By Ziad Abdel Samad
Preface
Civil society in the Arab region today is weak. Can this weakness be attributed to badly formulated laws governing the civil society sector, or is it due to structural flaws in Arab civil society organizations (CSOs)? If it is the latter, have these flaws resulted in poor strategies and insufficient capacities to respond to the challenges facing the region?
A culture of charity prevails in Arab societies, in part because charitable giving to the poor is one of the five pillars of Islam. Charitable giving is placed at the same level as the other four pillars: faith, prayer, fasting for self-purification during Ramadan, and, for those who are able, pilgrimage to Mecca. Given the social importance of charitable donation, why is civil society as weak as it is in Arab countries?
This paper seeks to explore the reasons that civil society in the Arab region has not fulfilled its potential. It analyzes the objective barriers limiting CSOs’ abilities to increase their impact and improve their roles in society.
The culturally embedded value of charitable giving may not be sufficient to create a thriving CSO sector, just as lack of development in the region is not the only reason why the sector is as weak as it is. This paper considers other objective barriers limiting CSOs’ abilities to increase their impact and improve society. These other factors may be external, such as lack of democracy, inadequate legal framework, or other restrictions imposed by the ruling regimes. Similarly, there may be relevant restrictions stemming from cultural and social realities. Or there may be internal limitations that result from poor organizational vision, policies and strategies, as well as from a lack of human and financial resources, sustainable or reliable funding, and access to information.
This paper incorporates new research that evaluates the results and effectiveness of CSOs in eight Arab countries. Section I establishes the definitions and CSO sector classifications used throughout this paper; Section II provides an overview of external and internal issues pertinent to CSOs in the Arab region; Section III focuses on the results of the survey; Section IV presents case studies of Lebanon and Palestine to illustrate how the obstacles identified in this paper have shaped civil society in each country, and Section V offers proposals and solutions.
Although more in-depth analysis and follow up is needed, the results of the research give a clearer idea about the real factors affecting the role of CSOs in Arab countries. The research is therefore useful in setting priorities for interventions aimed at empowering CSOs and increasing their effectiveness and efficiency. These priorities necessarily vary to a certain extent from one country to another according to specific local factors and challenges.
Acknowledgments
This research was mainly supported by the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law. While the author was a fellow in Washington, DC, President Douglas Rutzen and Program Director Catherine Shea provided extensive support. A special thanks to Kareem Elbayar, Civil Society Legal Intern at ICNL, who served as a research assistant during the period of my work at the ICNL offices, and to Office Manager Sylvia Staggs for her logistical support. Thanks also to Wafa Yassir, to Ziad Majed, to Natasha Shawarib who provided great support. I would also like to thank Program Manager Kinda Mohamadieh, Program Coordinator Cynthia Abi Rashed and Executive Secretary Hanan Younis of the Arab NGO Network for Development. They helped in conducting the survey and analyzing the data. Finally, special thanks to all our colleagues from the twenty-five NGOs that completed the questionnaires and sent them back on time.
Ziad Abdel Samad
Washington, DC, May 2006
I. The Definition, Classification and Role of Civil Society in the Arab Region
A definition of the CSO sector is important in order to find the commonalities in the sector. The definition should be flexible enough to encompass the changing nature of a non-profit sector that is linked to changing market and state forces, allowing an increase in popular understanding of this sector and its role in the process of enhancing democratization. Similarly, a classification is needed in order to shed light on the differences between CSOs. Together, definition and classification permit an improved understanding of the various types and roles of the entities forming the third sector and the challenges that they are facing. This task is necessary for an evaluation of the role of the sector and the legal systems that govern it.
It is commonly agreed that all forms of structures that do not belong to the state or to the market are considered CSOs. These structures include non-governmental non-profit organizations, including welfare, charitable, developmental, and environmental organizations. They may be professional and worker’s trade unions, farmer and peasant groups, or social movements that reflect the needs of groups such as youth, students and women. According to some researchers, they may include political organizations and parties. The CSO sector historically provided social services; it now also operates in the realm of societal development and sometimes national strategies and structures.
Turning first to the question of a definition, in the cross-national analysis presented in the Johns Hopkins University Non-Profit Sector Series, Salamon and Anheier (2004) take on the challenge of clearly defining the non-profit sector. They consider definitions from four different perspectives of legal, economic, functional, and structural/operational. Salamon and Anheier (1997) argue convincingly for an approach based on considerations of structure and operation, and encompassing indicators related to the organization’s relation to government, distribution of profit, governance, and participation. Specifically, this definition looks at the level of institutionalization of the organization, either through the formal incorporation charter or through the regularity of their structured work. It looks at the separation of the organization from government, although government support, funding, and participation are included in permitted kinds of relations with government. It also looks at the distribution of profits of the organization, its governance structure (particularly its ability to control its own activities) and whether participation is voluntary.
The use of the structural-operational definition of civil society serves well across nations, including developing societies where the role of the state and the private sector are unstable and the surrounding context is highly politicized, such as the situation in many Arab countries. This definition helps cover the gaps of a narrow legal definition that cannot encompass the diversity and continuously changing nature of the third sector, and which is highly influenced by the changing role of the state and that of the private sector.
