-à-vis CSOs, etc. It is thus assumed that the legal system is not the only obstacle to the development of civil society, and the law must take into consideration many other dimensions in order to ensure an enabling environment for civil society.

    In order to have a comprehensive picture of the regional context, both types of external obstacles – those that are of a political, economic, or social nature, and those that arise in connection with a particular country’s legal system – are considered below.

    Political, Economic, and Social Obstacles
    1. Militarization – Problems of Peace and Security

    The Middle East has become a synonym for crisis and conflict. The causes are diverse but a lack of security and societal instability is the common result. Militarization is primarily a result of foreign occupation in violation of international laws and conventions. An example of this situation is Palestine, where many UN resolutions have been violated for decades while the international community is unable to put an end to the conflict. More recently, we have seen this problem in Iraq, where the 2003 invasion undermined the decisions of the UN Security Council and the principles of international law. Moreover, the so called “war on terror” is not a war but a doctrine with unforeseen consequences: it is enhancing extremism and violence instead of achieving stability and tolerance.

    Problems from militarization are also a result of various internal conflicts, as in Sudan, Algeria, and Western Sahara. A prominent example is the growing tension in the countries of the Arabian Gulf, particularly Yemen, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. There, radical Islamic movements and sympathies are on the rise, largely as a response to the humiliation caused by the double standards in the implementation of the international laws, the foreign military occupation and the military bases established in the region. These tensions of course are added to the socio-economic and political challenges that these societies face.
    2. The Political Context – The Need to Introduce Radical Political Reforms

    It is well known that most of the Arab regimes are undemocratic and some are totalitarian. The lack of sound public institutions, the absence of legislatures, the permanent violations of constitutional laws where they exist, and judicial systems weakened by the interference of the political branches are the main characteristics shaping the regional political context. The absence of rule of law is another major problem. In most Arab countries, the state controls civil and political rights, and political and civil society organizations are heavily restricted. It is worth noting that elections are highly controlled and manipulated by the state through undemocratic electoral laws and regulations. Moreover, the reform agenda is creating high levels of internal tension because of the external influence and interference in the processes.
    3. The Socio-Economic Context – Low Human Development Indicators

    The higher the level of development in a society, the more likely it is that civil society is active (Salamon and Anheier 1997). This is due to the increased role of the middle class, which supports the promotion of voluntary initiatives and the establishment of civil society organizations. Arguably the level of urbanization may also promote the rise of the non-profit sector because of the prominent role played by middle-class professionals. Communications technology can also be a key factor in the progress of the non-profit sector; for example, as rural and poor urban populations are exposed to telecommunications, they may be released from their traditional ties and relations and therefore build affiliations to new groups such as civil society organizations. There is thus a direct relation between the development of the communications sector and the development of the non-profit sector (Salamon and Anheier 1997).

    Human, economic and social development indicators show that the Arab region is one of the worst in the world on the development front. (See Arab Human Development Report (AHDR), issued by the United Nations Development Program; Millennium Development Goals Report (MDGR) for the Arab Region issued by the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia in 2005). According to the MDGR, the proportion of people living on less than $2 per day per person is 31.5 percent in countries in the Middle East and North Africa; moreover 23.6 percent of the population of the region is deprived of basic health and education services and a decent standard of living. The 2002 AHDR indicated three main contributing factors -- deficits in women’s empowerment, freedom, and in human capacities and knowledge relative to income. Illiteracy is another of the major challenges highlighted by the AHDR. The number of illiterate people is still increasing, to the extent that Arab countries embark upon the twenty first century burdened by over 60 million illiterate adults, the majority of whom are women.

    In addition, the AHDR found a low level of prevalence and use of information technology and communications, and that a small percentage of the population has access to communications. This is due to many factors, the most important of which is the underdeveloped infrastructure. Moreover, Arab states have imposed restrictions and censorship on individual freedoms, including the right to free expression and to access to information.

    Underdevelopment in the Arab region has thus led to a weak middle class and poor access to communications and information. Without these two key underpinnings, civil society in the Arab region is understandably less effective than it might be.
    4. Culture and Religion

    In societies with high levels of instability and insecurity, individuals tend to rely on their clans, tribes, and religions and other types of indigenous or ethnic structures. Clan, tribal, and religious affiliations become stronger when the state fails to provide essential security. These primitive relations distort the formation of civil society, and highjack the concept of citizenship. Instead of strengthening social capital, this phenomenon creates a kind of clan and ethnic group mentality that prevents coordinated action. Indeed, in many Arab countries, these tribal, ethnic or confessional relations are stronger than the structures of the state and the local authorities.

    Moreover, there is a pressing need for cultural reforms, particularly related to religious discourse in the region. Reforms should tackle, among other issues, educational systems and relations between religion and the state. In fact, within the complicated Arab context, many initiatives are being launched for democratization of the region. The European Union initiated the first of these in 1995: the “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.” In 2004, during the G8 summit in Sea Island, Georgia, another initiative was launched -- the “Broader Middle East Partnership for the Future.” These two efforts join the many regional Arab reform initiatives launched in recent years, the most important of which is the declaration issued by the Summit of the League of the Arab States held in 2004 in Tunisia. Such initiatives stress the role of civil society and its participation in the process of societal reform and democratization. It is a crucial moment in the evolution of civil society in the Arab region with the hope that it can become enabled to be a real partner in the process of democratization, which is a prerequisite for its achievement and sustainability.

    Obstacles Related to Legal Systems

    5. The Legal System and Governance Structures

    Enhancing the role of the third sector and its effectiveness depends on several interrelated factors. The most important among them is the legal system, the primary goal of which, in relation to CSOs, should be to regulate the relations between organizations and the state. The legal system is a set of rules and regulations mainly directed to protect individual and public freedoms from any threat or violation. Ideally, legislation should be in accordance with international declarations of human rights, and developed in dialogue with local civil society. CSO law, as any other law, should clarify the rights and the obligations of all concerned parties.

    However, in Arab countries across the board, legal structures governing CSOs are often poorly crafted or administered. One ambiguity is that the same law often rules different forms of registered associations without being tailored to the variety of objectives that exist. Effective laws for CSOs will provide a framework for good governance, systems of accountability, and public transparency.

    As discussed earlier, in many Arab countries, tribal, ethnic or confessional relations are stronger than the structures of the state and the local authorities. In practice, the implemented and institutionally adopted law is a tribal or communitarian one. It is difficult to envision the implementation and respect of any non-profit law under these circumstances. It is also obvious that a perfect law with a highly centralized ruling power or with complicated cultural constraints will never be implemented in an effective manner. The legal system requires an adequate political and developmental environment in order to contribute to the formation of an independent non-profit sphere. All discussion of a theoretical legal framework must be discussed in light of these considerations.

    With regard to their non-profit legal systems, Arab countries can be divided into three main categories:

    1. Countries where there is high restriction of civil society; these countries are characterized by the absence of a law governing non-profit types of organizations.

    2. Countries where there is a law but it serves as a tool used by the public authorities in order to exert more pressure and restrictions on civil society organizations.

    3. Countries where relatively liberal laws create enough space for civil society to be freely active; but civil society in these countries nonetheless faces problems with the implementation of the laws by the public administration.

    Despite the numerous initiatives for modernization and democratization of the region, most Arab governments continue to exert heavy legal and procedural restrictions on the establishment and activities of civil society associations. Laws in most of these countries prevent any group of people from conducting public activities unless they are registered as an association. In some cases, associations are subject to excessively cumbersome registration procedures. An association’s activities are restricted to the objectives and activities described in these documents, and they cannot easily be altered. Moreover, the types of organizations are often defined according to the type of their activities as perceived by the state, disregarding the perceptions and objectives of the association’s members and constituency. In many countries the government demands that the association obtain advance permission each time it organizes any public activities. Permission is also required if the association is planning to be a member of any regional or global network or to receive funding from foreign donors. The government also has the right to monitor the financial status, public activities, and private activities of the association’s members, and it may dissolve the association for any reason the government believes is legitimate.

    6. Government Policies

    Governmental policies to control CSOs have many other aspects, three of which are worth mentioning here. The first is related to the behaviors of the ruling elites which are “defensive and jealous” of other potential powers, and therefore exert control to limit the scope of the non-profit sector (Anheier 2004). This phenomenon is well known in Arab countries, where it is easy to identify organizations created by the monarchs or the ruling elites in order to enlarge their political influence and power among the population in need.

    The second is when states exert pressure on the religious structures in order to limit their influence, thereby restricting the religious non-profit sector. This situation is encountered in many of the Arab countries, such as the case with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Libya, Algeria, and Jordan.

    The third aspect occurs when the state finds it necessary to fund the non-profit sector in order to enable it to provide essential social services. In this case, the state is unable to provide these services and thus turns to CSOs to assist in delivering state-financed services. This may contribute to conceptual confusion with the risk that government funding can transform the sector into an agent of the state (Salamon and Anheier 1997). This last case is not common in Arab countries, although it exists in a limited way in Lebanon where the state contracts with philanthropic and religious institutions to serve orphans, people with disabilities, and the elderly. Similar contracting occurs with some semi-private schools to provide educational services to populations in need, a phenomena that exists to a lesser degree in Kuwait and in Tunisia.

    7. Level of Centralization

    Most of the Arab countries are ruled by monarchies or totalitarian regimes. Only in Lebanon can there be found living former presidents. In all the other Arab countries, the head of state stays in power until death or exile through “coup d’état.”

    Moreover, in most of these countries, elections can be subject to manipulation, and even when they take place, the regimes have the power to dissolve elected parliaments if they become uncontrollable. Where constitutions exist, they can often be easily modified for the benefit of a ruling party. The judiciary is not independent, but rather restricted by the political branches, nominated by decrees of the executive body, and under the direct control and pressure of the ruling elites .

    Highly centralized power structures, combined with ongoing tension between ruling elites and the main religious groups (e.g., the Islamic Brotherhood and similar groups) at this point in time limit the room for development of a healthy and independent third sector.

    Internal Obstacles Facing Arab Civil Society Organizations

    Internal obstacles that challenge Arab CSOs from within the organizations themselves can be divided into three main categories:

    1. Vision and Mission

    The first set of internal challenges relates to weak visions and missions on the part of CSOs, along with corresponding absence of relevant strategies for carrying out organizational missions. This obstacle has a number of causes. Across the Arab region, there exists inconsistent understanding of the role and the potential of civil society, which may contribute to CSOs’ difficulty in developing clear mission statements. Moreover, countries of the Arab region often lack comprehensive development plans. Generally speaking, the establishment of national development plans should be the responsibility of the state; however, these plans should reflect a dialogue between the state and civil society. The absence of a shared national vision, answering to national challenges and leading to adopt strategies for carrying on development, in addition to undermining the importance of CSOs’ role, affect the latter’s ability to develop organizational visions and missions that reflect the priorities of their constituencies.

    2. Capacities

    Civil society in most Arab countries faces systematic oppression by the state. In the last three or four decades, the region has seen the flourishing of dictatorships and authoritarian and one-party regimes. The rise of these regimes has led to the destruction of preexisting societal structures and prevented the rise of new independent ones. Within this context, it is hard to expect civil society in the region to be active and influential, despite the period of change that the region is passing through. Building a strong and effective civil society in Arab countries will require time, awareness-raising, and capacity building strategies, as well as practical resources.

    3. Weak Internal Governance Structures

    Arab CSOs often have weak internal governance structures that prevent them from being more effective. One potential cause is the use and exploitation of civil society organizations by ruling elites, politicians, or even individuals seeking to secure a public role to play in society. Civil society also can be abused by sectarian factions seeking to spread extremist ideologies. As discussed more fully below, CSOs often have a weak understanding of the main elements of internal governance.

    III. Research Results

    This section discusses the results of a survey of a limited sample of CSOs. The survey was designed to identify and summarize the main challenges that CSOs in the Arab region face. Specifically, it posed questions designed to elicit information on the degree to which the obstacles described above – particularly the external obstacles at the country level and obstacles internal to CSOs – affect them in different types of country environments. The goal of the survey was to collect and present information about the sector in various countries, not to build a comprehensive database for statistical analysis.

    Questionnaires were sent to 104 CSOs in 11 Arab countries that are members of the Arab NGO Network for Development. Responses came from 25 CSOs in 8 countries, a response rate of 24% of CSOs in 73% of the surveyed countries. Responses were grouped by country, in terms of whether the CSO legal framework is generally considered to be conservative or liberal. The legal framework in countries dubbed conservative is generally more restrictive and would be expected to pose more obstacles; the legal framework in the three countries in the liberal category often reflects a laissez-faire attitude on the part of government regulators. For example, in Lebanon, which is considered to have a liberal legal framework, the CSO sector is governed by a 1909 Ottoman Law which refers to government agencies that have not existed for decades; in effect, the law is simply ignored.

    Although the small sample size does not allow broad conclusions about national realities, it does give preliminary ideas about the challenges facing CSOs in each country and reveals issues ripe for further in-depth research. Improvements for future research via surveys would be to increase the number of surveys sent, send surveys to more of the states of the 22-member Arab League, conduct follow-up surveys, survey by phone as well as mail, and create comparison groups of survey responses from Western, Asian and/or African regions.

    The survey focused on the presumed constraints, both internal and external, that the civil society sector faces in Arab countries. The 66 questions of the survey were divided into four sections. The first section dealt with general information on the organization: type of organization, vision, breadth and scope of activities and constituency, internal governance and financial reporting. The second section asked about the legal framework in which the CSO operates. The third section focused on the CSO’s understanding of the role of civil society, and the last section focused on the social and political environment in which the CSO operates.

    Survey responses to the first section indicated that the respondents work in various fields, including human rights (either broadly or in defense of specific groups, such as women, children or the disabled), environmental protection, social or sustainable development, or capacity building. Three are registered as foundations, three are civil companies, and the remainder consists of associations. Twenty-three of the 25 identified themselves as non-governmental organizations and two identified themselves as networks.

    Lack of Good Internal Governance Mechanisms as an Obstacle to CSO Development

    Mission and vision. Responses to the survey suggested that the lack of good internal governance practices is one of the principle obstacles to greater CSO effectiveness in the region. Answers reflected a weak understanding of key components of good internal governance, including the existence of a vision and mission statement, organizational strategy, organizational structure, and appropriate divisions in governance and management structures.

    A majority of the respondents did not clearly articulate a vision statement. 36% of the CSOs surveyed left the question blank and only 17% of the CSOs provided a clear vision statement. This problem was especially pronounced in countries with more restrictive laws (see Chart 1: What is Your Organization’s Vision?). In the three countries with relatively liberal legal environments for CSOs, 25% of respondents stated an articulate vision, whereas in the more conservative countries only 8% did. It appears that in countries with more restrictive legal frameworks, a poor legal framework inhibits a CSO’s ability to clearly define its vision.

    Chart 1: What is Your Organization’s Vision?

    Governing Structures. Inconsistencies appeared in the replies related to hierarchical relations within the organization, that is, the relations among the governing bodies, the executive level and staff, and representatives of constituencies . These inconsistencies may stem from an organization’s failure to have an effective organizational chart, or from failure to understand the questions on the survey form. It is also likely that responses to questions about decision-making within the organization depend upon the position of the person who fills out the questionnaire; in other words, whether he or she is a member of the governing board or the staff. For example, in one case two different questionnaires came back from the same organization but having been completed by two different people; their answers to the same questions were different in many cases.

    Internal financial systems. All but one of the respondents has a financial auditing system in place, and the majority of the organizations issues annual financial reports (84%). Of these, 40% use external auditing and 32% use both internal and external auditing. The percentage of respondents from countries with relatively liberal laws that use external auditing is markedly higher than in conservative countries (92% versus 54%; see Chart 2: What Type of Auditing System Does Your CSO Use?). One possible explanation is that CSOs in more restrictive countries rely on internal audit systems, included within their own internal financial management system, to avoid state interference in their finances.

    Chart 2: What Type of Auditing System Does Your CSO Use?

    External Obstacles -- CSO Relationships with Governments

    60% of responding CSOs expressed positive views of their relationship with the government, while 20% stated relations were bad and 20% said that they were average. At the same time, 36% of the CSOs stated that they had experienced restrictions imposed on their operation by the government, and a slight majority of 52% said that the legal framework is an obstacle to their operations. It is interesting to note that if the results collected from CSOs in liberal countries are removed, only 53% of the respondents said they have a good relationship with the government, while 44% report an average or negative relationship. Sixty-nine percent of CSOs in conservative countries reported that the legal framework is an obstacle to their development, and a disturbing 62% report that they have experienced restrictions imposed by the government. Different answers came from the same country about the relation with regulators and whether CSOs experienced restrictions imposed by the government on their activities. This question is very subjective and answers to it are influenced by the type of organization questioned and its strategy. Often, for example, human rights organizations are the most restricted by regulatory bodies. Moreover, the relations of advocacy organizations with the government are not the same as those of service providers.

    In countries with liberal laws, the body that regulates CSO’s operation was reported as the Ministry of Interior in 75% of the cases. In countries with more conservative laws, the regulatory body is normally a different ministry, such as the Ministry of Social Affairs (54%), the Ministry of Justice, or the Ministry of NGOs or its equivalent (see Chart 3: Principal Government Regulator). This is surprising, because regulation and oversight by the Ministry of Justice is generally assumed to be more transparent than processes controlled by the Ministry of the Interior; the latter is typically more concerned with security issues (UNDP 2006). These responses suggest that even in liberal countries, relations between government and civil society are considered to raise security issues.

    Chart 3: Principal Government Regulator

    External Obstacles -- Relationships with Other CSOs

    Most respondents stated that their relations with other CSOs were positive (88%). This result is encouraging; it suggests that CSOs are aware of the importance of networking and coordination. It also suggests that there is potential for further formation of social capital. Social capital is an aggregate of those features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions (Putnam, 1993). Increased social capital promises to contribute to the CSO sector’s ability to meet many challenges facing the sector.

