Prepared by Ziad Abdel Samad and Kinda Mohamadieh
Background
The Millennium Summit in the year 2000 set out a global development plan based on a set of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), to which countries worldwide committed. The International Summit on Financing for Development in 2002 convened for the purposes of looking into mechanisms to finance this development process. It resulted in the Monterrey Consensus that highlighted several key issues including: points of action for mobilizing domestic financial resources, mobilizing international resources for development including foreign direct investment, addressing the flows of international trade as an engine for development, increasing international financial and technical cooperation, addressing issues of external debt, and addressing the coherence and consistency of the international monetary, financial, and trading systems. During the UN World Summit that convened in September 2005, donor countries renewed their commitment to improve aid effectiveness, through harmonization of procedures and alignment of aid with developing countries priorities, and to scale-up development assistance (i.e. Aid for Trade, to build national capacities, prioritizing least developed countries (LDCs) and countries afflicted with crisis and the HIV/AIDS pandemic).
However, two main approaches could be highlighted among developed and developing countries in drawing upon the issues under discussion. Developed countries promote a link between more aid and trade liberalization policies. Developing countries stress the need for more unconditional aid. Their major concern is the elevation of conditionalities imposed by the World Bank and the IMF through aid flows. Accordingly, the pledge made by developed countries at the Hong-Kong 6th WTO Ministerial Meeting (December 2005) for an aid for trade package for LDCs was highly questioned. Developing countries expressed their concern that this package would significantly constrain them in their negotiations process. Also they were concerned that this aid will be administered through the international financial institutions, which would allow for more conditionalities imposed through these institutions.
The core challenge is to reconfigure the structure of aid flow and management, by increasing the linkages of aid to human development needs. Through enhancing this linkage and the efficiency of the used mechanisms, aid will be more responsive to national needs and governments will be more accountable to the expected results from aid flows.
It is worth noting that aid and debt have been tackled by the MDGs through targets 13 and 15 of goal eight. Target 13 includes addressing the special needs of the LDCs which includes: tariff and quota free access for LDCs’ exports; enhancing program of debt relief for highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs) and cancellation of official bilateral debt; and making available more generous official development aid (ODA) for countries committed to poverty reduction. Target 15 includes dealing comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term. These items make some links between the international development framework and the debate around aid and debt, however the targets do not address main points in the aid issue. When discussing more generous aid for countries committed to poverty eradication, it does not clarify which poverty reduction strategies it means; is it that based on the approach of the international financial institutions and used to exert pressure on developing countries or one based on genuine national goals and needs? It also does not clarify nor provide guidance as to the kind of national and international measures that may be considered linked to debt sustainability. This ambiguity allows developed nations and international institutions to still link debt alleviation to other constraining measures such as enforcing economic liberalization, privatization, and other structural adjustment measures.
One of the main challenges facing aid efficiency is that aid flows are highly linked to international political considerations. Donors’ pledges are not consistent from year to year and highly fluctuate based on political considerations and emerging priorities. Also, aid cannot be viewed in isolation from the conditions imposed by the international trading system and developed nations’ foreign policy. Developed nations and international institutions give with one hand- aid- and take with another –costs of forced integration in the international trading system- which creates an aid system that is superficial at best and manipulative at worst. All these factors have resulted in a failure by most developed countries to meet their pledge to commit 0.7% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to official development assistance which they have held since the 1970s . According to OECD figures, the US have dedicated just above 0.2% of its GDP or 27.5 billion USD to official development aid (ODA) in 2005. Only the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Luxemburg, and Denmark exceeded the 0.7% of their GDP and reached 0.8% and beyond. Japan dedicated around 0.3% or 13.1 billion USD. Italy and Spain dedicated the same percentage which amounted to 5.1 and 3.1 billion USD respectively. France and Britain came closer to 0.5% of their GDP representing 10.1 and 10.8 billion USD respectively.
This paper will tackle the status of financing for development in the Arab region. It will focus on two main initiatives of aid flow into the region; the American Middle East Partner Initiative (MEPI) and the European Middle East Development Assistance (MEDA) program. The paper will try to engage in a preliminary analysis of their objectives through looking at factors shaping the US and EU policy in the Arab region. It will shed light on the gaps in the US and EU approaches and understanding of aid policy and how it is presented within their general reform initiatives in the Arab region.