Civil society is situated between state and market, monitoring their powers and roles to assure a balance between them. However, especially in developing countries, it is important to consider the family as a third border to civil society (Anheier 2004), distinguishing between civil society and tribal or religious society. This issue raises additional challenges in defining civil society in developing countries such as those of the Arab region. Structures built on family relations, i.e., tribal, clan, and religious considerations, are not considered civil society. Accordingly, as civil society is expected to monitor the power of the state and market, it also has the potential to observe tribal and clan relations in order to assure balance among market, state, and family.
Within the Arab region, civil society is referred to as the “indigenous sector” (Kandil 1994). The use of this terminology reflects the intertwining of the CSO sector and societal relations, which are dominated by tribal, clan, family and religious ties. In several Arab countries, societal relations are more important than the relation of the citizen to the state. This stems from the weakness of the notion of citizenship in Arab societies.
Moreover, the CSO sector in the Arab region is dominated by welfare and charitable concepts, and is primarily involved in service provision and social assistance and welfare. The structural-operational definition successfully includes the indigenous sector as well as other “borderline” cases of civil society groups, which are abundant in developing countries due to factors such as vague relations with the government or to unclear fundraising systems and funding sources.
Regrettably, in no case does the law governing CSOs in the Arab region take these elements into consideration. All organizations, even if they are purely ad hoc and temporary, could be considered the same under the law when applying for registration; currently, for example, no distinction is made between grant-making foundations and charities that provide services. In short, governments in the Arab region have not considered the CSO sector from an analytical point of view when creating legal structures, which has been an obstacle to the sector’s development.
In addition to an appropriate and fitting definition, a classification system is required to analyze the variety of types of organizations. In the study of civil society organizations, the definition alone does not present an adequate tool for explaining the role and development of the sector. Civil society organizations are not homogeneous, and often countries enact different laws for different types of organizations with different references in public administration . In creating a classification system, the legal framework is often limited by what the state considers non-profit organizations, which often does not cover many of the structures and entities functioning as non-governmental organizations. For example, at the present time, human rights organizations in Egypt are not allowed to be freely registered as NGOs. Thus, identifying the various classes of organizations may help in determining the appropriate legal framework to regulate their relations with the state and the market. Additional elements worth considering when designing the legal framework of civil society within a country are the structure of the organization, its relationship to the government, its financial structure, its governance and operation, and its contribution to enhancing social capital.
The role of civil society is growing internationally as a result of the decreasing ability of the state to provide services and assure social justice. In addition, contemporary societies are witnessing the development of social capital, increased interaction between people internationally, and increased awareness and tools for the protection of human rights. The CSO sector often steps in to fill the gaps in these areas, and is often paid to do so by governments. This is a privatization of welfare, developmental, and environmental services of sorts; it certainly promotes public-private partnership and may serve as a middle way between giving primacy to the market or asking the state for a greater role (Anheier 2004). For a variety of reasons, civil society in the Arab region has not realized this potential. However, Arab CSO leaders have been engaged in a debate about the relationship between civil society and the state. Some activists claim that a relationship with the government is irrelevant, while for many others, the value of this relationship is not so self-evident. In addition to the question of relevancy, there is the question of appropriateness. The view of this factor often varies according to the type of CSO. For example, service-delivery CSOs might find coordination with appropriate government agencies to be necessary part of doing business while advocacy CSOs might reasonably believe that cooperation with the state will undermine the goals of the organization.
We are now equipped with the structural/operational definition of CSOs, with a sense of the scope of organizations that should be included in a classification system, and with a general concept of the role of civil society in the Arab region. Other issues specific to the region have been highlighted; namely, the strength of family, tribe and clan and the importance of including cultural and religious dimensions in understanding possible reasons for the weakness of the CSO sector in contemporary Arab countries. Next, we turn to an overview of the key external and internal obstacles faced by CSOs in the region.
II. Civil Society in the Arab World: External and Internal Obstacles
The obstacles faced by the CSO sector in the Arab region can be divided into two categories. The first are the external obstacles, some of which affect society as a whole, while others are more specific to the CSO sector. Second are the internal obstacles, those that may pose challenges for CSOs from within the organizations themselves.
External Obstacles Facing the Arab Region
The Arab region faces many challenges affecting its overall developmental process. These challenges are political, economic and social in nature. Globalization, a complicated phenomenon, has various expressions that are clearly reflected in the region – from militarization in all its forms to economic, social, and environmental challenges, in addition to challenges resulting from cultural and religious diversity and extremism.
Additional external obstacles are peculiar to specific Arab countries, and include various problems that arise from the legal system and lack of rule of law. These types of obstacles include not only deficiencies in the laws themselves, but also additional dimensions and challenges that must be considered when drafting laws for the CSO sector. Among these dimensions, many can be mentioned such as the complexity of societal relations, the political environment, the level of development, the concentration of power, the behaviors of this power regime vis-à-vis CSOs, etc. It is thus assumed that the legal system is not the only obstacle to the development of civil society, and the law must take into consideration many other dimensions in order to ensure an enabling environment for civil society.
In order to have a comprehensive picture of the regional context, both types of external obstacles – those that are of a political, economic, or social nature, and those that arise in connection with a particular country’s legal system – are considered below.
Political, Economic, and Social Obstacles
1. Militarization – Problems of Peace and Security
The Middle East has become a synonym for crisis and conflict. The causes are diverse but a lack of security and societal instability is the common result. Militarization is primarily a result of foreign occupation in violation of international laws and conventions. An example of this situation is Palestine, where many UN resolutions have been violated for decades while the international community is unable to put an end to the conflict. More recently, we have seen this problem in Iraq, where the 2003 invasion undermined the decisions of the UN Security Council and the principles of international law. Moreover, the so called “war on terror” is not a war but a doctrine with unforeseen consequences: it is enhancing extremism and violence instead of achieving stability and tolerance.