    Responses were also positive with regard to CSO relations with the United Nations; 67% of the CSOs expressed the belief that UN agencies support their work. This reflects the level of coordination and the potential role of the partnership between the UN agencies and civil society. It is worth noting that the support provided by the UN can be financial, but it also can be technical or political. For example, UN support appears to be more important to CSOs in conservative countries than it does to CSOs in liberal countries. Sixty-nine percent of CSOs in conservative countries report that their relationship with the UN is beneficial, while only 58% in liberal countries feel similarly. Thus, the support of the UN can perhaps be considered a kind of protection and a source of legitimacy for CSOs operating in hostile environments.

    Overall, 16% percent of the organizations reported that they do not refer in their work to international human rights conventions. All the CSOs operating in countries with restrictive laws reported that they do not refer to international human rights. This result reflects the impact of local culture, and may be reinforced by the fact that 76% of all the respondents stated that tribal and traditional relations affect their ability to accomplish their work.

    Financial Restrictions on CSOs and Donor Relations

    When it comes to financial restrictions, 52% of the responses overall indicated that the organization does not experience financial restrictions . However, exempting the CSOs in liberal countries shifts the results dramatically; among conservative countries, 64% report financial restrictions and only 36% report no restrictions. Such interference may explain why CSOs in conservative countries generally prefer not to hire external auditors.

    Most CSOs reported good relations with their financial donors (55%), while 20% said that their relations with donors are average and another 20% reported poor relations. Sixty-four percent reported strong donor support in setting their organizations’ work plans and agendas, while only 8% reported that they have poor donor support. These data raise questions about whether CSOs with inadequate visions and weak strategies (see above) are building their agendas around local needs as opposed to donors’ viewpoints. When considering donor relations in the Arab region, it should be kept in mind that many perceive foreign donors to have a negative impact on the work of civil society because they are thought to impose a foreign agenda, leaving local civil society organizations unable to respond to local priorities. According to this view, CSOs that receive grants from foreign donors are considered collaborators; when this combines with poor visions and weak strategies, there is a danger that CSOs’ agendas may diverge dramatically from real local needs. This further raises the question whether sudden withdrawal of foreign funding will leave these weak CSOs without strategies or agendas at all.

    Legal Obstacles to CSO Development

    Seventy percent of CSOs in countries with restrictive laws reported that the legal framework is an obstacle to their work, while only 33% of the CSOs operating in liberal countries reported that the legal framework is an obstacle. Chart 4 shows responses broken down by liberal versus conservative countries, respectively.

    Chart 4: Is the Legal Framework an Obstacle to your CSO’s development?

    Seventy-six percent (76%) of respondents stated that tribal and traditional relations affect their ability to accomplish their work. A closer look at these responses reveals some interesting characteristics of Arab CSOs. 17 out of 25 respondents said that traditions (e.g., cultural ties) directly affect women’s participation. 10 stated that cultural factors negatively impact the values of civil society organizations. Finally, 11 claimed that cultural factors negatively impact the understanding of the difference between rights and charity. Chart 5 breaks down the responses by conservative and liberal countries.

    Chart 5: How Does Tradition Negatively Impact the Work of Your CSO?

    Regardless of whether an Arab CSO is located in a conservative or liberal country, the external obstacles of political, socio-economic, cultural and financial factors are problematic to similar degrees (see Chart 7: Summary of Self-Identified Obstacles). Socio-economic obstacles were reported somewhat less frequently in conservative countries; however, human resources were proportionately less of a problem in liberal countries. Although legal factors are an obstacle in both types of countries, they are much more of an obstacle in conservative countries, which is no surprise but does invite further dialogue.

    Chart 7: Summary of Self-Identified Obstacles

    IV. Case Studies – Lebanon and Palestine

    To place the survey findings in context, this study will now examine two case studies – Lebanon and Palestine. Both cases studies are of countries that can be considered “liberal” for the purposes of the survey findings of Section III, above. Data and analysis for the case studies are drawn from the Civil Society Index (also called the Civil Society Diamond or CSD) developed by CIVICUS and Dr. Helmut Anheier of the University of California, Los Angeles. The CSD is a measurement with four dimensions: 1) the structure, 2) the impact, 3) the environment, and 4) the ethics (values and culture).

    Surveys on the CSD were implemented in Lebanon and Palestine. In Lebanon, the survey was conducted by the International Management and Training Institute, and in Palestine it was conducted by the Bisan Center for Research and Development.
    Lebanon

    The Lebanese experience reflects many of the obstacles to the development of civil society, both internal and external, that have been examined in this paper.

    The legal framework for civil society is considered fairly good, and is not for the most part considered an obstacle, despite issues with its implementation by the Ministry of the Interior. The law governing nonprofits in Lebanon is the Ottoman Law of 1909, which was itself inspired by the 1901 French Law of Associations. The Lebanese civil society sector faces a challenge in its relationship with the governmental body charged with its regulation, the Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry exerts substantial pressure on CSOs, violating the rights secured by the Law of Associations. The law stipulates that the founders need only provide the Ministry (or regional authority) with a "notification of establishment", containing copies of the identification of the founders and of the constitution and bylaws. Consecutive Interior Ministers, however, have changed this procedure into a process of "registration" granted by the Ministry and requiring, among other things, a template version of bylaws, contrary to the law and under the pretext that these requirements are merely "administrative procedures." However, the Ministry cannot exert pressure on an already established association except through the articles included in the association's bylaws. For this reason, the Lebanese environment for CSOs is considered the best in the region.

    Although this legal framework is fairly good, civil society in Lebanon faces many challenges that shape its overall characteristics and prevent it from being more effective. One is conflict. The most recent example is the July 2006 war and the political developments following it. But Lebanon also endured fifteen years of civil war, which ended only in 1990. During this war various religious groups fought one another, creating mistrust among them and threatening overall national unity. The results of the civil war remain and affect the whole Lebanese situation and the country’s post-war politics. The CSD survey reports that 86% of respondents have a negative perception of the social and cultural fabric of their society and showed that various groups do not trust each other. It is thus obvious that Lebanese civil society is highly polarized and affected by the political structure based on the confessional distribution of power and wealth; CSOs likewise are affected by this reality.

    Similarly, respondents reported a high level of mistrust towards the governmental and public administrations. Corruption in Lebanon is a phenomenon affecting the performance of the public sector. For example, the financial activities of several public institutions in Lebanon are still not transparent, suggesting that these entities pose a significant fiduciary risk to the government (CFAA 2006).

    The ratio of respondents who prefer to receive services from the nonprofit sector rather than the public sector is ten to one. These findings reflect wide public recognition of the effectiveness of Lebanese CSOs. Indeed, civil society has been particularly successful in implementing poverty eradication policies, in providing health and education services and in protecting the environment. In spite of this, a majority of respondents (73%) feel that the nonprofit sector is also corrupt, which reflects the perception about society as a whole and not only about the public sector.

    The CSD survey also identified limited public participation in third sector activities. Moreover, the effectiveness of that little public participation is debatable. This is due to the abovementioned obstacles in Section II; lack of participation mainly due to the political, economic and social obstacles and lack of good governance and the possibility of participation in the decision making process.

    The Lebanese case also illustrates how internal obstacles, particularly those relating to the organizational and structural aspects of CSOs, undermine development of the sector. CSD survey respondents expressed mistrust towards the organizational charts, as well as administration and financial performance of CSOs. The lack of proper organizational structures and internal governance also affect networking and coordination among CSOs, since networking necessitates a clear vision and mission statement of the involved groups, and also requires mutual trust among them. The CSD survey concluded that umbrella organizations and networks are not efficient enough and that they lack good internal governance. Finally, the CSD survey concluded that Lebanese CSOs lack adequate human, financial and technical resources needed in order to fulfill their objectives.
    Palestine

    The legal system in Palestine is also considered among the best in the region, and civil society there enjoys a fairly large degree of independence. It is worth noting that the adopted law in Palestine was the result of the campaign conducted by Palestinian CSOs seeking more space and recognition of their role. Palestinian CSOs are one of the most active civil societies in the Arab region. Yet, it is also important to add that the Palestinian Authority imposes restrictions on CSOs when it comes to both the interpretation of the law and its implementation.

    Palestinian CSOs manage, in many sectors, to replace public services due to the absence of the state— particularly in the sectors of health, education, rural development, and agriculture. Despite this, the results of the survey show that civil society in Palestine also faces many challenges and obstacles.

    Two main issues are readily apparent and have a strong impact on CSOs in Palestine. The first one is related to the foreign occupation that the society, as a whole, is subject to and which has a major impact on the role, the objectives and the performance of civil society organizations. The second is the nature of the state itself. Palestine is a state under construction, with limited sovereignty and independence, and therefore a very limited capacity for social services.

    Moreover, it is very important to notice that the last legislative elections show great mistrust in the Palestinian Authority as well as other political parties. This is the result of the prevalence of corruption and the lack of real democratic and participatory processes in ruling the country. This environment affects the role and the performance of CSOs .

    Another constraint that Palestinian civil society faces relates to funding. It is difficult to estimate the volume of charitable donations since most donations go directly to philanthropic associations. Furthermore, it is obvious that the socio-economic reality in Palestine nowadays limits the capacity for organizations to solicit local donations and affects the ability of the individuals to volunteer or to be members of CSOs. At the same time, the sanctions imposed on the nation as a whole create a shortage in funding.

    It is difficult based on available data to reach detailed conclusions, particularly concerning the extent of CSO membership and voluntarism, and the effectiveness and impact of civil society. However, data from the CSO survey does highlight the challenges that CSOs in Palestine face. For example, more than 90% of respondents indicated that they do not volunteer for a CSO, with little difference between the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

    As in Lebanon, internal obstacles confront Palestinian NGOs, including weak governing bodies, poor control over finances, and limited participation in organizational decision-making.

    These two case studies confirm what the survey results reported in Section III suggest -- reforming the legal system alone will not strengthen CSOs and empower them in the Arab world. In spite of the fact that in Lebanon and Palestine the laws of associations are the best in the region, data from the CSD study does not reflect a healthy and independent non-profit sector. On the contrary, the results reflected weaknesses and challenges that they are facing apart from to the legal framework.

    V. Recommendations

    Strengthening the CSO sector and improving its effectiveness depends on several interrelated factors: legal systems, national reforms, and tools for overcoming internal obstacles.

    Legal systems should be developed in accordance with international declarations of human rights and in dialogue with the local civil society. The legal system’s primary goal should be to regulate the relation of CSOs with the state. CSO law, like any other law, should clarify the rights and the obligations of all the concerned parties. When drafting a law and lobbying for a good legal framework, reformers must take into consideration external factors affecting the sector, such as those described in this paper. It should protect the CSO sector from the tendencies of the state to exert control over the civil society organizations while restraining CSOs from engaging in abuse of any advantages of their status (such as access to power or, where appropriate, tax-exemption). The non-profit legal framework should also take into consideration the varieties among types of CSOs. For example, laws governing registration of CSOs should take into consideration the structural definition including the five characteristics: voluntary, self-governing, private, institutional, and non-profit aspects. Additional elements worth considering when designing the legal framework of civil society within a country are the structure of the organization, its relationship to the government, its financial structure, its governance and operation, and its contribution to enhancing social capital. The “Arab Initiative for the Freedom of Association,” for example, was launched by a group of CSO leaders from various Arab countries to promote adequate legal frameworks and laws of associations in the regin, and is now supported by many institutions, including the World Bank’s Department of Social Development in the MENA Region, Banian, and the Association for the Defense of Rights and Freedom in Lebanon.

    Although legal systems governing the CSO sector are in need of reform, reform alone will not strengthen CSOs sufficiently to empower them in the Arab region. This is particularly evidenced by the CSD reports in Lebanon and Palestine. In spite of the fact that the laws of associations in both nations are the best among the region, the results of the surveys did not reflect a healthy and independent non-profit sector. On the contrary, the results reflected weaknesses and challenges that they are facing without regard to the legal framework.

    In order to be able to face external challenges, the elaboration of comprehensive national strategies and policies is of high importance. This should be the result of a participatory process in which the various stakeholders (the state, the business sector, and the third sector) should take part. These strategies should focus on two dimensions: the need to reform political institutions and the introduction of serious economic, social and cultural reforms. Any national plan should take them all into consideration at the same time.

    Facing internal challenges strengthens civil society organizations; enhancing their capacities, accountability and transparency helps them to influence external factors and to create change. The following recommendations would support the sector in overcoming its internal obstacles:

    • Implement special programs and adopt rules and regulations (codes of conduct) to improve governance inside civil society organizations. Internal governance should lead to the adoption of democratic, transparent and accountable structures.
    • Support civil society organizations in refining their vision, mission and strategies in a participatory way (i.e., involvement of members and constituencies).
    • Develop the organizational capacities of civil society organizations in terms of administrative and financial management. This will improve transparency and accountability.
    • Educate CSOs in advocacy, lobbying and dialogue techniques.
    • Support networking among CSOs at the local, regional and international levels in order to elaborate common visions, information sharing, exchange of experiences, and so forth.

    Conclusion

    This paper provides an overview of the obstacles faced by CSOs, both external and internal. The research results focus on developing an understanding of Arab CSOs’ legal status, governance, and self-identified obstacles. These results were followed by a discussion of legal frameworks of Arab countries, both as they are and as they might be. Finally, specific recommendations were made for legal frameworks governing CSOs, for responding to external obstacles, and for overcoming internal ones.

    The results of the survey provided some interesting insights about the experiences of real-world CSOs in the Arab region, their strengths and weaknesses, and their perspectives on the obstacles that they face. The research reported here is useful in setting priorities for interventions aimed at empowering CSOs and increasing their effectiveness and efficiency. However, this survey was only one step and should provide inspiration for additional research. As mentioned earlier, future research via surveys might increase the number of surveys sent, send surveys to more of the states of the 22-member Arab League, conduct follow-up surveys, survey by phone as well as mail, and create comparison groups of survey responses from Western, Asian or African regions. An expanded evaluation, such as a broader scope or the inclusion of time series data, would permit not only a more precise understanding of the CSO sector in the Arab region, but also more finely-tuned recommendations to support the growth and efficiency of the sector, thereby improving the lives of people in the region.

    The answer to the conundrum presented at the beginning of the paper is that there are several reasons why civil society is not stronger than it is in Arab society today. External obstacles such as repressive regimes, militarization, international pressures and occupations conspire to create a response where family, clan and tribal relations strengthen as people protect themselves. Another result is that CSOs and individuals lack access to information and do not proactively create a clear, strong vision about the transformative role that they can play in their societies. Legal reform becomes a key element of developing a CSO sector that can respond creatively to contemporary challenges, but an appropriate legal framework alone will not provide all the tools that the CSO sector requires.

    References

    1. Defining the Nonprofit Sector: A Cross National Analysis; John Hopkins Nonprofit Sector Series 4, Lester M. Salamon and Helmut K. Anheier
    2. Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector; Lester M. Salamon, Helmut K. Anheier, and Others, John Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project; 1999
    3. Citizens, Strengthening Global Civil Society: CIVICUS, 1997
    4. Helmut Anheier: Civil Society: Measurement, Evaluation, Policy; Earth scan UK and USA, 2004
    5. civil society 2004/2005, Sage publications, center for study of global civil society, London school of economy.
    6. The World Bank: Executive summary of the Country Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA); Beirut on 25th of June 2006
    7. Assessing and strengthening civil society worldwide; a project description of CIVICUS civil society index: A participatory needs assessment & Action planning tool for Civil society; Volkart Finn Heinrich. CIVICUS civil society index paper series, Volume 2, Issue 1; March 2004
    8. CSI index country report: Bisan Center for research and development, Palestine (Draft not for distribution)
    9. http://www.undp-pogar.org/themes/civil.asp, accessed October 4, 2006

    10. دليل قانوني مقارن، عبد الله خليل: 2004
    11. حق تكوين الجمعيات، عبد االله خليل، 2004
    12. تنظيم الجمعيات في الدول العربية، جمعية الدفاع عن الحقوق والحريات (عدل)، لبنان (لا تاريخ، الا ان الكتاب هو نتاج اعمال اربعة ورش عمل عقدت بين العامين 1997- 1998
    13. الجمعيات في لبنان بين الحرية والقانون والممارسة، جمعية الدفاع عن الحقوق والحريات (عدل)، لبنان (لا تاريخ، الا ان الكتاب هو نتاج اعمال ورشه عمل عقدت في بيروت في العام 1999
    14. دليل قياس حالة المجتمع المدني في لبنان، ملخص تنفيذي عن تقرير حالة المجتمع المدني في لبنان، المعهد الدولي للتدريب، سيفكوس، 2006 )مسودة اولى غير قابلة للتوزيع)

    Endnotes

  • Civil Society Organizations and Networking

    Roles of civil society organizations

    Traditionally, CSOs have been mainly involved with providing charity services. But with the decrease in the role of the Welfare State, their role expanded to provide lacking services in various fields and to a wider scope of beneficiaries. This development was brought about by the change in the role of the State and the structural adjustment policies pushed by the main International financial institutions. Later on, an due to the deterioration of socil economic life conditions, the role of CSOs can has development gradually to be defined by three main pilars: (1) service provision (2) capacity building and raising awareness, (3) advocacy and lobbying.

    Service providers are involved in various fields of development, which could include traditional services such as shelter provision for the elderly and orphans and in some fewer cases for the poor, as well as basic poverty alleviation activities, services in health, education, income generation, vocational training, rural development, and other fields.

    Moreover, CSOs implement capacity building and awareness raising campaigns. Therefore, CSOs conduct training programs and actively elaborate methods of information dissemination. Accordingly, CSOs mainly aim at enhancing participation of various social groups in the different developmental programs that affects their lives, based on a clearer understanding of their needs, priorities, and opportunities available to them.