Introduction; Shaping the US and EU aid policy towards the Arab region
The International Summit on Financing for Development convened in a period when several considerations in the global and regional policy-making process, and on the economic, political, and security fronts, were being rearranged upon the attacks of 11 September 2001. In fact, it was indicated in the Monterrey consensus that after the attacks of 9/11, “it is more urgent to enhance collaboration among all stakeholders to promote sustainable economic growth and to address long-term challenges of financing for development”. The UN General Assembly, gathering on 16 November 2001, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, concluded that terrorism must be addressed in parallel with poverty, underdevelopment, and inequality .
In this context, the Arab region has been the subject of heightened international attention, especially from the US and the EU. Various initiatives have been proposed as solutions or gates for change and democratization in the region. The perception was growing that terrorism threats are rooted in radical Islamic movements that are entrenched in the Arab region. The high influence of these movements has been attributed to lack of good governance and democracy as well as weak developmental conditions and high levels of poverty.
Accordingly, the US and the EU policies focusing on democracy in the Arab region have clearly adopted “the idea of using development assistance as a foreign policy tool ”. Yet, disregard of the Millennium Declaration adopted by 189 head of States in September 2000, both the US and the EU ignore the need to interrelate peace and security along with democracy and poverty eradication. These initiatives call for peace building and peaceful conflict resolution. At the same time, they practice and support foreign occupation of land, expansion of military bases, and consistent double standards in the implementation of international laws and resolutions related to the rights of citizens in the Arab region, whether in Palestine, Iraq, or Arab countries with foreign military basis. Accordingly, their policies established to face terrorism, and push for development and democracy in the Arab region do not reflect upon one of the main factors behind the rise of terrorism, which is linked to the feelings of humiliation and despise that some citizens of this region accumulated due to the above-mentioned measures.
In February 2002, the US Senate resolved that “the United States foreign assistance programs should play an important role in the global fight against terrorism to complement the national security objectives of the United States” . During 2004, the American administration presented its new strategy entitled “The Greater Middle East Initiative”. The initiative was proposed as a tool for achieving political reform and facing Islamic fundamentalism, which was considered, according to the initiative itself, as the roots of increasing terrorism in the world. In addition, there were several European initiatives, including the EU’s “Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East”, which is based on the Euro-Mediterranean partnership known as the Barcelona Process . During the 2004 Summit of the G-8 countries, the “Greater Middle East Initiative” that was named “Partnership for the Future”, was further developed upon as a result of skepticism and suggestions from the EU. The elaborated initiative, now called the “Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative”, included some new rhetoric. It referred to the Palestinian conflict and the occupation of Iraq as major problems that need immediate solutions. It also highlighted that democratization cannot be a process from abroad, but it needs to be an internal dynamic taking into consideration local participation and reflecting local needs and cultural aspects. Moreover, the EU’s initiative was further developed into the “European Neighborhood Policy”, which was proposed after the EU’s enlargement. This policy is supposed to be based on national action plans covering a number of key areas for specific action: political dialogue and reform; trade and measures preparing partners for gradually obtaining a stake in the EU’s Internal Market; justice and domestic affairs; energy, transport, information society, environment and research and innovation; and social policy and people-to-people contacts. However, this rhetoric is still not reflected in efficient mechanisms in neither of the initiatives.
It could be noted that all these proposals and reform initiatives (The US initiative, the Euro-med partnership initiative, and that of the G8 countries) included three main issues:
a) The promotion of democracy and good governance (including topics such as free elections, parliamentary exchange, freedom of expression and independent media initiatives, freedom of association and civil society enhancement, …)
b) The building of a knowledge society (through a basic education initiative), expanding economic opportunities, creating forums, launching trade initiatives, and financing for growth initiatives.
c) Expanding economic opportunities, creation of forums, trade initiatives, and finance for growth initiatives.
MEPI and MEDA; Case Studies of Aid Initiatives for the Arab Region
The two main active aid arms of the US and the EU reform initiatives in the Arab region are MEPI and MEDA respectively.
About MEDA
MEDA has been in place since the 1995 Barcelona Convention and was developed from MEDA I to MEDA II in 2000. Since its launch, MEDA has invested $250 million in more than 350 programs to support political, economic, and educational reform efforts and women’s empowerment in the Middle East countries. Under the 1996 ‘MEDA I’ Council Regulation, more than 3,400 million Euros were committed for the period 1995-1999. An indicative figure of 5,350 million Euros has been earmarked by Ministers for MEDA II. In addition, the European Investment Bank (EI
provides 7,400 million euro in loans for the Euro-Mediterranean area .