Problems from militarization are also a result of various internal conflicts, as in Sudan, Algeria, and Western Sahara. A prominent example is the growing tension in the countries of the Arabian Gulf, particularly Yemen, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. There, radical Islamic movements and sympathies are on the rise, largely as a response to the humiliation caused by the double standards in the implementation of the international laws, the foreign military occupation and the military bases established in the region. These tensions of course are added to the socio-economic and political challenges that these societies face.
2. The Political Context – The Need to Introduce Radical Political Reforms
It is well known that most of the Arab regimes are undemocratic and some are totalitarian. The lack of sound public institutions, the absence of legislatures, the permanent violations of constitutional laws where they exist, and judicial systems weakened by the interference of the political branches are the main characteristics shaping the regional political context. The absence of rule of law is another major problem. In most Arab countries, the state controls civil and political rights, and political and civil society organizations are heavily restricted. It is worth noting that elections are highly controlled and manipulated by the state through undemocratic electoral laws and regulations. Moreover, the reform agenda is creating high levels of internal tension because of the external influence and interference in the processes.
3. The Socio-Economic Context – Low Human Development Indicators
The higher the level of development in a society, the more likely it is that civil society is active (Salamon and Anheier 1997). This is due to the increased role of the middle class, which supports the promotion of voluntary initiatives and the establishment of civil society organizations. Arguably the level of urbanization may also promote the rise of the non-profit sector because of the prominent role played by middle-class professionals. Communications technology can also be a key factor in the progress of the non-profit sector; for example, as rural and poor urban populations are exposed to telecommunications, they may be released from their traditional ties and relations and therefore build affiliations to new groups such as civil society organizations. There is thus a direct relation between the development of the communications sector and the development of the non-profit sector (Salamon and Anheier 1997).
Human, economic and social development indicators show that the Arab region is one of the worst in the world on the development front. (See Arab Human Development Report (AHDR), issued by the United Nations Development Program; Millennium Development Goals Report (MDGR) for the Arab Region issued by the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia in 2005). According to the MDGR, the proportion of people living on less than $2 per day per person is 31.5 percent in countries in the Middle East and North Africa; moreover 23.6 percent of the population of the region is deprived of basic health and education services and a decent standard of living. The 2002 AHDR indicated three main contributing factors -- deficits in women’s empowerment, freedom, and in human capacities and knowledge relative to income. Illiteracy is another of the major challenges highlighted by the AHDR. The number of illiterate people is still increasing, to the extent that Arab countries embark upon the twenty first century burdened by over 60 million illiterate adults, the majority of whom are women.
In addition, the AHDR found a low level of prevalence and use of information technology and communications, and that a small percentage of the population has access to communications. This is due to many factors, the most important of which is the underdeveloped infrastructure. Moreover, Arab states have imposed restrictions and censorship on individual freedoms, including the right to free expression and to access to information.
Underdevelopment in the Arab region has thus led to a weak middle class and poor access to communications and information. Without these two key underpinnings, civil society in the Arab region is understandably less effective than it might be.
4. Culture and Religion
In societies with high levels of instability and insecurity, individuals tend to rely on their clans, tribes, and religions and other types of indigenous or ethnic structures. Clan, tribal, and religious affiliations become stronger when the state fails to provide essential security. These primitive relations distort the formation of civil society, and highjack the concept of citizenship. Instead of strengthening social capital, this phenomenon creates a kind of clan and ethnic group mentality that prevents coordinated action. Indeed, in many Arab countries, these tribal, ethnic or confessional relations are stronger than the structures of the state and the local authorities.
Moreover, there is a pressing need for cultural reforms, particularly related to religious discourse in the region. Reforms should tackle, among other issues, educational systems and relations between religion and the state. In fact, within the complicated Arab context, many initiatives are being launched for democratization of the region. The European Union initiated the first of these in 1995: the “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.” In 2004, during the G8 summit in Sea Island, Georgia, another initiative was launched -- the “Broader Middle East Partnership for the Future.” These two efforts join the many regional Arab reform initiatives launched in recent years, the most important of which is the declaration issued by the Summit of the League of the Arab States held in 2004 in Tunisia. Such initiatives stress the role of civil society and its participation in the process of societal reform and democratization. It is a crucial moment in the evolution of civil society in the Arab region with the hope that it can become enabled to be a real partner in the process of democratization, which is a prerequisite for its achievement and sustainability.
Obstacles Related to Legal Systems
5. The Legal System and Governance Structures
Enhancing the role of the third sector and its effectiveness depends on several interrelated factors. The most important among them is the legal system, the primary goal of which, in relation to CSOs, should be to regulate the relations between organizations and the state. The legal system is a set of rules and regulations mainly directed to protect individual and public freedoms from any threat or violation. Ideally, legislation should be in accordance with international declarations of human rights, and developed in dialogue with local civil society. CSO law, as any other law, should clarify the rights and the obligations of all concerned parties.
However, in Arab countries across the board, legal structures governing CSOs are often poorly crafted or administered. One ambiguity is that the same law often rules different forms of registered associations without being tailored to the variety of objectives that exist. Effective laws for CSOs will provide a framework for good governance, systems of accountability, and public transparency.