    Furthermore, CSOs role in advocacy and lobbying complements its other two roles. Starting since the early nineties, the involvement of CSOs in advocacy campaigns has been increasing. This role was elaborated in quest of social justice through partnerships with international organizations such as the United Nations agencies, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, which were involved in structural adjustment reforms in the developing countries.

    Yet, the main challenge currently facing the role of Arab CSOs is its ability and capacity to be organized in social movements seeking for national policies and programs change. Advocacy and lobbying campaigns are essential for facing today’s socio-economic challenges, including the implications of neo-liberal policies and the social and economic impact of trade agreements for developing countries, the impact of debts, in addition to tckeling the issues related to poverty eradication and gender inequality. Therefore, engaging in networks could significantly improve the impact of CSOs’ work on advocacy and lobbying. “CSOs pointed to the importance of the networks that grew out of hemispheric activity in alleviating the isolation felt by many groups and in sharing the experiences of their counterparts in other countries. ‘Engaging at the multilateral level enhances our knowledge about issues,’ was the way one women’s organization put it. Working at the multilateral level has encouraged CSOs to forge alliances and consequently improve their own analysis and impact” . In addition, policy-makers are often more welcoming for perspectives and opinions that are backed by a group of CSOs, that represent a wider and diverse constituency, rather than one organization. This would help CSOs get a seat on the table in the process of policy-making.

    In this regards, Arab CSOs are facing the following challenges:

     CSOs are more service providers than advocacy groups. They are in some cases involved in the implementation processes of national policies and programs, but are not partners in the design and set-up stages and evaluation processes. Thus, there is a mounting need to address the ability of CSOs to have an affective role in advocacy and to consider the level of awareness among CSOs of the mechanisms available for them to enhance their participation in policy-making.

     There is a need to assert partnership in identifying local needs and setting clear, comprehensive, and relevant national policies is essential. CSOs would enhance their role in this regards by building national coalitions in various sectors, thus elaborating visions and strategies, increasing their resources and strengthening their support group. In this regards, it should be stressed that the elaboration of the local agenda is a prerequisite for addressing regional interests and agendas of international institutions.

     CSOs ought to preserve consistency in participation and involvement with various processes of development and globalization.

     Within the mounting challenges, there is a need that part of the involved CSOs concentrate on raising awareness among other CSOs of the impact and challenges brought about by these new trends.

     There is a need for proper access to information related to regional and international engagements of national governments.

     CSOs need to enhance transparency and accountability, as well as internal proper management and administrative measures from which they can acquire their legitimacy, representation, and accountability.

     Proper legal frameworks that assure freedom of associations are primary concern that presents preconditions for proper involvement of CSOs in relation to regional and international blocks. Thus, there is a need to concentrate on advocating for proper legislative mechanisms for CSOs involvement.

     There is a need to enhance the involvement of CSOs from developing countries. It is worth noting that involved civil society groups are overwhelmingly based in, and representative of, developed countries. For example, of the 1,550 NGOs registered with the United Nations, only 251 are based in developing countries. ”

    General insight into networking (how it contributes to strengthening the positions of CSOs)

    Networking between CSOs, including non-governmental organizations, represents a major means for exchange of information and knowledge about needs, priorities, resources, solutions, and best-practices. It also represents a means to strengthen the position of CSOs through finding common grounds in their missions, unifying positions, and thus reinforcing their advocacy and lobbying campaigns.

    Moreover, networking contributes to enhancing democratic practices and developmental roles of CSOs. It supports these organizations in their quest for independency from the government and the private sector.

    The objectives of networking among CSOs include:

    - Progressing from a service provision role to a more development and social change oriented role
    - Highlighting the common grounds between member organizations and its affiliations.
    - Elaborating a common and clear understanding of development
    - Elaborating a renewed comprehensive vision for the role of CSOs
    - Finding a proper legal framework for CSOs’ work and role
    - Complementing the role of the government while securing an independent position
    - Enhancing coordination and avoiding duplication
    - Developing skills, building capacities, and enhancing training
    - Building civil society, through finding spaces that are based on strong collaboration, common aims, clear perspective and vision, comprehensive approach towards development, and a core role for CSOs in society

    Moreover, networking takes on a significant dimension given that the role of CSOs is no more limited to charity and relief aid; however they are increasingly working as a main partner in the process of development. In this regards, networking can contribute to:

    - Limiting competition between CSOs, and enhancing coordination and group work
    - Enhancing the understanding of mechanisms for coordination and collaboration in the decision-making process among CSOs and in various fields
    - Working together to face the economic, political, social, and cultural challenges
    - Implementing an objective and comprehensive evaluation of programs and activities
    - Empowering CSOs to participate in a process of capacity building and raising awareness
    - Identifying a strong, independent, and effective role for the civil society sector through dialogue and group coordination
    - Strengthening the negotiations position with decision-makers on various levels
    - Organizing advocacy and lobbying campaigns in fields of socio-economic policies
    - Achieving a better management of human and financial resources

    In principle, networking is looked upon as effective mechanisms and frameworks for coordination. This is achieved through renewing the means and tools for exchange of information and experiences through periodical meetings that the network usually organizes as part of its mandate and as a step towards supporting and developing frameworks for coordination that can prosper within the context of the network. Accordingly, members of a network elaborate their common vision. They also indicate their mission, which is based on the long-term objectives that they aim at achieving through their networking efforts, in addition to the specific short-term objectives that could lead them towards achieving their mission.

    Values and principles of networking

    Networking is based on principles of Human rights principles, respect of diversity, democratic practices, rule of law, participation, sustainable development, and social justice, while considering the importance and necessity of respecting the independence of each member of the network.

    - Democracy: implies that the relationship between CSOs and governments should be based on democracy and rule of law, which enables CSOs to achieve their objectives in a society that respects the freedom of association and protects the independence of these organizations.

    - Participation: which is based on the right of CSOs to take part in the national decision-making process and the whole developmental process, in addition to the right to participate in planning, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating various development programs

    - Diversity: based on the need to preserve the various roles of CSOs in service provision, raising awareness, and participation in economic, social, education programs, as well as strengthening local communities in the process of defending the rights of marginalized and dispossessed groups in order to strengthen and support the infrastructure for a strong civil society.

    - Independence: based on the importance that CSOs have the ability to identify their programs based on the needs and priorities of the local community. In this regards, any conditionality that is associated with funding and may affect these priorities ought to be considered as a threat to developmental work and independence of civil society’s mission.

    - Monitoring and evaluation: represents a major factor in the role of CSOs and which networking can significantly contribute to. It includes critical review of the objectives, strategies, and performance of a network. In addition, it looks upon the contribution of a network’s programs to the promotion of development policies, democracy, transparency, volunteerism, as well as the institutionalization of participation and evaluation in the internal management procedures of the network.

    - Respect of gender equality: networking is effective means for promoting and enhancing the role of women in social development and change. Networks can contribute to changing the stereotype of women, promoting women’s economic, social, and political rights, and fighting all kinds of discrimination against women. This ought to be reflected in the programs, objectives, and mechanisms adopted by all the members of the network that work on gender equity.

    About the Arab NGO Network for Development; strategies and programs

    The Arab NGO Network for Development is a relatively new initiative in the Region, where networks are still rare structures among CSOs. ANND bases its strategies on the above-listed values and principles of networking that it believes present the added value that networks can contribute to civil society and its mission.

    ANND sets its strategies given the context and dynamics on both the regional and international levels. In this regards, ANND sees that there are several external obstacles as well as opportunities presented by this context. Opportunities can be detected in the enhanced mobilization of civil society both regionally and internationally, thus presenting more space for coalition-building and coordination, such as is the case of the World Social Forum and the Euro-Mediterranean Civil Forum. Moreover, there has been an increasing attention towards the Arab region in general, specifically concerning issues of democracy and reforms, human rights including the rights of women, the participation of civil society, and solidarity campaigns especially with Iraq and Palestine. Yet, there are also several dimensions in the region that do represent serious obstacles for progress, including the instability due to the numerous conflicts including the occupation in Iraq, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and various internal conflicts in several Arab countries. In addition, many Arab countries impose restrictions on freedom of association and on the participation of civil society which is a major hindrance for the progress of civil society’s activity.

    Accordingly, ANND have set advocacy as its main strategies, and sees that its contribution to Arab CSOs could be through coalition building, providing resources and research, enhancing communication and exchange between CSOs, as well as capacity building of its member CSOs. In addition, given the increasing importance of following the economic, social, and cultural changes resulting from trade liberation and open market policies in the world today, there is more significance for the participation and follow-up of international and regional forums and conferences that are organized in this regards. Through its efforts in networking and coordination, ANND enables CSOs and strengthen their capacities to take part in these processes, and to lead and be creative in this regards. Here it is worth noting, that being involved in national, regional, and international networks does not affect the independency of these organizations, however it contributes to the process of exchanging experiences, and developing vision, mission, and understanding of opportunities and challenges.

    In this context, ANND works on three main programs ; democracy and human rights, development, and globalization and trade. ANND believes that these three issues are highly interlinked and are at the top of the priority agenda of the Arab Region, as well as many other regions in the world.

    There has been an increase of the debates and dynamics in the context of governance and democratization in the Arab region. Development is the main concern of ANND whereby it concentrates its efforts on the Millennium Development Goals Campaign, thus serving as a regional coordinator of the global campaign. ANND also actively participate in the arab caucus and works on mobilization of Arab CSOs for the World Summit on Information Society, which is going to be organized in Tunisia in November 2005. Moreover, given the mounting tensions and problematic areas in the Arab countries and the effects of the global events and dynamics on the Region, the international interest in the regional processes is continuously increasing. In this regards, several initiatives for reforms and democratization have been introduced, both foreign and Arab. ANND follows these processes and developments through working on two main axes within the development program; (1) working towards establishing a human rights watchdog center the follows the implementation of the five main international conventions on human rights: Political and civil Rights, Economic, social, and cultural rights, Rights of the child, Elimination of all forms of discrimination against women, Elimination of all forms of torture, and Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (2) enhancing a civil society/ governmental dialogue on reforms and democratization in the Arab region. However, ANND believes these issues cannot be de-linked from the processes of integration into regional and international trade agreements and blocks. Accordingly, ANND works on following the socio-economic impacts of the World Trade Organization, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, and other agreements such as the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), and the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Aghadir agreement or the Mediterranean Arab Free Trade Area (MAFTA).
    On parallel, Starting 2004, ANND have adopted an overall approach that aims at mobilizing and strengthening youths’ participation and involvement in various campaigns and processes of civil society in the Arab region, such as the processes of the social forums, that of the World Summit on Information Society, the Euro-Mediterranean platform, and others. ANND works on expanding its outreach to youth organizations in the Arab region, supporting national coordination and exchange, and enhancing the networking and exchange on the regional levels. ANND holds annual solidarity activities with both the Palestinian and Iraqi peoples based on the conviction that these two cases are the priority in the Arab region and have direct impacts into all other processes in the Region.

  • NGO Interaction, Coordination, and Networking

    Introduction*

    Networking is an efficient tool for the exchange of knowledge and information among NGOs. It should be based on their needs and their motivation to face challenges. Networking can be also a tool to disseminate information and knowledge. By defining common ground and joining forces, networking serves to strengthen NGOs’ capacities and negotiating abilities. It promotes democracy and reinforces the developmental role of civil society organizations.

    This chapter highlights the need for and the importance of networking among NGOs; its objectives, feasibility, and ethical criteria. It also sheds light on the challenges facing networks, their types, and the various structures adopted for networking. Moreover, it talks about the relation between NGOs, government agencies, and donors. Finally, it points to the major challenges facing the work of NGOs in Lebanon, and how would they be overcome by networking.

    First: Objectives and Feasibility

    Networking is an efficient tool to reinforce independent decision-making of NGOs and counteract any attempts for their control, influence their direction, and use them as a tool to alleviate the effects of private and public economic policy, on the social, cultural, and environmental levels. Networking also helps NGOs resist the attempts of donors who, in some instances, try to impose their own objectives, programs, and culture.

    1. Objectives

    Through networking, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and NGOs actually aim for the following:

    • Shaping a mutual and clear concept of development;
    • Shaping a mutual and modern vision of the civil sector;
    • Establishing a suitable legal environment for their work;
    • Complementing and participating in a modern state;
    • Building civil society and spaces on the bases of strong alliances, clear objectives, a mutual vision of development, and a pivotal role for NGOs.
    • Moving from the role of service provision and charity to a more effective role in the process of social change;
    • Coordinating and avoiding the duplication of services;
    • Developing skills, training, and building capacity.

    The importance of networking increased with the increase of the role of CSO and after they were recognized as vital partners in development. This role drastically changed after decades of activity in the field of charity and service provision, when NGOs began to attach more priority to development issues in their mission and strategies.

    2. Feasibility

    Networking contributes to:
    1. Ending competition between civil society organizations and developing cooperation and teamwork;
    2. Promoting decision-making concepts and mechanisms in NGOs, at all levels;
    3. Defining the active and influential role of NGOs through multilateral and group dialogue;
    4. Cooperating on overcoming economic, political, social, and cultural risks and challenges;
    5. Promoting negotiations with decision-makers on all levels;
    6. Organizing lobbying and advocacy on economic and social policy;
    7. Empowering NGOs to build capacities and raise awareness;
    8. Conducting objective and bold assessments.

    Networks among NGOs working in the same sector or field also aim at rationalizing the use of human and financial resources.

    Effective and influential roles of NGOs were reinforced in the last two decades following the United Nation’s elaboration of new concepts of development, notably during the nineties. Measuring development would no longer be limited to some quantitave indicators such as income, life expectancy upon birth, and illiteracy rates. The concept of development became more comprehensive in its dimensions and goals by setting additional qualitative indicators related to the economy, politics, society, culture, the environment, and the quality of life. This led to the development of the perception and definition of civil work. It assigns a greater importance to NGOs political, social, cultural, and economic role in the fields of democracy, defending human rights, and protecting the environment, as an integral and effective partner to the state.

    Some even give this role a broader dimension. They adopt the notion of making the civil sector a full partner of the state. This partnership includes participation and ability in decision-making processes. In addition, it involves the civil sector in the mechanisms and implementation of decisions in all economic and social fields and at all levels, national, regional, and international. This gives the civil society sector greater responsibility and pushes it to improve its performance and develop common principles, goals, and work mechanisms, through coordinating and sharing both information and experiences within a framework of democracy, cooperation, transparency, and respect of other opinions.

    The impact of globalization is increasing, so is the regional and international interest in following its economic, social, and cultural effects. This is in addition to the adoption of free trade policies and open markets. Networking and coordination, in fact, reinforce this participation and give NGOs the capacity to take initiatives and innovate. Joining a local, regional, or international network does not aim for assimilation. It aims to encourage interaction; sharing of experiences and information; developing visions, objectives, and concepts; and limiting competition.

    3. Summary

    Networking is considered an effective tool and mechanism of coordination. It highlights the common denominator between member NGOs and their relationship with their mandate. Networking is undertaken by NGOs to develop a comprehensive development vision and strengthen their analytical methods, in the aim of improving the state’s economic, social, and political performance that reflects on their constituencies and programs. However, networking can only be achieved through effective tools of sharing information and experiences; periodic meetings to organize the structural frameworks of the network; and the support and development of other frameworks of coordination mechanisms that may emerge among NGOs.

    In addition, networking can contribute to the formation of a common ‘vision’, a mutual and higher goal bringing NGOs together. It also seeks to produce a ‘mission’ for future objectives that can only be reached through mutual cooperation and common work. Finally, members of networks define the specific ‘objectives’ they wish to achieve in a given timeline.

    Second: Qualitative Standards

    Based on the definition of networking, the following standards can be adopted for measuring its quality and methods:

    1. Vision and the Mission

    Networking is based on an agreed upon vision by a group of NGO. This vision constitutes their long term objective. This common vision is their ‘alternative development model’. They work through the network to promote and achieve this ‘model’ seeing it as ‘a preferential advantage’ .

    Networking must have a clear mission that reflects its need and the reasons for its establishment. It should clarify the future directions taken by the network in achieving its objectives.

    The mission defines the rationale and reasons for establishing the network, its legal and social legitimacy, and its general philosophy towards society and all target groups.

    The mission often confirms the principles of democracy, sustainable human development, and social justice. In addition, it builds a non-violent culture on the foundations of respecting the right to life, solidarity, and cooperation; and on the grounds of equal rights between all citizens regardless of their sex, creed, faith, race, or ability. Moreover, it should focus on raising the social and cultural awareness of citizens, developing a modern society, and empowering civil society.

    2. Principles and Values

    The principles and values of networking rest on promoting and developing the role of civil society institutions within a framework of diversity, democracy, the rule of law, collaboration, sustainable development, and social justice, in addition to respecting the privacy of members.

    A. The concept of democracy: The relation between NGOs and governments must be governed by democratic principles and the rule of law in such a way as to help them realize their objectives and implement their programs in an environment that respects the freedom of associations and safeguards their independence.

    B. The concept of full partnership: NGOs have the right to participate in the decision-making process involving public policy and private development objectives. They also have the right to participate in the planning, implementation, monitoring, follow-up, and assessment of the different development programs.

    C. The concept of diversity: Networks should respect the different roles of NGOs: services; awareness building; participating in forming an economic, social, and educational vision; empowering the local community, and defending the rights of the marginalized and deprived. This aims to strengthen the foundations of the future civil society.

    D. The concept of independence: NGOs must enjoy their right to set and define their programs according to local needs and priorities. Any attempt to politicize funding and change these priorities is considered a violation of the very essence of developmental work and a threat to the independence of these organizations.

    E. The concept of assessment and evaluation: The major principle governing the work of civil society organizations and NGOs (especially in networking) is their critical revision of the objectives, strategies, programs, and performances to improve their developmental content. This is addition to promoting institutional and volunteer work, and internal democracy, transparency, accountability, and accountability.