As discussed earlier, in many Arab countries, tribal, ethnic or confessional relations are stronger than the structures of the state and the local authorities. In practice, the implemented and institutionally adopted law is a tribal or communitarian one. It is difficult to envision the implementation and respect of any non-profit law under these circumstances. It is also obvious that a perfect law with a highly centralized ruling power or with complicated cultural constraints will never be implemented in an effective manner. The legal system requires an adequate political and developmental environment in order to contribute to the formation of an independent non-profit sphere. All discussion of a theoretical legal framework must be discussed in light of these considerations.
With regard to their non-profit legal systems, Arab countries can be divided into three main categories:
1. Countries where there is high restriction of civil society; these countries are characterized by the absence of a law governing non-profit types of organizations.
2. Countries where there is a law but it serves as a tool used by the public authorities in order to exert more pressure and restrictions on civil society organizations.
3. Countries where relatively liberal laws create enough space for civil society to be freely active; but civil society in these countries nonetheless faces problems with the implementation of the laws by the public administration.
Despite the numerous initiatives for modernization and democratization of the region, most Arab governments continue to exert heavy legal and procedural restrictions on the establishment and activities of civil society associations. Laws in most of these countries prevent any group of people from conducting public activities unless they are registered as an association. In some cases, associations are subject to excessively cumbersome registration procedures. An association’s activities are restricted to the objectives and activities described in these documents, and they cannot easily be altered. Moreover, the types of organizations are often defined according to the type of their activities as perceived by the state, disregarding the perceptions and objectives of the association’s members and constituency. In many countries the government demands that the association obtain advance permission each time it organizes any public activities. Permission is also required if the association is planning to be a member of any regional or global network or to receive funding from foreign donors. The government also has the right to monitor the financial status, public activities, and private activities of the association’s members, and it may dissolve the association for any reason the government believes is legitimate.
6. Government Policies
Governmental policies to control CSOs have many other aspects, three of which are worth mentioning here. The first is related to the behaviors of the ruling elites which are “defensive and jealous” of other potential powers, and therefore exert control to limit the scope of the non-profit sector (Anheier 2004). This phenomenon is well known in Arab countries, where it is easy to identify organizations created by the monarchs or the ruling elites in order to enlarge their political influence and power among the population in need.
The second is when states exert pressure on the religious structures in order to limit their influence, thereby restricting the religious non-profit sector. This situation is encountered in many of the Arab countries, such as the case with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Libya, Algeria, and Jordan.
The third aspect occurs when the state finds it necessary to fund the non-profit sector in order to enable it to provide essential social services. In this case, the state is unable to provide these services and thus turns to CSOs to assist in delivering state-financed services. This may contribute to conceptual confusion with the risk that government funding can transform the sector into an agent of the state (Salamon and Anheier 1997). This last case is not common in Arab countries, although it exists in a limited way in Lebanon where the state contracts with philanthropic and religious institutions to serve orphans, people with disabilities, and the elderly. Similar contracting occurs with some semi-private schools to provide educational services to populations in need, a phenomena that exists to a lesser degree in Kuwait and in Tunisia.
7. Level of Centralization
Most of the Arab countries are ruled by monarchies or totalitarian regimes. Only in Lebanon can there be found living former presidents. In all the other Arab countries, the head of state stays in power until death or exile through “coup d’état.”
Moreover, in most of these countries, elections can be subject to manipulation, and even when they take place, the regimes have the power to dissolve elected parliaments if they become uncontrollable. Where constitutions exist, they can often be easily modified for the benefit of a ruling party. The judiciary is not independent, but rather restricted by the political branches, nominated by decrees of the executive body, and under the direct control and pressure of the ruling elites .
Highly centralized power structures, combined with ongoing tension between ruling elites and the main religious groups (e.g., the Islamic Brotherhood and similar groups) at this point in time limit the room for development of a healthy and independent third sector.
Internal Obstacles Facing Arab Civil Society Organizations
Internal obstacles that challenge Arab CSOs from within the organizations themselves can be divided into three main categories:
1. Vision and Mission
The first set of internal challenges relates to weak visions and missions on the part of CSOs, along with corresponding absence of relevant strategies for carrying out organizational missions. This obstacle has a number of causes. Across the Arab region, there exists inconsistent understanding of the role and the potential of civil society, which may contribute to CSOs’ difficulty in developing clear mission statements. Moreover, countries of the Arab region often lack comprehensive development plans. Generally speaking, the establishment of national development plans should be the responsibility of the state; however, these plans should reflect a dialogue between the state and civil society. The absence of a shared national vision, answering to national challenges and leading to adopt strategies for carrying on development, in addition to undermining the importance of CSOs’ role, affect the latter’s ability to develop organizational visions and missions that reflect the priorities of their constituencies.
2. Capacities
Civil society in most Arab countries faces systematic oppression by the state. In the last three or four decades, the region has seen the flourishing of dictatorships and authoritarian and one-party regimes. The rise of these regimes has led to the destruction of preexisting societal structures and prevented the rise of new independent ones. Within this context, it is hard to expect civil society in the region to be active and influential, despite the period of change that the region is passing through. Building a strong and effective civil society in Arab countries will require time, awareness-raising, and capacity building strategies, as well as practical resources.
3. Weak Internal Governance Structures
Arab CSOs often have weak internal governance structures that prevent them from being more effective. One potential cause is the use and exploitation of civil society organizations by ruling elites, politicians, or even individuals seeking to secure a public role to play in society. Civil society also can be abused by sectarian factions seeking to spread extremist ideologies. As discussed more fully below, CSOs often have a weak understanding of the main elements of internal governance.
III. Research Results
This section discusses the results of a survey of a limited sample of CSOs. The survey was designed to identify and summarize the main challenges that CSOs in the Arab region face. Specifically, it posed questions designed to elicit information on the degree to which the obstacles described above – particularly the external obstacles at the country level and obstacles internal to CSOs – affect them in different types of country environments. The goal of the survey was to collect and present information about the sector in various countries, not to build a comprehensive database for statistical analysis.
Questionnaires were sent to 104 CSOs in 11 Arab countries that are members of the Arab NGO Network for Development. Responses came from 25 CSOs in 8 countries, a response rate of 24% of CSOs in 73% of the surveyed countries. Responses were grouped by country, in terms of whether the CSO legal framework is generally considered to be conservative or liberal. The legal framework in countries dubbed conservative is generally more restrictive and would be expected to pose more obstacles; the legal framework in the three countries in the liberal category often reflects a laissez-faire attitude on the part of government regulators. For example, in Lebanon, which is considered to have a liberal legal framework, the CSO sector is governed by a 1909 Ottoman Law which refers to government agencies that have not existed for decades; in effect, the law is simply ignored.
Although the small sample size does not allow broad conclusions about national realities, it does give preliminary ideas about the challenges facing CSOs in each country and reveals issues ripe for further in-depth research. Improvements for future research via surveys would be to increase the number of surveys sent, send surveys to more of the states of the 22-member Arab League, conduct follow-up surveys, survey by phone as well as mail, and create comparison groups of survey responses from Western, Asian and/or African regions.
The survey focused on the presumed constraints, both internal and external, that the civil society sector faces in Arab countries. The 66 questions of the survey were divided into four sections. The first section dealt with general information on the organization: type of organization, vision, breadth and scope of activities and constituency, internal governance and financial reporting. The second section asked about the legal framework in which the CSO operates. The third section focused on the CSO’s understanding of the role of civil society, and the last section focused on the social and political environment in which the CSO operates.
Survey responses to the first section indicated that the respondents work in various fields, including human rights (either broadly or in defense of specific groups, such as women, children or the disabled), environmental protection, social or sustainable development, or capacity building. Three are registered as foundations, three are civil companies, and the remainder consists of associations. Twenty-three of the 25 identified themselves as non-governmental organizations and two identified themselves as networks.
Lack of Good Internal Governance Mechanisms as an Obstacle to CSO Development
Mission and vision. Responses to the survey suggested that the lack of good internal governance practices is one of the principle obstacles to greater CSO effectiveness in the region. Answers reflected a weak understanding of key components of good internal governance, including the existence of a vision and mission statement, organizational strategy, organizational structure, and appropriate divisions in governance and management structures.
A majority of the respondents did not clearly articulate a vision statement. 36% of the CSOs surveyed left the question blank and only 17% of the CSOs provided a clear vision statement. This problem was especially pronounced in countries with more restrictive laws (see Chart 1: What is Your Organization’s Vision?). In the three countries with relatively liberal legal environments for CSOs, 25% of respondents stated an articulate vision, whereas in the more conservative countries only 8% did. It appears that in countries with more restrictive legal frameworks, a poor legal framework inhibits a CSO’s ability to clearly define its vision.
Chart 1: What is Your Organization’s Vision?
Governing Structures. Inconsistencies appeared in the replies related to hierarchical relations within the organization, that is, the relations among the governing bodies, the executive level and staff, and representatives of constituencies . These inconsistencies may stem from an organization’s failure to have an effective organizational chart, or from failure to understand the questions on the survey form. It is also likely that responses to questions about decision-making within the organization depend upon the position of the person who fills out the questionnaire; in other words, whether he or she is a member of the governing board or the staff. For example, in one case two different questionnaires came back from the same organization but having been completed by two different people; their answers to the same questions were different in many cases.
Internal financial systems. All but one of the respondents has a financial auditing system in place, and the majority of the organizations issues annual financial reports (84%). Of these, 40% use external auditing and 32% use both internal and external auditing. The percentage of respondents from countries with relatively liberal laws that use external auditing is markedly higher than in conservative countries (92% versus 54%; see Chart 2: What Type of Auditing System Does Your CSO Use?). One possible explanation is that CSOs in more restrictive countries rely on internal audit systems, included within their own internal financial management system, to avoid state interference in their finances.
Chart 2: What Type of Auditing System Does Your CSO Use?
External Obstacles -- CSO Relationships with Governments
60% of responding CSOs expressed positive views of their relationship with the government, while 20% stated relations were bad and 20% said that they were average. At the same time, 36% of the CSOs stated that they had experienced restrictions imposed on their operation by the government, and a slight majority of 52% said that the legal framework is an obstacle to their operations. It is interesting to note that if the results collected from CSOs in liberal countries are removed, only 53% of the respondents said they have a good relationship with the government, while 44% report an average or negative relationship. Sixty-nine percent of CSOs in conservative countries reported that the legal framework is an obstacle to their development, and a disturbing 62% report that they have experienced restrictions imposed by the government. Different answers came from the same country about the relation with regulators and whether CSOs experienced restrictions imposed by the government on their activities. This question is very subjective and answers to it are influenced by the type of organization questioned and its strategy. Often, for example, human rights organizations are the most restricted by regulatory bodies. Moreover, the relations of advocacy organizations with the government are not the same as those of service providers.