    F. The concept of gender respect: Networks must work on promoting the role of women in society; changing stereotypes; defending all their economic, political, and social rights; eliminating all forms of discrimination; and ensuring that these rights are indivisible and integral to human rights. This must be reflected in the programs, objectives, and mechanisms of NGOs and networks.

    3. Goals and Objectives

    Networking experiences differ in objectives. They can aim to coordinating services or conducting relief work. The objective can field based and quantitative, such as training, education (popular education or literacy), health care (vaccination), or school health. It could also be qualitative and seek to change society by organizing or mobilizing through empowerment and capacity building, developing awareness, organizing pressure campaigns, or changing public policies. Local and national networking is usually quantitative while regional and international networking tends to be more qualitative.

    The goals of networking are defined as follow:

    A. Empowering civil society: The main goal of networking lies in building a strong civil society that is capable and effective, through capacity building and empowerment. Networks also aim to promote, develop, and institute the role of NGOs in society, allowing them to contribute to setting the rules of a developed and democratic civil society.

    B. Promoting coordination: Networks plan to develop, promote, and coordinate NGOs across many fields, inside or outside the network. They also seek to coordinate the relationship with other networks, UN organizations, and international governmental and non-governmental agencies.

    C. Sharing information and experiences: Networks aim at sharing information, data, and experiences to develop member capacities, skills, capabilities, and resources on all professional levels: programmatic, administrative, and institutional.

    D. Solidarity and cooperation: One of the aims of networks is to promote solidarity and cooperation with member or non-member NGOs facing crises or difficulties. Solidarity and cooperation are integral components of networking.

    The objectives of networks are closely related to the nature and objectives of member NGOs.

    4. The Strategy

    A strategy is ‘the science and art of leading’. To NGO networks, strategy is ‘defining and assessing tasks to achieve a mission or objective, and then choosing the suitable alternative’. Strategic planning is considered the means to empower networks and enable them to progress in parallel with development and change.

    Each and every network must set a strategy in order to reach its goals. This strategy must include a clear vision and reflect its mission and objectives.

    Strategic planning includes all the elements of planning and organization that are based on analyzing the status quo and observing the way things should be, in order to define how it could be.

    Strategic planning is an advantage for NGOs and networks, because it is the best method for defining objectives, maximizing the benefit from available human and financial resources, and working effectively by defining timelines and setting priorities. It also contributes to assessing and reviewing the different programs and projects. It helps the network gain legitimacy and credibility. (See Chapter III)

    5. Work Mechanisms

    Networking is executive in nature when it provides care and services directly to beneficiaries. This requires working mechanisms that allow their delivery to those who need them the most and in the most cost-effective manner.

    Additionally, networking can seek to develop human and financial resources, build the capacities of members and allies alike, and enable them to deliver their programs. Members can work indirectly, that is through the network, in order to bring about social change. The role of the network would then be defined according to their ability to perform the task.

    A network prepares studies on different issues, especially on development, civil society, democratic society, and the laws governing the work of NGOs, in order to empower its members and contribute to awareness and mobilization.

    Seminars, conferences, workshops, and regular meetings can be held by networks. In addition, training sessions can be organized in order to initiate dialogue and discussion on issues such as democracy and civil society, or with the aim of adopting suitable measures for promoting advocacy and forming pressure groups and lobbies.

    Networks aim to develop tools for suitable service provision. These can include the establishment of an information system containing the objectives, activities, and work methods of different non-governmental organizations. They also strive to develop local and regional tools for following-up and monitoring the implementation of community and national programs and policies; as well as providing information on this work to members.

    Issuing periodicals, circulars, and other publications strengthens networking and dialogue between NGOs and helps to disseminate their news and activities, while promoting communication, coordination, and good relations.

    6. The Administrative and Regulatory Structure

    Networking guarantees a high level of flexibility in the regulatory structure because it:

    • Safeguards the independence and diversity of member NGOs;
    • Protects the principles of common work, cooperation, and coordination;
    • And promotes effectiveness in executing and influencing public policies.

    The structure of networks follows two models: centralized networking or horizontal networking:

    A. Centralized Networking: It can be a hierarchy or a pivotal system revolving around a center that leads the network and forms its reference point. Centralized networking is an efficient and fast tool due to the speed of decision-making and the ability to take initiatives without the need to referring to members every time. Yet, this model limits participation and might result in limiting the base of the network to one body, usually the chairperson, if any, or the Executive Board.

    B. Horizontal Networking: This is where members are equal in decision-making and assessment. The role of the secretariat or the executive management in this case is in facilitating continuous consultation between members, in order to make group decisions and coordinate for better performing of tasks. Despite the slowness of its mechanisms, it guarantees participation and communication, and encourages the sharing of experiences and information. Horizontal networking depends on the most effective communication tools, particularly telecommunications, and is similar to the structure of electronic networks.

    Administrative work required in the coordination process is the main challenge to leaders wishing to enforce the regulatory structure. Developing the administrative structure is often at the expense of strengthening and supporting members in implementing their programs. On the other hand, reinforcing networking and sharing mechanisms requires high flexibility and high governance ability. Therefore, it is preferable that the administrative structure is simple and that the administrative body does not replace the member associations’ decision-making processes.

    Networking develops in stages and is promoted through mutual work and sharing information and knowledge. While the vision and mission remain general and constant, the objectives need continuous review. They need to respond to current situations and develop in line with the vision and mission. Policies and work mechanisms need to be developed in the light of the program and its aims. Establishing networks could begin with providing a means to meet, follow-up, and achieve specific objectives that have unclear or undefined visions and missions. Networking can then evolve into a representative body of members with a common vision, a clear mission, defined objectives and work mechanisms. This will allow the network to conduct a variety of tasks on behalf of its members.

    Moving from the first stage to the next can only be done by developing the vision and mission. In other words, the objectives and programs must reach a higher level of maturity and progress. Time and flexibility are needed for networking to move to more developed stages, especially during the process of formulating the values and general principles. This requires widespread recognition of the importance of public interest over private interests, or the interest of any single NGO. Moving from one stage to the next also needs an effective and transparent mechanism of sharing information and experiences between all stakeholders. In some cases, networking can be institutionalized (resulting from a private or individual initiative) making its progress to more advanced stages subject to the objectives of founders or trustees.

    Finally, it is not necessary for networks to find the legal legitimacy for its work since legitimacy is drawn from its relation with members, citizens, the government, and the donors (in order of priority).

    Third: Challenges:

    Networking is a framework for defending the mutual interests of members and the general public . In this context, networks must consider the characteristics of each member. Collective interest helps to strengthen alliances and negotiating position and uphold the minimum required unity of civil work. Respecting common interest also helps in the allocation of tasks and therefore leads to greater experiences and guarantees the continuity of collective work.

    Civil society organizations and NGOs are facing many kinds of challenges. They range from the common and objective challenges of society (political, social, economic, and cultural), to the private or subjective challenges related to their ability to maintain independence and express, clearly and objectively, the feelings of society.

    The general challenges result from the processes development, implementing social justice, and democracy. The current world order, its laws, institutions, and mechanisms, is actually weakening the role of national governments. Their role has decreased to the extent that they cannot face these challenges. This now requires the genuine participation of different civil society organizations. Moreover, governments are no longer capable of fully assuming their duties in providing citizens with social and public services. All this has led to an increasing demand on the social role of NGOs in alleviating poverty, unemployment, and need.

    As for individual challenges, NGOs are obligated to set plans and programs that respond to the dire needs of society (its public) in accordance with a balanced relationship with the government and local and foreign donors. In addition, NGOs have to safeguard their independence and promote cooperation hand in hand. They must face the challenges of structural and administrative development and continuously train and empower their staff and volunteers. After all, true partnership is built on the basis of a vision and comprehensive objectives that are understood clearly by every stakeholder, through a clear role and position.

    In light of the above, NGOs assume responsibilities that are imposed by the need to face challenges on numerous levels and by the nature of the partnership with the donors and the public sector. Hence, networking becomes a tool to overcome these challenges.

    Fourth: Levels:

    There are many forms of NGO networks: geographic or thematic, permanent or temporary.

    1. Geographic networking:

    This is on three levels:

    A. National: It usually takes the form of solutions to the pressing challenges. Member NGOs collaborate and position themselves vis-à-vis other civil society organizations, the state, and public and social policies.

    B. Regional: It is selectively and willingly formed to express a common vision, clear tasks, and mutual regional objectives in order to face challenges deriving from the creation of new regional blocks.

    C. International: This form flourished in the 90s to meet the challenges imposed by globalization. The first international NGO networks developed with the emergence of the idea to incorporate civil society organizations in the international UN summits . In addition, the need for international networks grew with the escalation of the global circumstances and the rise of international institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO.

    2. Thematic networking: This is on two levels:

    A. Public: It includes organizations of multi-disciplinary experiences and conducts direct field work (the Arab NGO Network – based in Cairo, the Arab NGO Network for Development – based in Lebanon, etc.).

    B. Sectoral: It focuses on one sector or field such as health, education, the economy, protecting the environment, gender, youth, disability, or defending human rights. NGOs opt for this kind of networking either because they undertake the same kind of work or in response to a challenge in a specific field (the Arab Organization for Human Rights, the Arab Network for Environment and Development, the AISHA Network, etc).

    3. Period of networking:

    A. Permanent Networking: This type of networking is used to achieve long term goals requiring lengthy periods. In this case, networking evolves with the accumulation of experiences, expertise, and the development of a common awareness. It progresses from a basic framework for coordination and sharing experiences, to a constant alliance possessing vast common interests (the Collective of Volunteer Associations in Lebanon, the Lebanese forum for NGOs, the Palestinian NGOs Network, etc).

    B. Temporary networking: Temporary networking emerges from the aim to achieve definite and immediate objectives. Upon reaching these objectives, the network is disbanded. It may adopt other objectives at a more advanced level (i.e. The National Gathering for Municipal Elections - Baladi Baldati Baladiyyati, the National Gathering for an Elective Civil Personal Status Law).

    Fifth: Frameworks:

    1. Unions:

    Unions are formed of all NGOs. Some countries require membership in general unions as a condition for acquiring a license. Unions can be formed on different geographic bases: local (such as student unions), regional (such as the Union of Arab Lawyers), or international (such as the International Federation of Associations of the Disabled).

    Unions can also be sector-based, bringing together associations with the same specialization, such as women associations within the Lebanese Women Council or youth associations within the National Union of Lebanese Youth. Some countries even have unions for charity organizations, such as in Jordan.

    Furthermore, unions can be formed out of the basic need to confront a specific challenge that threatens the interests of a certain type of NGO. They unite in order to achieve their common objectives. An example is the Unions of Associations in Collaboration with the Lebanese Ministry of Social Affairs. When the Ministry’s budget was reduced, the grants allocated to NGOs decreased. The NGOs decided to form a union to strengthen their position, negotiate with the ministry, and ensure good relations between the two.

    Many unions attempt to control representation and limit their membership to those with the ability to exert organizational and administrative control. In other cases, unions are controlled by powerful external actors.

    2. Umbrellas:

    This is a framework of coordination that does not take the form of a union: a comprehensive membership and an institutionalized structure. The umbrella is broader and larger in terms of the range of visions and the diversity of objectives. It cannot constitute an effective framework but it provides a platform for sharing experiences and information. Consequently, it is a transitional framework followed during the process of transformation into a union or a network.

    An umbrella is formed within the framework of objective-oriented campaigns. Umbrellas are not always effective, because they have no executive power, but they work through their members. They provide financial, technical, and moral support.

    3. Networks:

    Networks are formed within flexible frameworks, yet they have limited and conditional memberships. They are characterized by the common general vision, principles, objectives, and working methods of their members. Networks can be local, national, sub-regional, regional, or international and their objectives can be comprehensive or thematic.

    To guarantee networking success and its continuity, a network must have a clear vision and a specific mission (task). It must also have common principles, targeted objectives, and working methods in which all members can participate. The flexible mechanism of organization, which is agreed upon by all the members, reflects their equality and safeguards their interests.

    Networks strive to develop pressure campaigns that influence public policy, either in general or in a particular field, and to develop the capabilities of members by raising their awareness in this field.

    Many types of networks have emerged in the Arab region:

    A. Networks with broad objectives:

    • Such as the Network for Arab NGOs which includes more than 500 NGOs and networks from all the Arab countries. This network works on capacity building by training personnel and aims to provide resources and information sharing. The network issues a quasi-periodic publication on Arab NGO work.
    • The Arab NGO Network for Development includes 35 national networks and NGOs from 12 Arab countries. It works in the field of social development, the environment, gender, and human rights. It focuses its work on monitoring sustainable development policies, trade agreements, reforms and democracy related issues, and human rights. ANND’s objectives are focused on building and empowering the capacities of Arab NGOs and organizing advocacy campaigns at national and regional levels.

    B. Sectoral networks:

    • An example of this is the AISHA Network, an Arab network for women’s associations working in seven Arab countries.
    • Another example is the Arab Network for Environment and Development that deals with environmental issues and sustainable development.
    • There are many other networks working on human rights, children’s rights, the rights of the disabled, and other issues.

    C. National networks:

    • One example is Espace Associatif (Space for Associations) in Morocco that includes 54 Moroccan NGOs.
    • The Palestinian NGO Network is made up of more than 90 NGOs and has branches in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem.
    • The Collective of Volunteer NGOs in Lebanon represents 14 Lebanese NGOs.
    • The Lebanese NGO forum represents 13 Lebanese NGOs
    • The Association of Humanitarian Associations in Lebanon includes 12 NGOs.

    D. National sectoral networks:

    • The Coordinating Committee for Yemeni NGOs for the Defense of the Rights of the Child.
    • The Lebanese Union for Child Welfare.
    • The Network of Women NGOs in Lebanon.

    E. Local networks having broad missions:

    • Coordinating Committee of NGOs in Saida.
    • Coordinating Committee of NGOs in Tripoli.

    4. Forums:

    The forum is a meeting place for stakeholders of different theoretical and organizational backgrounds and different sectors. The forum provides a stage for exchange and cooperation to reach long-term and mid-term goals.

    The idea behind the forum in its current form was launched in the first International Forum, later known as the ‘World Economic Forum’ held annually in Davos Switzerland since 1973, through an initiative of Klaus Schwab one of the largest international donors. Participants in this forum include multinational corporations, international economic and financial decision-makers, and representatives of international trade and financial institutions. It aims at “managing world economy”, setting economic priorities, legislative proposals, and adopting the mechanisms capable of increasing profits and facilitating free trade.

    UN agencies have organized civil society forums in parallel with their summits. The first of these was the forum held alongside the 1975 World Conference on Women in Nairobi and followed by the International NGO Forum in Rio the Janeiro that was held during the 1992 Earth Summit. Others were held during the 1992 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, the 1994 World Summit for Population and Development in Egypt, and the 1995 World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen. Following this, many NGOs and civil society organizations started holding their own forums in parallel with UN summit: Habitat II in Istanbul, Financing for Development (Monterrey, 2002), and the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg, 2002).

    The European Union sponsored and organized the first Euro-Mediterranean Civil Forum, parallel to the first ministerial summit on the EUROMED partnership, held in Barcelona late 1995. Subsequent editions of the EUROMED Civil Forum were held in Malta (1997), Stuttgart (1999), Marseille (2001), Valencia (2002), and Naples (2003).

    The early 21st century witnessed the emergence of the World Social Forum (WSF). It was held for three consecutive years, since 2001, in Porto Alegre, Brazil. The 2004 round was held in Mumbai. The WSF joins together civil society representatives, NGOs, and social movements from around the world, in response to the World Economic Forum and addresses the global increase in poverty and the marginalization of international UN tools. The number of participants in the 2003 WSF exceeded 120,000 individuals from around the globe, united under the slogan: “Another World Is Possible”.

    5. Platforms:

    Another popular kind of coordination frameworks is the platform. Platforms have become particularly popular in Europe and include most national NGOs. A platform is a highly flexible tool. Today, platforms in each European country are a branch of a larger European NGO umbrella called “CONCORD” established to organize relations with the European Union.

    Some NGOs and social movements around the Mediterranean have started to establish the Euro-Mediterranean Platform which will have national platforms in each of the represented countries.

    The EUROMED Platform has the following objectives:

    • To monitor processes of negotiation and bilateral and multilateral partnership agreements, and to ensure their fair implementation by all stakeholders.
    • To spread awareness across the platform and empower civil societies in the countries represented.
    • To organize a civil forum held in parallel with the EUROMED ministerial meetings and help civil society to express its opinions and positions on the priorities of platform’s framework.

    A consultative meeting of civil society organizations was held in Lebanon to study the establishment of the EUROMED Platform, attended by representatives of NGOs. It adopted a position paper on the vision, principles, objectives, and mechanisms. A follow-up committee was also established, comprising of four national networks and five NGOs to continue the discussions on this issue and to prepare sector-based working papers on the Partnership. They were presented at the Civil Forum in Naples in late 2003.

    6. Assemblies (Gatherings):

    Gatherings or assemblies are formed of unions and NGO frameworks and groups to achieve an immediate and specific objective. Members of an assembly do not necessarily have a united vision or task. They meet on a mutual interest to achieve one or more defined targets. They therefore have a united strategy and mechanism to achieve the goal(s).

    The lifespan of an assembly varies according to the ability to achieve the common goals.

    The following are just two examples of assemblies in Lebanese civil society over last decade:

    • The National Gathering for Municipal Elections in Lebanon: Its slogan was ‘Baladi, Baldati, Baladiyyati’ (My country, my town, my municipality). It assembled hundreds of Lebanese NGOs, associations, unions, networks, and individuals. Their goal was to hold municipal elections in Lebanon after a break of 35 years. The national campaign led to the adoption of an electoral law for the municipalities and mayors. The elections were conducted according to the law and the assembly disbanded at the end of the elections.