In countries with liberal laws, the body that regulates CSO’s operation was reported as the Ministry of Interior in 75% of the cases. In countries with more conservative laws, the regulatory body is normally a different ministry, such as the Ministry of Social Affairs (54%), the Ministry of Justice, or the Ministry of NGOs or its equivalent (see Chart 3: Principal Government Regulator). This is surprising, because regulation and oversight by the Ministry of Justice is generally assumed to be more transparent than processes controlled by the Ministry of the Interior; the latter is typically more concerned with security issues (UNDP 2006). These responses suggest that even in liberal countries, relations between government and civil society are considered to raise security issues.
Chart 3: Principal Government Regulator
External Obstacles -- Relationships with Other CSOs
Most respondents stated that their relations with other CSOs were positive (88%). This result is encouraging; it suggests that CSOs are aware of the importance of networking and coordination. It also suggests that there is potential for further formation of social capital. Social capital is an aggregate of those features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions (Putnam, 1993). Increased social capital promises to contribute to the CSO sector’s ability to meet many challenges facing the sector.
Responses were also positive with regard to CSO relations with the United Nations; 67% of the CSOs expressed the belief that UN agencies support their work. This reflects the level of coordination and the potential role of the partnership between the UN agencies and civil society. It is worth noting that the support provided by the UN can be financial, but it also can be technical or political. For example, UN support appears to be more important to CSOs in conservative countries than it does to CSOs in liberal countries. Sixty-nine percent of CSOs in conservative countries report that their relationship with the UN is beneficial, while only 58% in liberal countries feel similarly. Thus, the support of the UN can perhaps be considered a kind of protection and a source of legitimacy for CSOs operating in hostile environments.
Overall, 16% percent of the organizations reported that they do not refer in their work to international human rights conventions. All the CSOs operating in countries with restrictive laws reported that they do not refer to international human rights. This result reflects the impact of local culture, and may be reinforced by the fact that 76% of all the respondents stated that tribal and traditional relations affect their ability to accomplish their work.
Financial Restrictions on CSOs and Donor Relations
When it comes to financial restrictions, 52% of the responses overall indicated that the organization does not experience financial restrictions . However, exempting the CSOs in liberal countries shifts the results dramatically; among conservative countries, 64% report financial restrictions and only 36% report no restrictions. Such interference may explain why CSOs in conservative countries generally prefer not to hire external auditors.
Most CSOs reported good relations with their financial donors (55%), while 20% said that their relations with donors are average and another 20% reported poor relations. Sixty-four percent reported strong donor support in setting their organizations’ work plans and agendas, while only 8% reported that they have poor donor support. These data raise questions about whether CSOs with inadequate visions and weak strategies (see above) are building their agendas around local needs as opposed to donors’ viewpoints. When considering donor relations in the Arab region, it should be kept in mind that many perceive foreign donors to have a negative impact on the work of civil society because they are thought to impose a foreign agenda, leaving local civil society organizations unable to respond to local priorities. According to this view, CSOs that receive grants from foreign donors are considered collaborators; when this combines with poor visions and weak strategies, there is a danger that CSOs’ agendas may diverge dramatically from real local needs. This further raises the question whether sudden withdrawal of foreign funding will leave these weak CSOs without strategies or agendas at all.
Legal Obstacles to CSO Development
Seventy percent of CSOs in countries with restrictive laws reported that the legal framework is an obstacle to their work, while only 33% of the CSOs operating in liberal countries reported that the legal framework is an obstacle. Chart 4 shows responses broken down by liberal versus conservative countries, respectively.
Chart 4: Is the Legal Framework an Obstacle to your CSO’s development?
Seventy-six percent (76%) of respondents stated that tribal and traditional relations affect their ability to accomplish their work. A closer look at these responses reveals some interesting characteristics of Arab CSOs. 17 out of 25 respondents said that traditions (e.g., cultural ties) directly affect women’s participation. 10 stated that cultural factors negatively impact the values of civil society organizations. Finally, 11 claimed that cultural factors negatively impact the understanding of the difference between rights and charity. Chart 5 breaks down the responses by conservative and liberal countries.
Chart 5: How Does Tradition Negatively Impact the Work of Your CSO?
Regardless of whether an Arab CSO is located in a conservative or liberal country, the external obstacles of political, socio-economic, cultural and financial factors are problematic to similar degrees (see Chart 7: Summary of Self-Identified Obstacles). Socio-economic obstacles were reported somewhat less frequently in conservative countries; however, human resources were proportionately less of a problem in liberal countries. Although legal factors are an obstacle in both types of countries, they are much more of an obstacle in conservative countries, which is no surprise but does invite further dialogue.
Chart 7: Summary of Self-Identified Obstacles
IV. Case Studies – Lebanon and Palestine
To place the survey findings in context, this study will now examine two case studies – Lebanon and Palestine. Both cases studies are of countries that can be considered “liberal” for the purposes of the survey findings of Section III, above. Data and analysis for the case studies are drawn from the Civil Society Index (also called the Civil Society Diamond or CSD) developed by CIVICUS and Dr. Helmut Anheier of the University of California, Los Angeles. The CSD is a measurement with four dimensions: 1) the structure, 2) the impact, 3) the environment, and 4) the ethics (values and culture).