    • The National Gathering for an Elective Civil Law (on personal status): It includes NGOs, labor unions, women’s associations, youth associations, and individuals. It aims to pass a non-compulsory personal status law. The assembly is still functioning because the law has not yet been passed.

    Sixth: NGO Relations with Government Agencies

    The new concept of development is based on the principle of a tripartite partnership between the public sector, the private sector, and the civil society sector. Development is no longer exclusively a government function, but the responsibility of the whole society. In order to achieve a comprehensive partnership in decision-making and the delivery of programs and policies, civil society today must be fully mobilized .

    Lebanese society is characterized by the presence of active associations. During the Lebanese civil war, they were able to attract a large number of volunteers and had a vital role in providing social services. The clearest examples are in the fields of emergency and relief, first aid, education and illiteracy, rural development, and social awareness. The civil sector implemented all these services in cooperation with the relevant government institutions and in collaboration with related United Nations organizations (UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, etc.). This experience is a shining example of cooperation between the public and civil sectors. During the times of war in Lebanon, NGOs were instrumental in relieving the burden of destitute civilians who suffered over a period of fifteen years.

    Previous experiences have proven the importance of the relationship between NGOs and government institutions. They have shown how it can be transformed into a true partnership of planning, delivery, and assessment.

    By the end of the Lebanese war, new frameworks, institutions, and mutual committees emerged to coordinate between the public and civil sector, such as:

    1. The Economic Social Council (ECOSOC): Five positions are held by civil sector representatives, in addition to trade unions (industrialists and merchants), labor unions, agricultural syndicates, university professors’ and teachers’ unions, and intellectuals.
    2. The Higher Council for Child Welfare: It includes the public and civil sectors, plus interested international organizations.
    3. The National Committee of the Disabled: It includes institutions that work on issues related to people with disabilities: NGOs, care centers, representatives of the disabled, and public sector institutions.

    This relationship must be clear and defined, “NGOs should not be structurally linked to the government and should be internally and self run” . The choice of the representatives and the mandate of these organizations should be assessed and developed to suit their objectives.

    On the other hand, the relationship between NGOs and the government must surpass the old concept of basic technical and administrative ties, limited to implementing random programs, naming representatives, and implementing the associations’ laws. This relationship must be in harmony with the new concept of development and should accompany its progress. The new concept defines the role of NGOs as the institutional factor reinforcing civil society on the grounds of social justice and democracy. It is no longer just about providing services.

    The government must consider NGOs a full partner in development. These NGOs retain the right to set priorities, determine needs, formulate visions, and set objectives, policies, and delivery mechanisms. This requires:

    • Creating a legal framework to organize the work of NGOs, grant them the freedom to be formed and incorporated, provide them with independence and freedom to choose the appropriate organizational structure, and give them freedom to set objectives and agendas.
    • Creating a regular and structured mechanism for consultation between the public and civil sectors. This would promote the principle of partnership and decrease duplication and competition. (Many joint consultation commissions were established in Lebanon for the purpose of looking into certain issues and sectors. They need to reinforce their roles, independence, and standards of competence upon establishment).
    • Acknowledging the right of NGOs to defend economic, social, and cultural rights, human rights, and democracy.
    • Linking between the direct roles of these NGOs in service provision and defending the civil rights of citizens.

    The work of NGOs should be governed by a suitable legal framework enabling them to progress and develop their activities. The legitimacy of NGO work and the freedom to establish associations is part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant for Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights which were signed by most Arab countries, including Lebanon. The independence of NGOs is the foundation of the legal framework. It defines vision, objectives, programs, and activities, as well as administrative, organizational, and financial independence.

    On one hand, the government must adopt and respect the implementation of a suitable legal framework, monitor its implementation, and ensure the freedom to form associations and their independence. In addition, by-laws defining the nature of the relationship between the state and the civil society must be set, with particular reference to the delivery of common programs and service provision. The state must contribute to funding the NGOs by alleviating burdens, taxes, and fees, and granting direct financial contribution when needed.

    On the other hand, the civil sector must set a clear vision and define tasks and objectives that express society’s needs. It must facilitate negotiation and dialogue through networking and coordination frameworks. Transparency, accountability, respecting internal laws and financial systems, and the sound rotation of power, must be respected and followed properly to attain good governance and legitimate representation, and to encourage participation.

    Promoting solidarity between society and the state, through mutual recognition of reciprocal roles, requires a reform of local and national mechanisms, plus the promotion of the mechanisms of dialogue. The proposal for establishing the ECOSOC fell within this objective. It proposed a framework of communication and dialogue across all sectors. ECOSOC is the national framework of representatives from different sectors. Its members represent the production sector (traders, industrialists, and agriculturalists), the labor sector (trade unions, teachers’ and professors’ unions, farmers, etc), professions (lawyers, physicians, architects, engineers, etc), intellectuals, the media, and representatives of civil society. This experience needs an objective assessment and its role must be defined. Its relation to civil society and the government must also be organized in order to enable it to stand up to national challenges.

    Seventh: Coordinating with Donors

    Funding is the most important issue influencing the work of NGOs. The ability to sustain and develop NGO work and services depends on it. It is influenced by conditions related to governmental and non-governmental donors, local or foreign; in addition to the target groups considered the ultimate objective of funding.

    The concept of funding developed with the development of the concept of civil work. In the past, this concept depended on charitable donations given by the wealthy to help the poor. With the change in the concept of development and its relation to the principles of human rights (notably the right to development), funding was transformed. It took institutionalized patterns that now follow modern models of organization and governance.

    Sources of funding are in three categories:

    1. Self-Funding

    • Donation Campaigns: They directly depend on local donors and members of the local community. These campaigns are usually seasonal, during Lent or Ramadan, for example, when charitable organizations can particularly benefit. One charitable organization working in Lebanon raises 85% of its budget through local donations. The Lebanese Red Cross holds annual donation campaigns through collection points in the streets and roads and by visiting public and private institutions to collect donations.
    • Activities: Some NGOs depend on the returns of activities and services they provide to the needy in the local community. They collect fees from the beneficiaries in return for services. This is based on the concept of the participation of the local community and the target groups in fundraising to guarantee the continuity of the services. A major NGO working in the health field in Lebanon was able to provide more than 65% of its budget from the financial returns of its services. In order to do this, it set the real cost price of each of its services, taking into account the voluntary effort. This kind of self or auto financing ensures the sustainability of funding and guarantees an acceptable quality of services if compared to that of the private sector.
    • Membership Fees: NGO members can be a source of income through subscription fees, membership fees, and in-kind donations; yet, this source is usually limited and secondary.

    2. Government Funding

    • Contracts: Some governments fund NGOs that provide certain services that they do not provide themselves. This is done through contracts that define the kind and quality of services provided by the NGO. An example of this is the contracts of the Lebanese Ministry of Social Affairs which contribute to the care expenses of NGOs and covers part of the health and social services provided by them. The Ministry of Health also funds hospitalization services in NGO hospitals (and the private sector).
    • Support Funds: Some government institutions (notably development funds), such as the National Fund for the Displaced and the Council of the South, fund some projects delivered by NGOs which they are unable to undertake themselves.
    • Exemption from Taxes and Fees: The government can participate in funding the civil sector indirectly by setting laws that exclude NGOs from paying certain taxes, custom fees, Social Security, and insurance fees. Consequently, the money saved can be implemented in developing programs and services.

    3. Foreign Funding:

    This is the most common way of funding. It is direct and comes from several sources, which can include:

    • Government Sources: Some governments have funding programs for certain projects in countries of their choice; they can go through agencies or NGOs (according to political priorities).
    • Funds: They are formed to fund certain projects, or are established by major companies for the purpose of alleviating poverty and unemployment.
    • NGOs: They are usually intermediaries between the basic donors and the beneficiaries.
    • International Programs and Funds: They are affiliated to international organizations (such as the United Nations or the World Bank) or regional groupings (such as the European Union).

    It is important to note here that during the Earth Summit in Rio (1992), donor countries pledged to allocate 0.7% of their GDP to for development aid. This was confirmed by the Monterrey Consensus in the 2002 Summit on Financing for Development. Despite the fact that in 1998 the rate was more than 0.23% , the sums spent yearly in the form of grants are estimated at 52 billion dollars , 13% goes to NGOs to fund development programs and projects in developing countries .

    In the Millennium Declaration of the UN General Assembly, 189 countries pledged to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015 . The 8th goal commits developed and wealthy countries to work with developing countries in achieving these objectives by creating an environment suitable for achieving fast and sustainable development. The Summit on Financing for Development confirmed the engagement of rich countries to allocate 0.7% of their GDP to fund development programs in developing countries.

    The World Bank estimates that the annual budget for poverty eradication policies is 100 billion US dollars; the needed amount is twice the above mentioned figure. The World Bank aims to spend this amount on development programs through social funds and in coordination with NGOs in developing countries.

    However, this reality imposes a new challenge for NGOs: their ability to reach foreign funding without their priorities and national strategies being influenced. Donors often impose new working methods that may not be compatible with local needs, or that may have objectives and priorities different from those of beneficiaries.

    A further challenge set by foreign funding is the requirements and regulatory and administrative standards imposed by donors on NGOs. This can increase the percentage of funds spent on administrative expenses rather than on the delivery of programs, activities, and services.

    The essence of a true partnership is based on mutuality, the fair distribution of benefits, and balanced relations. True partnership also depends on the principle of independence of NGOs in setting their priorities, objectives, and intervention mechanisms. It is also based on dialogue and sharing experiences and information. To this effect, donors should embark on discussions with local organizations before adopting any programs and strategies. Finally, true partnership requires disclosure, transparency, and accountability.

    Here lies the importance of networks: they provide the framework that helps NGOs to deal with donors, as well as shape their priorities, objectives, and mechanisms. Networks can safeguard the independence of their members without intervening in work priorities. They can help them strengthen their capabilities and negotiating positions with donors. Developed flexibility in governance helps networks limit administrative and organizational spending; thus, it increases direct spending in programs and projects, encouraging donors to cooperate.

    Eighth: Challenges Facing NGOs in Lebanon and the Role of Networking

    Non-governmental organizations face many challenges that are imposed by the process of transforming conventional work patterns into development programs and policies to eradicate poverty, unemployment, and diseases. These challenges are summarized in the following:

    1. Safeguarding National NGOs and Promoting the Concept of Citizenship

    Confessionalism is a major problem in the public and private lives of the Lebanese. Confessional diversity can be enriching and beneficial if it is governed in a just system based on sound political grounds and not on the basis of confessional quotas .

    The idea of good citizenship arises from the feeling of belonging to a nation where all citizens are equal in rights and obligations before the law. Consequently, NGOs must assume a basic role in promoting the feeling of citizenship and reinforcing the grounds of national unity.

    Networks support the independence of NGO work and their ability to face the challenge of social disintegration and divisions by providing the minimum requirements for exchange, dialogue, safeguarding diversity, and difference. Therefore, they allow NGOs to assume their role in defending the interests of the whole of civil society.

    2. Shaping a Long-term Human Development Vision: Lobbying Public Policies

    Lebanon needs to have a comprehensive development vision and a clear national strategy that defines priorities and social policies, and with clear objectives and programs.

    The civil sector has an important role to play in achieving this by forming a common national vision and a strategy defining the programs and tasks.

    To succeed, this requires high levels of exchange and coordination between NGOs in all sectors, especially regarding common work principles and frameworks.

    3. Commitment to Causes

    The civil sector is characterized by its ability to sense and express the true feelings of society. Civil work gains its legitimacy from its ability to express the issues of society objectively, responsibly, and seriously.

    National policies of direct economic, social, and cultural influence on citizens are the core interest of the civil sector. Providing services is just a priority in national choices and requires a partnership between the government and the civil sector that starts from decision-making and extends to delivery and assessment.

    In light of the challenges of integration in the world economy and implementing regional and international trade agreements, developing countries have started to adopt privatization in order to lower public spending, improve the quality of services, and decrease the burden of public debt. These countries are also adopting financial and fiscal policies to solve the macroeconomic crises they face and to ensure the settling of external debt.

    Perhaps the most influential sector on economic, social, environmental, and cultural situations is that of services; notably vital public utilities such as water, electricity, education, and health.

    All the above require a clear political position from the civil sector and NGOs, in defense of the interests of their target groups. These positions must be based on research and socioeconomic analyses that define the risks, weaknesses, and alternatives. Therefore, NGOs are expected to launch lobbying campaigns on public policies and national choices. Networking is a tool to assist in reinforcing national dialogue and bring together different opinions in the aim of organizing lobbying campaigns.

    4. Coordinating Civil Society’s Allies: Forming Lobbies

    Civil society is formed from different kinds of organizations, such as labor and agricultural unions, student movements, cooperatives, clubs, and cultural councils; different sectoral organizations such as the environmental and the women’s movements; organizations working in the field of human rights, development, and care for the needy. Coordination between these different civil society organizations and institutions thus becomes necessary.

    Some of those mentioned above have already set their frameworks: the General Worker’s Union, the Union of Independent Professionals, and The Lebanese Women’s Council. There also several types of coordination between NGOs: the Collective of Volunteer Organizations in Lebanon, the Forum of Humanitarian NGOs, the National Union for Associations in Contract with the Ministry of Social Affairs, the National Council for Social Service, and the Lebanese Environment Assembly. Cooperation and coordination, within a sector or between one sector and another, are necessary to define common interests, unify efforts, defend them, and complement their roles. It also leads to a wider popular participation in decision-making.

    5. Overcoming Challenges: International Conferences (follow-up), the Private Sector (results), the Internal Structure of Associations

    Currently, there are many international trends in civil society, and numerous objectives. Yet, the common factor is a conviction that building another world of human values, social justice, and human rights is necessary. This requires:

    A. A world order built on participation, democracy, and transparency.
    B. Effective mechanisms for holding establishments accountable.
    C. National governments assuming effective roles in spreading sovereignty, expressing the interests of their citizens through democratic mechanisms that follow the principles of right, citizenship, and the respect of human rights.

    Today, globalization has weakened the role of national governments and local decision-makers to the extent that they lose their ability to lead. This reality increases the need to link the national dimension of NGO activity with the regional and international movements. Therefore, alliances of regional and international networks are important to influence international, regional, and local decision-making.

    In order to do this, the civil sector must formulate its vision that defines the nature of these alliances and priorities. Participating in international conferences and forums requires clear and defined positions that contribute to effective lobbying and exchange. These frameworks have a great capacity to efficiently organize, coordinate, exchange information and experiences, and contribute to reinforcing participation.

    The civil sector is required to observe the conformity of government policies and programs with the decisions of international conferences. This is done through forming social and environmental watches and human rights watches.

    6. Avoiding the Transformation of Networks into an Administrative Burden

    The most important challenge facing the civil sector is its own administrative structure. This can be transformed into an objective but requires additional effort to safeguard it and ensure its continuity.

    Coordination must not change into a tool that replaces members, since the prominent objective of coordination is reinforcing and empowering of members to deliver programs and achieve goals. Consequently, reducing spending on administrative work is a challenge facing most networks in reaching their objectives.

    Ninth: Civil Work: Practices and Implementation

    NGOs in Lebanon have undertaken prominent roles in strengthening and empowering civil society. Coordination frameworks were influential in this success, by helping to set the principle of collective work and gathered together a range of segments in one framework and around common goals. They also helped some countries, including Lebanon, reform legislations and laws by organizing consultation and negotiation campaigns with the state, and by lobbying decision-makers.

    The experiences of coordination in overcoming the challenges of the Lebanese civil war contributed to overcoming the challenges occupation in Palestine. Both challenges had resulted in the absence of government institutions. NGOs played a leading role in providing services in the fields of emergency and relief, in addition to cooperating with public sector institutions and international organizations to coordinate development and social services.

    On the other hand, Lebanese NGOs made a significant contribution despite the attempts of confessional division. They maintained a certain level of communication between areas and religious denominations, through networks and coordination frameworks.

    However, the present situation requires a different approach. The current approach must contribute to establishing the pillars of peace on safe and solid grounds. This is why new structures, visions, objectives, and mechanisms are needed.

    The urgent matter here is shaping a comprehensive developmental vision, influencing public policy, and setting national priorities development and reconstruction policies. It is no longer sufficient to merely provide services and fill gaps in government services.

    The same can be said for the experiences of civil work in other Arab countries. The civil sector is working on developing concepts that correspond to the changes in the nature of civil work (from charity work to developmental work, par excellence).

    Confronting challenges and modernizing public and private policies are not the exclusive responsibility of civil society. Governments also have a role to play, so does the business sector. They must demand the formulation of comprehensive developmental visions and set programs and work plans, as well as distribute roles among the different active stakeholders in society. In addition, challenges require new legal frameworks that give NGOs the freedom of establishment; set objectives, programs, and plans; and address target groups.

    Governments must provide financial and moral support to these organizations. On one hand, they have to allocate budgets for development programs as well as social services that they do not provide. On the other hand, they have to relieve NGOs from fiscal burdens, custom fees, and other problems that weigh them down.

    Strengthening, empowering, and promoting the democratic structure of the civil sector includes setting mechanisms for the circulation of leadership, decision-making, and good governance, and not just the concepts, principles, and public policies.

    Accordingly, the current objectives of networking are institutional development, capacity building, safeguarding collective interest in defending the civil sector, and empowering it to have a balanced relation with both public and private sectors.

    Two questions remain: To what extent have national networks and the current coordination frameworks been successful in becoming strong and efficient local partners of governments? To what extent have they contributed to managing the development process and reflecting the trends of local society?

    *By Ziad Abdel Samad and Kinda Mohamadieh

  • “Partnership within the Interlink between Development, Human Rights, Peace and Security; A Civil Society Perspective from the Arab Region”

    Preface*

    The following paper is meant to be a background for a presentation on best practices of partnership initiatives to promote security, human rights and sustainable development in the Middle East Region, from the perspective of the Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND). It is also meant to focus on ANND’s views on best practices from the experience of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the Arab region, especially in the fields of capacity building, service delivery, and the promotion of good governance, advocacy, and technological advancement.

    Although it will not concentrate specifically on best practices, the following paper will tend to draw upon the challenges of forging effective and successful partnerships in the Arab region. It is a contribution to the debate of the United Nations (UN) Secretary General’s report “In Larger Freedom, Towards Development, Human Rights, Peace and Security” from an Arab civil society perspective. Accordingly, it aims at clarifying the approach by which civil society in the Arab region has looked upon the report and what it implied to them in light of the challenges they face while struggling to contribute to social and human development.

    The paper is divided into five sections;

    - The first section tries to briefly highlight the new understanding of partnership and the UN’s discourse in this regards

    - The second section discusses the issues of global partnership as reflected by the Secretary General’s report, emphasizing the needed role of civil society regarding the three suggested pillars of this partnership; aid, debt, and trade.

    - The third section focuses on the understanding of partnership between civil society and the UN, governments, private sector, and parliamentarians as it was reflected by the Cardoso Report entitled “We the People: Civil Society, the United Nations, and Global Governance”. In addition, it discusses the suggested conceptions and mechanisms of partnership on development, human rights, peace and security as it was presented by the Secretary General’s report “In Larger Freedom, Towards Development, Human Rights, Peace and Security”.

    - The fourth section focuses on partnerships in the Arab region and tries to analyze the main characteristics of Arab civil society and its challenges. In this context, it presents a look into the implications of the Secretary General’s Report on main challenges for the Arab region, including terrorism, reforms and democracy, development, sanctions and weapons of mass destruction, and technical and financial capacities of civil society organizations. This section is based on the outcomes of a discussion seminar on the Secretary General’s report, which was held last July in Lebanon at the UN house, with the participation of 145 civil society representatives from NGOs, academia, trade unions and social movements.

    - The fifth section talks about some of the partnership initiatives that ANND is involved in. It concentrates on partnerships with various UN agencies both at the regional and the national levels, including programs and efforts to tackle the challenges of foreign occupations, and others in the areas of human sustainable development, trade issues, human rights, and democratic change.

    I. Partnership in the New Literature and Concepts of Development

    Partnership has been often integral to mechanisms and processes linked to sustainable development, socio-economic change, and human rights protection. According to the predominant global perspective during the 20th century, the market and the state were the two sets of organizational and institutional tools to reach the goals of development. Now, these two sets of tools have inherent limitations and neither can make up for the deficiency of the other. It is within the context of this public good failure that civil society and non-profit or non-governmental sector develops.

    Partnership among public, private, and civil society has been pursued by the international financial institutions (IFIs) when they were looking to promote their structural adjustment policies (SAP) in the eighties, and later in the nineties when they launched the initiative on poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs). The stress on partnership reached a peak with the increase of debate around the need to reform the IFIs, mainly the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Accordingly, partnership has been increasingly used in the discourse of the UN as well as other international organizations. It has been strongly promoted since the Rio Summit in 1992 and it was a main factor in the implementation process of the resulting Agenda 21.

    The discourse on partnership was maintained throughout the series of global summits during the nineties, including discussions on partnerships for sustainable development, human rights, environmental protection, and social and economic development. The multi-stakeholder partnership approach has been linked to good governance. Accordingly, this concept “has been championed by business groups since the days of the original Earth Summit in Rio….for by institutionalizing their role as stakeholders in official fora, corporations gain considerable influence in any outcomes and benefit from an image boost as they are seen to be part of the solution” .

    Within the partnership discourse, civil society organizations (CSOs) have been the center of attraction, given the values they stand for and positive image they hold. The IFIs, the UN agencies, as well as several governments have quested partnership with various kinds of CSOs. For example, common projects were implemented by many European governments or the European Commission (EC) and NGOs during the eighties. Later, the European Union (EU) took a step further by enhancing the role of CSOs in the whole Barcelona process which was launched in 1995. Moreover, CSOs have increasingly worked towards enhancing partnership and collaboration among each other, in a quest to develop networks and initiate broad-based social movements that could exert enough pressure towards achieving change.

    During the preparations for the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) , partnership was reinforced as the key word. Yet, much debate has been raised on the implications of such a concept, many of which are still lingering to date. The inequality of the three sectors, among which partnership is emphasized, threatens the success of their cooperation, given that outcomes could be engineered to the interest of the powerful. Before the WSSD, several NGOs warned of the risks of partnerships undermining the intergovernmental implementation program and the fact that business, with a much stronger economic power than other groups, will drive the multi-stakeholder dialogue processes. In fact, the troika partnership among public, private, and civil society sectors was sometimes considered as a kind of return to the tiers-état of the pre-French revolution, where two dominant minorities- the public and the private sectors- are in control while the majority- civil society- are marginalized .

    In 2002, the UN has set some criteria on which partnership initiatives would be branded as official outcomes of the Summit. Projects had to be: international both in scope and reach; be new - or if on-going have a demonstrable 'added value' in the context of the Summit - and aimed at implementing Agenda 21, the Millennium Declaration Goals (MDGs) or sustainable activities in developing countries and countries with economies in transition . It is clear that such criteria were not strict or clear and thus could not serve as basis for an efficient and effective selection criterion.
    Although effective partnership is becoming more urgent and necessary given the mounting and interlinked challenges we face today in development, human rights, peace, and security, the appropriate grounds for partnership is still not set yet. Today, partnership still reflects upon the same questions and challenges.

    II. Issues of Global Partnership as Reflected upon by the UN’s Secretary General Report entitled “In Larger Freedom, Towards Development, Human Rights, Peace and Security”

    The Secretary General’s report “In Larger Freedom, Towards Development, Human Rights, Peace and Security”, discussed goal number eight of the MDGs titled “Global Partnership for Development” in a section called “Making Goal 8 Work: Trade and Financing for Development”. The report outlined the discussion in three paragraphs on aid, debt, and trade. Although partnership among government, civil society, and the private sector is not confined to these three areas, it is worth looking into how the UN has perceived them.

    II- 1. On Aid:

    The Secretary General’s report talks about the failure of developed countries to reach their commitment of 0.7% of GDP in aid, which emerged in the 1970’s and was reaffirmed in the series of summits during the nineties, especially in the Monterrey Summit on Financing for Development in 2002. The report highlights that aid amounts decreased from 0.33% in the 1980’s to 0.25% currently. The report also urges all developed countries to set timetables for reaching 0.7% by no later than 2015.

    However, the report does not make reference to how things are expected to change given that the trend has been in consistent deterioration since the 1980’s. It also does not consider the impact of current trends of budget deficits in developed countries, including most European countries, in addition to the failure of the United States’ (US) congress to support its president’s commitments. It further refers to proposals being discussed by countries like Brazil, Chile, France, and Germany on innovative financing, but it does not reflect on any mechanisms for further developing such innovative proposals and increasing foreign aid.

    Moreover, the report indicates that “starting in 2005, developing countries that put forward sound, transparent and accountable national strategies and require increased development assistance should receive a sufficient increase in aid, of sufficient quality and arriving with sufficient speed to enable them to achieve the MDGs” . Yet, the reference to sound, transparent, and accountable national policies is often linked to the conditions set about by the WB. The results of implementing these policies during the eighties and nineties often proved inadequate to developing countries. The report lacks a clear statement on the complete realization of the impact of IFIs’ policies, including that of the WB, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the IMF on the development processes of developing countries.

    The report also talks about “the immediate action to support a series of “quick wins” — relatively inexpensive, high-impact initiatives with the potential to generate major short-term gains and save millions of lives” . In all the above, the report does not mention any role for CSOs, although their capacities to reflect the needs of communities and to facilitate reaching out to most vulnerable groups is most needed in these areas.

    It is essential to stress that external aids should be related to poverty reduction policies, dependant on the harmonization of the development assistance agencies’ policies, practices, and procedures, and dependant as well on the national public capacities in absorbing, managing and distributing this aid. Thus, in all the abovementioned, the role of civil society would be a crucial factor in the process of reforming aid mechanisms and making them more adequate to local and national needs, and, accordingly, more sustainable within the development policies of developing countries.

    II- 2. On Debt:

    The Secretary General’s report talked about the need to “…redefine debt sustainability as the level of debt that allows a country to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and reach 2015 without an increase in debt ratios” . Accordingly, the report called for 100 per cent debt cancellation of highly indebted poor countries’ (HIPCs) and significantly more debt reduction for many heavily indebted middle-income countries. Indeed, progress on debt has been positive given that the debt relief that was lately committed to by the G8 leaders includes debt to the IMF and includes 100% permanent debt cancellation for some poor countries.

    The current proposed debt relief and cancellation schemes immediately benefit 18 countries and could benefit 38 countries in the upcoming years. However, it leaves a lot of other countries that are burdened by their debts, including highly indebted countries such as Sri Lanka, Kenya, and Vietnam . Oxfam, Action Aid, Jubilee 2000 and other international NGOs and advocacy groups on debt calculate that over 60 countries will need 100 per cent of their multilateral debts cancelled if they are to reach the MDGs by 2015 . It is worth noting that the processes related to HIPCs and set according to WB and IMF policy conditions and budget ceilings still play a big part in the qualifying procedures for debt cancellation.

    According to Christian Aid calculations, the HIPC program covered only 6.4 per cent of total debt of the world’s poorest countries. Also, in 2002, only 42 out of 165 developing countries were eligible to the HIPC, out of which 20 complied with the IFIs conditions. In September 2002, a report issued by the WB, on the Status of Implementation of the HIPC, showed that the Bank’s strategy for countries in the HIPC program “exporting themselves out of debt” through exports of primary commodities did not work . Yet, till date, the HIPC and IFI’s policies are being used as basis for debt relief and cancellation programs. Their failure and negative impact on the development process of most involved countries are not addressed in the Secretary General’s report. It ought to be stressed that debt cancellation should be unconditional, taking into consideration the need for mobilizing more resources for development

    Therefore, the report fails to indicate the gaps in the way of dealing with the global debt problems. It does not refer to the failure of real partnerships on programs related to debts such as HIPCs. Moreover, it does not take account of the long term advocacy being led by coalitions of CSOs regarding the need for 100% cancellation of debts in many poor countries in order to make the achievement of the MDGs possible. Accordingly, the positive role that CSOs play in reflecting the needs of communities and their capacities, upon which sustainable debt relief and cancellation can be based, is ignored in the report.

    II- 3. On Trade:

    In paragraphs 55 and 56, the Secretary General’s report addresses the issues of trade. It is evident that trade has not been comprehensively and effectively tackled in the report. The United Nations still has not provided a clear definition of fair trade which works for the people and what it stands for in comparison with free trade. In the latest G8 Summit, the language presented in the communiqué on the ability of countries to decide their own reforms was disappointing from a trade perspective, as it implicitly referred only to African and Least Developed Countries (LDC), while leaving out other developing countries . The Secretary General’s report proceeds in the same direction while calling to successfully complete Doha negotiations by 2006. However, it does not realize that effectively committing to the time of ending the negotiations does not imply that all involved parties have achieved a benefit for their development processes. In this matter, the report fails to address the impact of the disadvantaged position of developing countries under the current system of the WTO.

    A real step forward in this area would necessitate a practical proposal with a set timeframe and mechanisms that address the subsidization system of developed countries, which impacts agriculture- the most important sector for developing countries. Also, practical steps would be needed regarding the implementation of special and differential treatment for developing countries within multilateral and bilateral trade agreements. Moreover, the report fails to address several dynamic trade-related issues, including the global movement of financial assets. According to the latest statistics of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), financial flows reached $400 billion from the South to the North in 2004, while in 1994 the amount was limited to $20 billion. Such issues should be addressed given that the flow of financial assets could represent lost development engines in many developing countries.

    While stressing the importance of committing to the negotiations within the WTO system, the Secretary General’s report did not give any indication on the relevance of the UN Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in pushing the multilateral trade negotiations towards fulfilling their development promise. In civil society’s Forum declaration to UNCTAD XI , civil society groups called upon UNCTAD to “participate actively in the creation and management of multilateral mechanisms…”. They stated that “UNCTAD was created precisely to elaborate and promote Southern development policies by creating a more equitable environment and enabling international economic growth. It must retain and build on this overarching mandate, to further the debate on how to deliver a global trade system that benefits all people and protects the environment” .

    Within this context, no mention has been included on the needed reforms and transparency in the international trade mechanisms, whether it is bilateral, regional, or multilateral. It was expected that reference to a larger role for UNCTAD and a more institutionalized role for relevant CSOs would be core to the UN’s discourse on partnership for better and fairer trade; that which could serve the development policies of developing countries and not vice versa.

    Accordingly, the report highlights the areas on which global partnership is needed, but fails to discuss the mechanisms in which this global partnership is going to be achieved. In addition, none of the nine paragraphs of the report that tackle global partnership refer to the needed roles of CSOs and accountable businesses. It is worth stressing that partnership should lead to changing the traditional donor-recipient relationship and enhancing country ownership and equity between partners. Accordingly, a real partnership is a country led one and could not be achieved without the three sectors; government, civil society, and accountable private sector. While the report does not present a scheme for real partnership in the three main areas: aid, debt, and trade, one cannot but question the extent to which the UN has been able to develop a comprehensive and effective vision for progress on global partnership.

    III. Regarding the Current Conception and Mechanisms of Partnership; the Importance of Partnership between Civil Society and the United Nations

    III-1. A Look into the Cardoso Report Entitled “We the People: Civil Society, the United Nations, and Global Governance”

    In the Cordoso report, the vision for a future conception of civil society and its relation with the UN was laid out. In the words of Cardoso , chair of the panel that prepared the abovementioned report, collaboration between UN and civil society is a necessity and not an option ; it is entrenched in Article 71 of the 1945 United Nations Charter .

    Accordingly, the UN needs to make full use of the capacities of the civil society sector. Yet, the approach of the Cardoso report towards setting a broader perspective on what civil society is implies several questions that impact the core of future relations between civil society and the UN, government, and the private sector. The report talks about the importance of the UN’s convening power, which is vital for enhancing partnerships among various sectors. However, the approach and conceptions presented in the report do not lead us to a vision of clearer relations between the three sectors and accordingly to more effective and efficient mechanisms.

    Primarily, it is important to realize that enhancing the relationship between the UN and civil society ought to be a priority. Through this relation, a better and more balanced relation between civil society and governments as well as civil society and the private sector can be achieved . Accordingly, the UN holds the challenge of working with civil society to develop a more adequate environment for CSOs to develop such partnerships; one which will not impact their neutrality, credibility, and transparency.

    In this context, it is important to realize that specifically in countries where spaces for democratic processes are still limited and where CSOs are faced with an inadequate association law, the threat to their independent existence is much higher. The UN, in its quest to develop the concept of effective and needed partnerships, is thus required to address the impact of the current undemocratic State processes which do not align with international conventions on human rights, including the emerging unilateralism in global affairs as well as some countries’ undemocratic and suppressive practices against civic engagement.

    In setting the grounds for the thirty proposals it outlines, the Cardoso report assimilates among civil society and the private sector, represented here in the form of associations of businesses, local authorities, and parliamentarians. Such an approach is worth reconsideration. For the fundamental characteristics of NGOs referred to in Article 71 of the United Nations charter include :

    • Separation and independence from the structures and functions of government
    • Aims and purposes that are not primarily commercial, or 'for profit'

    The inclusion of civil society, profitable businesses, and parliamentarians together under the Office of Constituency Engagement and Partnerships, which is called for by proposal 24 of the Cardoso report, could lead to increased confusion about NGOs and their Charter relationship to the UN . It also opposes efforts to enhance the special role that non-governmental and non-profitable entities can play with and within the UN system, towards strengthening more “civic space in which ideas can be freely held and in which law is paramount and assistance is rendered on the basis of needs and nothing else” .

    III-1.a. Partnership with the Private Sector:

    Given the difference in the nature and mechanisms of their work and engagement with society, there is a lack of trust between CSOs and the private sector, which all UN proposals on partnership fails to address. CSOs have had serious reservations about endorsing the proposal of incorporating the Global Compact into the proposed UN Office of Constituency Engagement and Partnerships. Several multinational companies have been engaged in violations of human rights and environmental standards in many parts of the World. When the negative impact of globalization is blamed on big multi-national corporations a real partnership which is built on “shared commitment by all stakeholders, participatory processes, and common definition of tasks, professionalism, respect, and equity …” is not very feasible. For any kind of partnership should not avoid considering corporate responsibility in dealing with aspects of social misconduct.
    Going back to the WSSD in 2002, it was clearly noticed that “the most vocal supporters of the partnership approach were generally corporations from some of the most environmental and socially dubious industries - namely oil, gas, chemicals, and mining” . Partnership projects with NGOs and the UN agencies are seen as means for cover up and for marketing industries as socially responsible. This being said, till date the impact and effectiveness of Type II partnerships between governments, UN, civil society, and the private sector have not been assessed.
    The relationship between these sectors, which was further proposed in the Cardoso report, fails to clarify the kind of engagement it aims at. It also creates a lot of tension by clustering civil society and private sector in one group, which blemishes the image that civil society is built on; that of defenders of human, social, environmental, economic, and cultural rights. While civil society groups are committed to proving their accountability, transparency, and legitimacy to the UN, there is an absence of any regulations that requests of companies to present evidence of their commitment to social responsibility. This adds to the complexities in the relationship between CSOs and their proclaimed partners in the private sector, especially larger multinationals which have often been related to endeavors of social, environmental, and human misconduct.

    It is therefore worth noting that the UN’s initiative “Global Compact”, should secure an efficient implementation of corporate social responsibility in order to develop the relation and trust between CSOs and the private sector. CSOs mistrust the commitment of corporations to human rights, environmental sustainability, and social responsibility. Accordingly, the UN ought to ask corporations to present social responsibility reports that address their commitment to society. Moreover, public-private partnership should be complemented by a partnership with civil society, as a prerequisite for the implementation of national strategies.