Surveys on the CSD were implemented in Lebanon and Palestine. In Lebanon, the survey was conducted by the International Management and Training Institute, and in Palestine it was conducted by the Bisan Center for Research and Development.
Lebanon
The Lebanese experience reflects many of the obstacles to the development of civil society, both internal and external, that have been examined in this paper.
The legal framework for civil society is considered fairly good, and is not for the most part considered an obstacle, despite issues with its implementation by the Ministry of the Interior. The law governing nonprofits in Lebanon is the Ottoman Law of 1909, which was itself inspired by the 1901 French Law of Associations. The Lebanese civil society sector faces a challenge in its relationship with the governmental body charged with its regulation, the Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry exerts substantial pressure on CSOs, violating the rights secured by the Law of Associations. The law stipulates that the founders need only provide the Ministry (or regional authority) with a "notification of establishment", containing copies of the identification of the founders and of the constitution and bylaws. Consecutive Interior Ministers, however, have changed this procedure into a process of "registration" granted by the Ministry and requiring, among other things, a template version of bylaws, contrary to the law and under the pretext that these requirements are merely "administrative procedures." However, the Ministry cannot exert pressure on an already established association except through the articles included in the association's bylaws. For this reason, the Lebanese environment for CSOs is considered the best in the region.
Although this legal framework is fairly good, civil society in Lebanon faces many challenges that shape its overall characteristics and prevent it from being more effective. One is conflict. The most recent example is the July 2006 war and the political developments following it. But Lebanon also endured fifteen years of civil war, which ended only in 1990. During this war various religious groups fought one another, creating mistrust among them and threatening overall national unity. The results of the civil war remain and affect the whole Lebanese situation and the country’s post-war politics. The CSD survey reports that 86% of respondents have a negative perception of the social and cultural fabric of their society and showed that various groups do not trust each other. It is thus obvious that Lebanese civil society is highly polarized and affected by the political structure based on the confessional distribution of power and wealth; CSOs likewise are affected by this reality.
Similarly, respondents reported a high level of mistrust towards the governmental and public administrations. Corruption in Lebanon is a phenomenon affecting the performance of the public sector. For example, the financial activities of several public institutions in Lebanon are still not transparent, suggesting that these entities pose a significant fiduciary risk to the government (CFAA 2006).
The ratio of respondents who prefer to receive services from the nonprofit sector rather than the public sector is ten to one. These findings reflect wide public recognition of the effectiveness of Lebanese CSOs. Indeed, civil society has been particularly successful in implementing poverty eradication policies, in providing health and education services and in protecting the environment. In spite of this, a majority of respondents (73%) feel that the nonprofit sector is also corrupt, which reflects the perception about society as a whole and not only about the public sector.
The CSD survey also identified limited public participation in third sector activities. Moreover, the effectiveness of that little public participation is debatable. This is due to the abovementioned obstacles in Section II; lack of participation mainly due to the political, economic and social obstacles and lack of good governance and the possibility of participation in the decision making process.
The Lebanese case also illustrates how internal obstacles, particularly those relating to the organizational and structural aspects of CSOs, undermine development of the sector. CSD survey respondents expressed mistrust towards the organizational charts, as well as administration and financial performance of CSOs. The lack of proper organizational structures and internal governance also affect networking and coordination among CSOs, since networking necessitates a clear vision and mission statement of the involved groups, and also requires mutual trust among them. The CSD survey concluded that umbrella organizations and networks are not efficient enough and that they lack good internal governance. Finally, the CSD survey concluded that Lebanese CSOs lack adequate human, financial and technical resources needed in order to fulfill their objectives.
Palestine
The legal system in Palestine is also considered among the best in the region, and civil society there enjoys a fairly large degree of independence. It is worth noting that the adopted law in Palestine was the result of the campaign conducted by Palestinian CSOs seeking more space and recognition of their role. Palestinian CSOs are one of the most active civil societies in the Arab region. Yet, it is also important to add that the Palestinian Authority imposes restrictions on CSOs when it comes to both the interpretation of the law and its implementation.
Palestinian CSOs manage, in many sectors, to replace public services due to the absence of the state— particularly in the sectors of health, education, rural development, and agriculture. Despite this, the results of the survey show that civil society in Palestine also faces many challenges and obstacles.
Two main issues are readily apparent and have a strong impact on CSOs in Palestine. The first one is related to the foreign occupation that the society, as a whole, is subject to and which has a major impact on the role, the objectives and the performance of civil society organizations. The second is the nature of the state itself. Palestine is a state under construction, with limited sovereignty and independence, and therefore a very limited capacity for social services.
Moreover, it is very important to notice that the last legislative elections show great mistrust in the Palestinian Authority as well as other political parties. This is the result of the prevalence of corruption and the lack of real democratic and participatory processes in ruling the country. This environment affects the role and the performance of CSOs .
Another constraint that Palestinian civil society faces relates to funding. It is difficult to estimate the volume of charitable donations since most donations go directly to philanthropic associations. Furthermore, it is obvious that the socio-economic reality in Palestine nowadays limits the capacity for organizations to solicit local donations and affects the ability of the individuals to volunteer or to be members of CSOs. At the same time, the sanctions imposed on the nation as a whole create a shortage in funding.