    It is worth mentioning in this regard that the report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change stated under the reform of the Security Council that “reforms should, in honoring Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations, increase the involvement in decision-making of those who contribute most to the United Nations financially, militarily, and diplomatically…..”. This proposition was completely adopted by the Secretary General in his report to the upcoming General Assembly (GA). In this context, and given the growing support of the private sector’s role within the UN’s processes, there is a threat that this will eventually mean a greater influence of huge multinationals on policy making within the Security Council. If not directly, then through the financial contributions of these companies to their states, intervention into the Security Council’s affairs could be achieved. This is of relevance given that from the start, the relationship of the UN with the private sector, reflected by the Global Compact initiative, was built on the financial contributions of the private sector. This in turn could have serious implications on the kind and balance of partnership being currently promoted by the UN.

    III-1.b. Partnership with Parliamentarians:

    The Inter-Parliamentary Union has been already set in place to play the role of systematically engaging parliamentarians and sensitizing them to global issues. The new proposition for partnership with parliamentarians in the Cardoso report extends the current structure, and proposes a four-point strategy which includes:

    • Taking UN issues to national parliaments more systematically
    • Ensuring that parliamentarians coming to UN events have more strategic roles at those events
    • Linking parliaments themselves with the international deliberative processes
    • Providing an institutional home in the UN to engage parliamentarians

    Yet, it is worth noting that the role of parliamentarians is to monitor the executive body and processes at the national level, and therefore, the participation of parliamentarians in the multilateral decision-making process could affect and ultimately limit their national monitoring role. Indeed, the Cardoso report propositions can benefit in enhancing the motto of “thinking locally, acting globally”, on which the team of eminent persons have based their approach. However, there is a real threat to be taken into consideration; when taking part in forming policies at the global level, parliamentarians could be caught up in the political trade-offs that influence the current processes of global decision making. This could limit the effectiveness of their role at the national levels and their neutrality on policy making.

    III-2. The Secretary General’s Report “In Larger Freedom; Towards Development, Human Rights, Peace and Security”, and its Implications on the Understanding of Partnership

    Based on outcomes of all the UN Summits during the nineties and the review of the five years since the launch of the MDGs in the year 2000, the Secretary General’s report presented an indispensable link between development, human rights, peace and security, as well as the reform of the UN. Accordingly, the global issues we face today cannot be the responsibility of officials alone, whether elected or assigned. Individuals and CSOs have an essential role in the decision-making process. Moreover, given this link, partnership with civil society cannot be limited to one of the above mentioned fields. To be comprehensive and effective, partnership should be developed on all interlinked dimensions.

    Here from, reforms of the bodies and mechanisms through which partnership of civil society and the UN is administered are definitely needed in order to enhance this partnership. Reforms need to address means to overcome the limited role that civil society plays with the UN on issues of peace and security, compared to the role they play on issues of development and human rights.

    These reforms should target a partnership where objectives and targets are clearly defined. Partnership should mainly target the challenges of sustainable human development within a framework of comprehensive vision and strategies, and thus should have clear implementation strategies In order to attain its objectives, partnership can effectively exist only if it is between equal partners, whose partnership extend in policy-making, setting mechanisms, implementation, as well as assessment and evaluation. In this regards, a strong and independent civil society is a vital pillar of a successful and comprehensive partnership plan.

    III-2.a. On Development:

    The MDGs are leading development processes in the world today. The 60th GA of the UN will look into the achievements on the MDGs’ tracks since five years.

    On one hand, when looking into how the Secretary General’s report tackled development and partnership, we realize that the role of the private sector was overemphasized in sections compared to that of CSOs.

    Paragraph 32 of the report stated that “each developing country has primary responsibility for its own development —strengthening governance, combating corruption and putting in place the policies and investments to drive private sector- led growth…” Also, paragraph 37 similarly stated that “without dynamic, growth-oriented economic policies supporting a healthy private sector capable of generating jobs, income and tax revenues over time, sustainable economic growth will not be achieved….”.

    This approach could be a step towards limiting the scope of the public sector’s role, especially that the report goes on with discussing needed national investment and policy strategies in seven clusters- gender, equality, rural development, urban development, health systems, education, and science and technology- based on private-sector led growth. Accordingly, it is of high importance to redefine the commitment of the public sector regarding basic services such as education as well as the processes of investing in human resources.

    On the other hand, the role of civil society has been described as critical in the implementation process, delivering of services, and mobilizing of grassroots on accountability issues. This description is limited to the implementation phase and does not reflect the needed full partnership and thus equality of all groups on various levels of policy making, implementation, and assessment.

    In the same direction, paragraph 38 dedicated to describing the envisioned role of civil society, talks about the role of CSOs in service delivery and in advocacy and lobbying by mobilizing grassroots and interest groups, and at the international level in exerting pressure and lobbing on core issues .

    Yet, unlike what was recommended in regards to the private sectors’ role, the report does not recommend that the government open more space for civil society groups to exercise a real partnership role with other sectors. Even if CSOs are involved on these various levels in some countries, their involvement at the policy making level will not be effective except if the government makes available enough space for their voices to be heard, in a consistent and institutionalized manner and not merely on occasions. Not just on development and human rights issues, but also on political and security issues, CSOs involved in advocacy and lobbying could have a critical role in complementing the efforts of their respective states.

    Moreover, the eighth goal of the MDGs, which is key among other goals, given that it tackles global partnership as prerequisite for the realization of the millennium challenges, is still vague in its presentation. Goal number eight revolves around the global economic system and trade relations, control of mechanisms for international exchange, job creation and unemployment problems, as well as aid and debt, among other issues. As discussed in section II of this paper, the Secretary General’s report tried to set medium-term mechanisms to address those issues. Long has been the debate around these issues in various literatures; yet, till now, no practical mechanisms has been set in place for a comprehensive and effective partnership between government, international institutions, civil society, and the private sector.

    III-2.b. On Human Rights:
    Although CSOs have been relatively more active within the UN’s human rights processes than in other areas, the current structure of human rights follow-up needs a lot of scrutiny . Principle weaknesses in the processes of the UN Commission on Human Rights result from the violations of human rights that the Commissions’ own members commit.
    In light of this, the UN report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change tackles the criteria of membership in the commission, calling for its expansion to a Human Rights Council including all 191 members of the UN. However, it is evident that such a recommendation will lead to weakening the focus of the Commission instead of enhancing and strengthening its mechanisms of cooperation. Also, this recommendation does not serve the betterment of civil society’s role with the Commission, since it could lead to a similar problem of inefficiency that the GA faces while trying to engage with non-state members , in addition to inefficiency of the consultative status given to CSOs with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).
    In general, the approach and proposals, presented under section IV of the Secretary General’s report entitled “Freedom to Live in Dignity”, are not enough to guarantee the respect of human rights. The Secretary General says that respect of human rights will preserve our moral and ethical positions and commitments, explaining in paragraph 140 that: “Strategies based on the protection of human rights are vital for both our moral standing and the practical effectiveness of our actions”. Accordingly, the Secretary General asks for consideration of human rights while he does not talk about the need to commit to human rights.

    However, the level of commitment cannot be merely an ethical issue but should be of legal – practical dimensions, including the ratification of the conventions and the modification of national laws and regulations accordingly, thus meeting the standards set by the international laws and conventions. Through making commitment a legal process, the mechanisms for partnership between various stakeholders, including human rights country teams and involved CSOs is automatically strengthened. This reassurance is the first step towards reforming this aspect of the UN’s work and harmonizing guidelines on all treaties.

    Thus, the partnership process concerning human rights rests mainly on their actual implementation as the principle purpose of the UN. This could require a major reform in the reporting procedures, by which the parallel reports presented by CSOs on national human rights conditions become obligatory. Moreover, a set of human rights criteria should be applied to the members of the Commission on Human Rights, which ought to be transformed into a mixed commission where CSOs have an institutionalized role. Civil society’s membership would be led by accredited civil society groups within the UN system, and covers the same countries which are members of the Commission.

    III-2.c. On Peace and Security:

    The Secretary General’s report calls the UN for the adoption of responsibility for protection and security. Paragraph 135 of the report states that: “The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and more recently the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change…endorsed what they described as an emerging norm that there is a collective responsibility to protect” .

    However, the mechanisms and measures for implementing such a responsibility and the role of the Security Council in such processes are not clear, especially under the impact of the veto power, double standards, and balances of political powers. In addition, the report talks about the International Criminal Court in adjudicating disputes among states to preserve peace. Yet, experiences of special courts for Yugoslavia and Rwanda highlight the challenge between international and national laws, which has not been addressed by the report.

    In the section on Freedom from Fear, only one mention of a possible role of civil society has been included under the section on “Preventing Catastrophic Terrorism”, which is stated in paragraph 88 . This reflects a lack of vision on partnership with CSOs regarding peace and security issues, which is essential for a comprehensive vision of partnership on the interlinked factors of development, human rights, and peace and security.

    The absence of adequate consideration of mechanisms for civil society’s role on issues of peace and security could lead to a situation where CSOs play the role of agents in the fight against terrorists and not partners in the struggle to end the social and economic reasons that lie at the roots of emerging terrorist groups. Under these circumstances and in the absence of a clear definition of terrorism, which realizes the rights of people to self determination and to organize resistance against occupation, the Secretary General’s call upon civil society groups could lead to internal destabilization and thus threatens their role in general.

    It is worth noting that the interlink between development, human rights, peace and security should not lead to an inadequate focus on the bi-products of the lack of sustainable development, respect of human rights, and human security. Accordingly, terrorism, which is the bi-product of numerous ills in society, should not be the focus. But, the achievement of sustainable human development and security, within a system based on human rights should be the focus of partnerships. Everything else, including a clear definition of terrorism and the way to struggle against it should represent a support to these processes.

    The future visions on peace and security issues are further developed through tackling reforms of the Security Council. The Security Council represents the most politicized organ of the UN and it is the main decision-making body regarding peace and security issues, as referenced in section V and VI of the UN’s Charter. It is also the most complex entity in terms of trying to achieve the ‘think locally act globally’ approach, which was recommended by the Panel on the UN-Civil Society relations. The Cardoso report discusses means of enhancing civil society engagement with the Security Council. Accordingly, it calls for strengthening dialogue with civil society, improving the planning and effectiveness of the Arria formula meetings by lengthening lead times and covering travel costs to increase the participation of actors from the field, ensuring that the Security Council field missions meet regularly with appropriate local civil society leaders, international humanitarian NGOs and perhaps others, such as business leaders, installing an experimental series of Security Council seminars to discuss issues of emerging importance to the Council serviced by the Secretariat, and convening independent commissions of inquiry after Council mandated operations.

    Yet, in the report on the Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, discussion of the Security Council reform included a fast and unclear mention in paragraph 260 of the role of civil society, in the form of a “welcome for greater civil society engagement in the work of the Security Council”. The report did not endorse any of the mechanisms presented by the Cardoso report nor did it introduce new mechanisms of implementation of such steps. As for the Secretary General’s report, it came to endorse all what the Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change introduced regarding the reform of the Security Council, but dropped the invitation for civil society engagement.

    This further reflects the lack of commitment to enhance partnership with CSOs on issues of peace and security. It thus indicates a gap in the understanding of the nature of threats the world faces today, which necessitates a consideration of the voices of CSOs and what they represent.

    IV. Where is Partnership for the Arab Region?

    The Arab Region is witnessing an increase in the number of national and regional civil society groups, including networks, organizations, and platforms. This is due to the rise of political, economic, social, and cultural challenges, both at the national and regional levels. Consequently, new dynamics for facing the negative impacts of globalization and for enhancing the adequate integration in the global system are emerging. Yet, developing partnerships should take into consideration several factors regarding the nature and current role of CSOs in various Arab countries.

    The concept of charity within Arab culture and religions has had a central influence on the emergence of civil society activities and structures. Services to special social cases such as orphans, people with disability, the poor, and many other hardship cases are mainly offered by social welfare associations affiliated to religious institutions. Both Islamic and Christian entities encourage welfare activities. Moreover, such kinds of institutions attain a high level of trust, and consequently support from the public, given their religious affiliations. Despite the important role that charity-based organizations play in the service provision sector, their role does not extend to advocacy and policy-influencing activities. Accordingly, partnerships fostered by these organizations are often developed with other service provision organizations, and are often limited within the scope to a specific community.

    In countries that experienced war and internal conflicts, such as Lebanon and Palestine, CSOs have been focused on emergency and relief activities. Given the partial or complete absence of government structures and related social services in periods of conflict, CSOs, specifically NGOs, have had a major role in providing such kinds of services. Under such conditions, NGOs were an essential factor in sustaining the daily lives and needs of the citizens and had an essential role in providing humanitarian aid and medical services. They showed specialization in several areas, such as social and human development, health, education, rural development, and human rights. Both Palestinian and Lebanese NGOs provided service delivery, networking, mobilization, and creation of “support systems” of various kinds, ranging from day-care centers to income-generating projects. However, in the post-conflict period, CSOs in both countries faced a big challenge in moving from purely humanitarian and relief activities to a more comprehensive role that tackles service provision, capacity building, as well as advocacy and lobbying on policy-making processes.

    The challenges of human development in the world today necessitates the formulation of comprehensive development approaches that can target and influence the formation of a political will, through national and/or regional strategies and programs based on the solid understanding of partnership. Yet, the conditions for such an approach are still incomplete in the Arab region. Given the impact of the abovementioned realities on the emergence of civil society, the role of this sector remains incomplete, whereby it lacks advocacy capacities and influence on national policies and strategies.

    IV-1. Categories of the Arab Countries and Civil Society Prospects in Each

    When looking into the current and prospective partnerships between civil society organizations and the public sector, it should be considered that each of the Arab countries has different experiences, a different history, different priorities, different approaches, and different working conditions. Accordingly, the countries of the Arab region could be divided into four main categories given the enabling environment and the roles CSOs play in each:

    A first category covers countries where CSOs are increasingly becoming partners in some social fields.

    These countries are either democratic systems or are emerging democracies. Partnerships are often limited to social services such as education, health and primary health care, as well as environmental programs. In addition partnerships are emerging in areas of poverty alleviation, community development, particularly in the rural areas, and popular education. In some of the these countries, special consultative councils were established such as the Economic and Social Council in Lebanon to serve as an area for consultation and exchange between the various civil society groups (NGOs, trade unions, academia, social movements, private and business sectors, media, and experts). However, these councils remained formal and inefficient in most of the cases.

    In several other emerging democracies, CSOs have been nominated in public sector committees for reform and administrative development. In addition, human rights organizations have been actively defending political, economic, social, and cultural rights. They are active in protecting the rights of vulnerable groups such as women, children, elderly, and people with special needs. Accordingly, some Arab NGOs have been taking an effective part in the annual meetings of the High Commission on Human Rights in the UN headquarters in Geneva. They present the Commission with alternative reports on issues of democracy, human rights, and development, but mainly on foreign occupation and the right to self-determination.

    Sometimes, association laws in these countries are adequate and protective of CSOs, yet governments could periodically disrupt the proper implementation of these laws. This reflects the lack of a stable relationship between civil society and government and thus the unavailability of full acceptance of the role of civil society from the government.

    A second category covers countries where the dominance of the state is still very strong, although some are currently witnessing a period of transition. In these countries, CSOs exist and are developing; however partnership is very limited with their governments whereby often there exists a confrontational relationship between the two sectors.
    Some of these countries have a very active civil society. But at the same time, its impact is not strong and efficient enough in order to introduce changes at the political level and in the socio-economic policies, because the system is highly centralized and has a strong control over society. These conditions could sometimes lead to an oppressive environment and offensive practices that limit civil societies’ work, especially that of human rights groups.
    A third category covers the countries where totalitarian regimes are in power. Under such regimes CSOs are perceived as a threat to government’s control over society. Also, there is a lack of any space for civil society to be organized independently, given that emergency laws/ Marshal Laws restrict the formation of such associations. These countries have some of the weakest civil society groups and the most hostile environments to operate in. Also, their governments often tend to create groups that operate as non-governmental organizations, which are the creation of the state and the implementers of its policies.

    A fourth category covers special cases of countries in conflict. These include:

    - Palestine, which has a very strong civil society that represents solid grounds for building partnerships. For example, the Palestinian Agricultural relief Committees (PARC) and the Ministry of Agriculture have joined efforts to build the capacities of the employees and workers in the sector. CSOs in Palestine are well-organized and they have built coalitions based on clear and strong objectives, as well as well-defined strategies and well-developed implementing bodies. Palestinian civil society groups work in numerous fields, often trying to contribute to alleviating the impact of the occupation. During the peace process, Palestinian civil society groups found themselves competing with the Palestinian Authority as it tried to co-opt CSOs while trying to establish government services. But with the outbreak of the second Intifada, they resumed their former role.

    - Sudan, which has a strong civil society that is active in poverty eradication, women empowerment, as well as the national reconciliation process and peace building. The Sudanese civil society realizes the importance of the role they should play in supporting national unity, building democracy, and enhancing good governance practices, as well as in fighting trends towards cocooning within political and tribal affiliations. Yet, Sudanese CSOs face critical financial problems in the post-war period, given the high needs in the process of rebuilding the country and resettling refugees in their lands. They also face the complexities of tribal, ethnic, and geographical affiliations of people in Sudan, which could often be a barrier to fostering more coordination and eventually partnerships Moreover, Sudanese CSOs face some tension with the government regarding an adequate legal framework that could allow them to play the needed role in the post-war period.

    - Iraq, which has an emerging civil society, whose role is still not very well defined given the chaotic living conditions and situation in the country. Currently, the status of civil society in Iraq presents one of the major challenges for civil society in the Arab region. There is a tremendous need for investing in building a civil and democratic society in Iraq, which would be a precondition for building a strong national government. The best way, and maybe the unique way to end the foreign occupation and to conserve the Iraqi national unity is to invest in building a strong and capable civil society and civic movements. Although human resources in Iraq are highly qualified, there is a need to contribute to the capacity building of civil society structures and institutions after decades of totalitarian regimes and deprivation from democracy and human rights.

    Iraqi CSOs could play a major role in healing social wounds through networking and learning from each other, especially since, well before the occupation, many NGOs in Northern Iraq had acquired significant experience in various fields like healthcare, education, gender, emergency and relief, post conflict reconstruction, and human rights. Thus, Iraqi CSOs ought to assess their needs and to build their capacities, so they would lead the process of development in Iraq.

    Yet, in general there is a trend of change in the Arab region as a whole. Even the governments themselves are feeling that there is a need to change, taking into consideration the recent meetings on democracy in Sana’a - Yemen and in Alexandria - Egypt as positive signs. It is inevitable that a strong partnership with governments is needed when civil society seeks participation in decision-making, in the implementation of taken decisions, and in the evaluation of policy implementation. However, real partnership is based on equal relations, mutual respect, and autonomy. In reference to the Arab Human Development Report 2002 , the main challenges facing development, besides gender inequality and the knowledge gap, are freedom and democracy, particularly freedom of association, freedom of political organizations, and freedom of expression. Therefore, real partnership based on equal relations, mutual respect, and autonomy cannot be achieved unless we witness real political changes towards more democratic regimes, more respect of human rights, and more spaces for various social actors to voice out their concerns.

    IV-2. The Implications of the Secretary General’s Report on Terrorism, Reforms and Democracy, Development, Sanctions and Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Technical and Financial Capacities of CSOs

    In the Arab region, the need for partnership between governments, the UN, and civil society is very strong; however, the ability to build this partnership is very weak. In the context of the interlinked issues laid out by the UN’s Secretary General in his report to the GA, the main concerns for civil society organizations in the Arab region, while considering the attempt to build national, regional, as well as global partnerships, abide in several factors including:

    V-2.a. Terrorism, Occupation, and Conflicts

    The Arab region has been caught up in challenges of foreign occupation and conflict for more than fifty years, most notably the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the war on and occupation of Iraq. The impact of these conflicts was never country specific, but impacted the region as a whole. In addition to many internal conflicts where foreign interferences were obvious such as in Lebanon, Sudan, and also in Kuwait, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Algeria and many other countries, Arab governments have often resisted change under the claim that the challenge of occupation and foreign intervention in the region necessitates the state to have a strong control over society and people’s association.

    Currently, the Arab region faces the challenge of terrorism, not only as a target of several terrorist attacks in many countries, but also because it holds the blame of being the main origin of terrorist groups in the world today. These issues represent main challenges for all civil society groups and individuals in the Arab region; as they represented a determinant of their past will as well represent a determinant of their future.

    Given the new approach of interlinking development, human rights, and peace and security together as indivisible challenges, civil society in the Arab region was positively looking towards a real global partnership for addressing these issues collectively and fairly. Yet, several questionable areas in the latest report of the Secretary General in regards to these issues could represent a hinder for any prospects in this area.

    First of all, the report represents a bias in addressing the threats facing the world today through stressing the impact of threats on specific regions in spite of its global nature. In paragraph 80 of the report, it is stated that: “In our globalized world, the threats we face are interconnected…A nuclear terrorist attack on the United States or Europe would have devastating effects on the whole world…”. This paragraph solely refers to the US and Europe with no reference or consideration to other countries or regions. This ambiguity can lead to a situation where threats are only treated when they are directed to the super powers and thus impact their interests regardless of their effect on other countries.

    Such bias is also clear in the Middle East region; for example Israel is given the right to own weapons of mass destruction while all other countries are fought against due to claims of owning such weapons. This exists despite the fact that all the countries in the region are threatened by the overall situation. Moreover Paragraph 91 states that: “It is time to set aside debates on so-called “State terrorism”. The use of force by States is already thoroughly regulated under international law. …”. This approach leads to an inability to take action against states such as Israel, which still do not abide by these agreements.

    Moreover, not having a clear understanding and definition of terrorism and the factors that breed such trends leads to a mistreatment of this threat. It is worth noting that today, terrorism’s definition is set through the understanding that the super powers are advocating for, while all other forms of terrorism are disregarded, including terrorism of the state. The latter do not fall under the adopted definition and understanding because they do not threaten the interests of the super powers. Despite the highly complicated task to define terrorism due to the diverse approaches, a definition of terrorism and terrorists remains a baseline for any efforts invested in dealing with the issue of terrorism and its effects on world security. In this regards, the UN should be the reference to elaborate a definition reflecting the interests of all member states, and not only specific interests.

    Paragraph 90 of the Secretary General’s report states that: “… the moral authority of the United Nations and its strength in condemning terrorism have been hampered by the inability of Member States to agree on a comprehensive convention that includes a definition”. Moreover, the report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change clearly states in paragraph 160 that: “The search for an agreed definition usually stumbles on two issues; the first is the argument that any definition should included State’s use of armed forces against civilians…..the second objection is that people’s under foreign occupation have a right to resistance and a definition of terrorism should not override this right………”. The report explains here that: “The central point is that there is nothing in the fact of occupation that justifies the targeting and killing of civilians”. Accordingly, it is important to stress the vitality and urgency of reaching a clear and well stated definition of terrorism, in which there is a clear reference to people’s right to self-determination and to organizing resistance against foreign occupation.

    Within the existing and possible double standards, resulting mistrust could form a real barrier for enhanced relations between CSOs from the Arab region and various UN agencies. This would limit the possibility of a convening role for the UN between CSOs and governments in the region.

    IV-2.b. Reforms and Democracy

    Reforms and democratic processes are a priority on the agendas of Arab States. Several developments have been taking place in the region, among which are the participation of Kuwaiti women in voting, the organization of municipality elections in Saudi Arabia, the elaboration of a new constitution in Qatar, the modification of the electoral law in Egypt, as well as the issuing of the Arab League that convened in Tunisia on reforms and democracy. These steps ought to be supported and internally pushed by the UN structures.

    Regarding issues of democracy, the UN’s report stresses the Secretary General’s efforts to make the UN activities more coherent and coordinated. This was reflected for example in linking activities of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Electoral Assistance Department. Accordingly, the Secretary General recommends that the UN should not limit its efforts to setting standards and criteria, but it should move towards supporting its member countries in enhancing internal democratic processes. Here lies an unanswered question on the role of the UN in protecting citizens against states that refuse to respect citizens’ rights. It highlights the debates on reforms and democratization in the Arab region and the conflicts between external dynamics and pressures on one hand and internal processes on the other.

    Moreover, the ambiguity regarding mechanisms for implementing international laws at the national levels and achieving a real, but not a contested role for the UN in national processes of democratic change could weaken the role of CSOs in such process. CSOs, whose role is referenced in the international conventions of human rights, will lack a supportive role from the UN, especially in countries where they still struggle for an adequate operating environment and association law.

    IV-2.c. Development as a Priority

    When it comes to sustainable development, Arab states often lack a concrete agenda defining clearly set priorities. Accordingly, development issues have not been a priority on the agenda of Arab governments, in comparison to other national issues such as sovereignty, independence, occupation, and instability. CSOs struggle to put development issues on the official agenda. This reality has a significant impact on the ability to find common grounds between agendas of states and that of civil society. Accordingly, partnerships on development issues are hard to develop.

    Furthermore, development policies have often been overshadowed by the complex political dynamics that the region faces. Arab countries have been long involved with national liberation agendas and regional anti neo-colonial policies, while marginalizing the need for national development agendas based on local needs, specifics, and priorities. Arab leaders and decision-makers did not consider that strengthening democratic processes and sustainable development policies at a local level would enhance and support the sovereignty of the Arab States at the regional and international levels. The Arab region does contain huge resources that are supposed to be the wheel for development, however regional and national conflicts have made these resources useless. In this context, and with the continuing of the Palestinian- Israeli conflict and the occupation of Iraq, most Arab states have reached a stagnant and deteriorated situation where civil society is controlled and weak, human development indicators are low, and trends are negative.

    Moreover, while concentrating on issues of reforms and regional threats, Arab States have had limited capacities dedicated to issues of development. Accordingly, the weakness of the public sector’s role often led to a lack of solid foundations for partnership. In spite of this, States also tend to set a limit on the role of CSOs, which struggle for development at the local and national levels. In many countries, CSOs do not enjoy the simple right to exist, where the freedom of association is a lacking concept. They are not yet recognized as legitimate partners for social change and progress towards sustainable development and they often face pressures and obstacles from the government. Given the limitations on freedom of association and the lack of democratic practices, CSOs find themselves fighting for their right to exist and for the defense of basic human rights, instead of participating in achieving progress at the development front.

    Regarding the processes of the MDGs, most reports have stressed that a successful campaign requires strong and consolidated partnerships, coherence of efforts and sharing of information. Yet, in the Arab countries, it is clear that the relationship and coordination described above has not been developed. For example, in several Arab countries, the government has been leading the processes of preparing MDGs reports’ (MDGRs) in close coordination with the UN agencies, mainly the UNDP. In others, the government’s role was relatively limited and the UN was leading the process. The exclusion of both CSOs as well as the business sector from the preparations of the MDGRs in most Arab countries is a clear indicator that the relationships between the two sectors and Arab governments have not been enhanced within the campaign.

    Besides the failure of governments and UN agencies to enhance the processes of partnership with civil society on the MDGs, it is worth realizing that CSOs should consider whether they have been able to successfully shift from the raising awareness phase to the phase of implementing practical steps that could lead to real change in people’s living conditions. Real partnership would necessitate that CSOs be partners at all levels, including policy formulation and evaluation. Arab CSOs ought to realize that the MDGs can serve as an effective

  • Discussion Paper on the Report of the United Nation Secretary General High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change

    I- Overview

    The UN stands at a time of great promise and need. Despite the many commitments that have been made over the sixty years of its existence, many of these obligations and commitments haven’t been met .

    The incident of 9 11 have changed the understanding of international order and security.

    II- Introduction

    The “report of the High Level panel on Threats, challenges and change” reflects the trend in which the debate on and understanding of concepts that are basic to the World security is being formulated. Thus the discussion of the report ought to concentrate more on the line of thought that it presents and reflects more than the mere content and propositions presented in it.

    The report summarizes the elements of threat to World security in six main points; (1) social and economic factors, (2) inter-state conflicts, (3) internal conflicts and wars, (4) spread of weapons of mass destruction, (5) terrorism, and (6) trans-national organized crime.

    Moreover, it divides those sources into two groups of threats; hard and soft. Yet, the report focuses on the hard threats, specifically on the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism, while dealing with the other four sources as soft threats.

    This theoretical categorization is based on the fact that dealing with the hard threats overcomes the capacities of the UN system and necessitates the interventions of the state super powers. This reflects an underlying deal that advocates the need to provide legitimacy to the super powers to undertake the responsibility to fight against the hard threats. In return, the UN system is offered aid and support, through financial and other kind of assistance, by the super powers in order to deal with the soft threats.

    III- Hard type of threats; WMD and terrorism

    Although the inter-relation between the six main threats of Human Security is mentioned in the report, the reflected approach undermines this inter-relation. Therefore it is not clear that there is a need to address them at the same level of consideration, and that it is a common responsibility to deal with. This ambiguity can lead to a situation where threats are only treated when they are directed to the super powers and thus impact their interests regardless of their effect on other countries. The example of such bias is clear in the Middle East region; Israel is given the right to own weapons of mass destruction while all other countries are fought against due to claims of owning such weapons equally. This exists despite the fact that all the countries in the region are threatened by the overall situation.

    Moreover, not having a clear understanding and definition of terrorism and the factors that bread such trends leads to a mistreatment of this threat to the whole world. It is worth noting that today terrorism’s definition is also set through the understanding that the super powers are advocating for, while all other forms of terrorism are disregarded since they do not fall under the adopted definition and understanding, and thus they do not threaten the interests of the super powers.

    Despite the highly complicated task to define terrorism due to the diverse approaches, as it was mentioned in the report, still a definition of terrorism and terrorists is a baseline for any efforts invested in dealing with the issue of terrorism and its effects on world security. In this regards, the UN should be the reference to elaborate the definition reflecting the interests of all member states and not specific interests.

    IV- Reforming the UN

    The initiatives to reform the UN are mainly concentrating on the enlargement of the Security Council. Therefore, most of the efforts are being done to achieve an agreement on the enlargement of this very important UN body, where the decision making is mostly concentrated. It is worth noting that the five permanent members of the Security Council have the right to use the veto, which is the right to stop any process if it is not in the interest of one or more of those permanent members. Furthermore, the suggestions included in the report are trying to enlarge the number of the permanent and non-permanent members of the council and to introduce some modifications on the right to the use of veto. The main problem in this regard is that efforts are tackling the shape and the form of the institution instead of working more on its definition of its role and the political contents.

    Reforming the UN requires a significant role of the General assembly in formulating binding and enforceable laws. This lead to the fact that the UN should have full jurisdiction to intervene in order to carry out its obligations as contained in its charter and other treaty processes. (Wheeler)

    Member states should be equals and no member state is more important nor has any more power within the UN, therefore, the equal voting right should not be violated.

    Funding is the most significant cause of the UN’s inability to fulfill the repeated commitments made by the member states.

    V- Right to military intervention

    According to the UN charter, Security Council can take measures to military intervention only after the five criteria are considered. Moreover, the right to military intervention is also given for “Self Defense” reasons. This right was abused by the US in order to justify the intervention on Iraq. Yet, all the arguments given and the evidences cited by the Secretary of State during the last meeting of the Security Council before leading the war, couldn’t convince other members of the Council.

    Later on, the whole world witnessed how falsified those evidences and arguments were. Therefore the criteria such as the seriousness of threats, the proper purpose, the proportional of means and the balance of consequences were not respected. This specific case leads to the conclusion that any military intervention requires a consensus among Security Council members, particularly because the five criteria cannot be in any case a matter of conflict or misunderstanding among them. Therefore, this specific case should also lead the UN Security Council to reconsider its “rights based approach” in favor of a “rights and responsibilities approach”, which puts forward mechanisms to hold any country accountable to the decision they take without the decision or the consensus of the Council.
    Moreover, the panel recommended that the decision to the use of force to address external threats should be based on five criteria: (1) serious of threats, (2) proper purpose, (3) Last resort, (4) proportional means and (5) Balance of consequences.

    The report mentions that one of the resorts before a military intervention is sanctions; sanctions were used as a tool against Sudan, Libya and Iraq. It is worth noting that it was shown in practice that the results of the mechanisms of implementing the sanctions did not yield to the expected outcomes. It increased the inequalities within the society diverted to a tool that contributed to increasing social disparities and degradation of socio-economic conditions. Accordingly, there is an essential need to evaluate these experiences from which lessons should be taken.

    VI- Interrelation between state security and human security

    Furthermore, it is important to underline the interrelation between the six threats mentioned in the reports. Therefore, this interrelation reflects the relation between state security and human security, where human security is not an alternative to that security but it establishes a complementary process by which state security is one of the means to an end product: human security .

    Human security is based on two core elements; Human Rights and developmental needs . However, the discourse on security in the concerned UN bodies such as the Security Council does not include the developmental dimension in the process of achieving security thus causing a gap between working toward state security and working toward human security.

    “it is essential to understand that in order to protect human security the member states and the UN have to eliminate poverty and, meet basic human needs, provide sustainability and fund specific programs that are needed to do so” (Rob Wheeler; strengthening and empowering the United Nations).

    However, the existing world system works in favor of big companies and rich countries while developing countries and individuals are still facing challenges of the unbalanced international relations among this system. Following are some example explaining how the current system functions:

    - The rules of global trade within the WTO and all other regional trade agreements are set in order to defend the rights and the interest of TNC on the account of the UN and other institutions. However, new regulations and laws are being implemented while ILO convention defending workers rights and the conventions on Human Rights especially the ESCR are not being implemented and respected.

    - WB and IMF structural Adjustment programs were the main recipe and the precondition for the developing countries to receive loans and aids, while the developed countries still are ignoring the commitment to increase their ODA up to 0.7%, in addition, debt restructuring and release is being neglected and not considered.

    - World military expenditures overcome 800 billion dollars; the US spends more than 500 billion, while the yearly spending on aids does not exceed 60 billion dollars. It is worth noting in this regard that the amount of 0.7% ODA is not more than 167 billion dollars. And that the due debts of developing countries are less than 400 billion dollars.

    The millennium declaration clearly mentioned the interrelation between peace and security and the implementation of human rights. It was also noted in the declaration that developmental challenges are core issues to be solved while talking about stability and security. Therefore, fighting poverty, diseases, illiteracy, gap between rich and poor, sustainability and life conditions are common responsibilities and concerns. Furthermore, the goal number eight focusing on global partnership reflects this common responsibility. It focuses on three main pillar challenges facing developing countries; Trade, aid and debt, therefore the requirement of full implication of the developed countries in facing those challenges.

    VII- Conclusion

    Five years after the adoption of the millennium declaration and the commitment to the implementation of the MDG, indicators and figures show how far humanity is from the realization of these goals. The reasons are diversified, and the responsibilities are divided between the wrong policies adopted in the developing countries, and the role of the IFI in dictating the trend of those policies. But also the lack of commitment of the developed countries, particularly the G8 to the implementation of the goal number eight. Therefore, according to the coordinator of social watch , benchmarks should be adopted by the international community according to which governments and their politician members can be judged objectively . Moreover, it was concluded that the decision making is scattered in a multiplicity of fora and institutions attended by different ministers and officials. Trade ministers attend the ministerial meetings of WTO, ministers of finance attend the annual meetings of IFIs, and therefore the coherence could be reached by the head of states while meeting in the UN General Assembly that should be given the more important role, mandate and responsibilities.

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