It is difficult based on available data to reach detailed conclusions, particularly concerning the extent of CSO membership and voluntarism, and the effectiveness and impact of civil society. However, data from the CSO survey does highlight the challenges that CSOs in Palestine face. For example, more than 90% of respondents indicated that they do not volunteer for a CSO, with little difference between the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
As in Lebanon, internal obstacles confront Palestinian NGOs, including weak governing bodies, poor control over finances, and limited participation in organizational decision-making.
These two case studies confirm what the survey results reported in Section III suggest -- reforming the legal system alone will not strengthen CSOs and empower them in the Arab world. In spite of the fact that in Lebanon and Palestine the laws of associations are the best in the region, data from the CSD study does not reflect a healthy and independent non-profit sector. On the contrary, the results reflected weaknesses and challenges that they are facing apart from to the legal framework.
V. Recommendations
Strengthening the CSO sector and improving its effectiveness depends on several interrelated factors: legal systems, national reforms, and tools for overcoming internal obstacles.
Legal systems should be developed in accordance with international declarations of human rights and in dialogue with the local civil society. The legal system’s primary goal should be to regulate the relation of CSOs with the state. CSO law, like any other law, should clarify the rights and the obligations of all the concerned parties. When drafting a law and lobbying for a good legal framework, reformers must take into consideration external factors affecting the sector, such as those described in this paper. It should protect the CSO sector from the tendencies of the state to exert control over the civil society organizations while restraining CSOs from engaging in abuse of any advantages of their status (such as access to power or, where appropriate, tax-exemption). The non-profit legal framework should also take into consideration the varieties among types of CSOs. For example, laws governing registration of CSOs should take into consideration the structural definition including the five characteristics: voluntary, self-governing, private, institutional, and non-profit aspects. Additional elements worth considering when designing the legal framework of civil society within a country are the structure of the organization, its relationship to the government, its financial structure, its governance and operation, and its contribution to enhancing social capital. The “Arab Initiative for the Freedom of Association,” for example, was launched by a group of CSO leaders from various Arab countries to promote adequate legal frameworks and laws of associations in the regin, and is now supported by many institutions, including the World Bank’s Department of Social Development in the MENA Region, Banian, and the Association for the Defense of Rights and Freedom in Lebanon.
Although legal systems governing the CSO sector are in need of reform, reform alone will not strengthen CSOs sufficiently to empower them in the Arab region. This is particularly evidenced by the CSD reports in Lebanon and Palestine. In spite of the fact that the laws of associations in both nations are the best among the region, the results of the surveys did not reflect a healthy and independent non-profit sector. On the contrary, the results reflected weaknesses and challenges that they are facing without regard to the legal framework.
In order to be able to face external challenges, the elaboration of comprehensive national strategies and policies is of high importance. This should be the result of a participatory process in which the various stakeholders (the state, the business sector, and the third sector) should take part. These strategies should focus on two dimensions: the need to reform political institutions and the introduction of serious economic, social and cultural reforms. Any national plan should take them all into consideration at the same time.
Facing internal challenges strengthens civil society organizations; enhancing their capacities, accountability and transparency helps them to influence external factors and to create change. The following recommendations would support the sector in overcoming its internal obstacles:
• Implement special programs and adopt rules and regulations (codes of conduct) to improve governance inside civil society organizations. Internal governance should lead to the adoption of democratic, transparent and accountable structures.
• Support civil society organizations in refining their vision, mission and strategies in a participatory way (i.e., involvement of members and constituencies).
• Develop the organizational capacities of civil society organizations in terms of administrative and financial management. This will improve transparency and accountability.
• Educate CSOs in advocacy, lobbying and dialogue techniques.
• Support networking among CSOs at the local, regional and international levels in order to elaborate common visions, information sharing, exchange of experiences, and so forth.
Conclusion
This paper provides an overview of the obstacles faced by CSOs, both external and internal. The research results focus on developing an understanding of Arab CSOs’ legal status, governance, and self-identified obstacles. These results were followed by a discussion of legal frameworks of Arab countries, both as they are and as they might be. Finally, specific recommendations were made for legal frameworks governing CSOs, for responding to external obstacles, and for overcoming internal ones.
The results of the survey provided some interesting insights about the experiences of real-world CSOs in the Arab region, their strengths and weaknesses, and their perspectives on the obstacles that they face. The research reported here is useful in setting priorities for interventions aimed at empowering CSOs and increasing their effectiveness and efficiency. However, this survey was only one step and should provide inspiration for additional research. As mentioned earlier, future research via surveys might increase the number of surveys sent, send surveys to more of the states of the 22-member Arab League, conduct follow-up surveys, survey by phone as well as mail, and create comparison groups of survey responses from Western, Asian or African regions. An expanded evaluation, such as a broader scope or the inclusion of time series data, would permit not only a more precise understanding of the CSO sector in the Arab region, but also more finely-tuned recommendations to support the growth and efficiency of the sector, thereby improving the lives of people in the region.
The answer to the conundrum presented at the beginning of the paper is that there are several reasons why civil society is not stronger than it is in Arab society today. External obstacles such as repressive regimes, militarization, international pressures and occupations conspire to create a response where family, clan and tribal relations strengthen as people protect themselves. Another result is that CSOs and individuals lack access to information and do not proactively create a clear, strong vision about the transformative role that they can play in their societies. Legal reform becomes a key element of developing a CSO sector that can respond creatively to contemporary challenges, but an appropriate legal framework alone will not provide all the tools that the CSO sector requires.
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Endnotes