During the period 1995-1999, some 86% of the resources allocated to MEDA were channeled bilaterally to the partners (this relates to Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Palestinian Authority, Turkey and Israel). The other 12% of the resources were devoted to regional activities of which all Mediterranean Partners and the EU Member States are eligible to benefit. Two percent were set aside for technical assistance offices. The European Parliament had launched the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIHDR) in 1994. Currently, the EIHDR is funded at 132 million Euros for activities worldwide; of which approximately 10 percent goes to the Middle East. The EIHDR functions as a unit within EuropeAid which was established by the European Commission in 2001 . It is worth noting that MEDA funding is used primarily for government programming, while the EIHDR line item (the relatively insignificant sum of 1.3 million euros for the Middle East) is used to fund NGOs . According to a study published by the US Institute for Peace , the EU have not been accorded a high priority to contacts with Arab NGOs, and funding has been given only to those groups with a decidedly secular, pro-Western outlook and to apolitical organizations such as environmental groups.
The eligibility criteria used for selecting countries to receive support for economic transition and the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area under MEDA II included undertaking a reform program approved by the Bretton Woods institutions or implementing programs recognized as analogous, in coordination with those institutions, but not necessarily financially supported by them in accordance with the scope and effectiveness of the reforms . Moreover, the connection between the level of democratization and reform in a country and the funding it receives is not explicit. For example, “Egypt, despite its poor record on reform, has received a disproportionate amount of aid over the years because of its critical role in the Middle East peace process” . Also, Tunisia is considered as a model for the partnership by several European governments, despite the clear violations of democratic processes and human rights that it consistently undertakes. For example, it was clear that these conditions were dismissed by the French president in his press briefing upon his visit to Tunisia in December 2003, whereby he saluted “the progress and radical changes in this country (Tunisia) ….and the efforts the Tunisian authorities have set to ….modernize Tunisia” .
According to the above, it is clear that the flow of aid is directly linked to the extent to which recipient countries accept and integrate policies and conditionalities imposed by the World Bank and IMF, which are based on market liberalization approaches and prioritization of privatization policies and interests of multinational institutions.
Notably the Euro-Mediterranean partnership divides the ‘Arab Region’; it includes countries of the Middle East and North Africa (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, and Egypt) and excludes the Gulf and Iraq among other Arab countries. Jordan has been included in the partnership without any clear justification or criteria; the geographic aspect is not evident, neither is the cultural aspect which is not prioritized by the partnership, nor is there any economic advantage for Jordan while considering the complementarities aspect among the Southern Mediterranean countries. On the other hand, Libya was excluded from the process. The embargo imposed on Libya by the US and EU was reviewed when the Libyan leadership changed its international policy to better suit the US and EU agendas, especially in relation to its nuclear policy. Moreover, European countries that are not on the Mediterranean, such as the UK, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Netherlands, and others, are part of the partnership.
These questions left unanswered leave the partnership open to subjective calculations, which are often based on the interests of the European partners and not the region as a whole. This artificial geographic definition of the Euro-Med region, which is clearly driven by the geo-political interests of European states, helps to increase the divisions between Arab countries instead of creating a more equitable playing field for all involved countries and facilitating cooperation and coordination between them.
Although the Euro-Mediterranean partnership has set three main tracks of action including the issues of peace and security, economics and free trade, as well as development and cultural aspects, progress since 1995 have been concentrated in the economic aspect. Bilateral trade association agreements were signed and ratified with all the partner countries (except Syria) with the aim at creating a free trade area. It is worth noting here that the assessments of the association agreements have shown negative short-term and medium-term impacts on the southern partner countries. The Sustainability Impact Assessment Study (SIA) for the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA) indicates that, due to be established in 2010, EMFTA might only generate slight net gains in regional economic welfare, but significant social and environmental costs in the Arab nations and Turkey . It is clear that without adequate economic preparedness as well as ability to sustain successful development policies and a stable and secure environment, governments are not able to set adequate economic and national policies that allow them to benefit from free trade agreements. Accordingly, the priority from the European perspective was related to their economic and trade interests and not building true and sustained partnership.
Moreover, one cannot disregard the European tendencies to integrate “peace building” within the partnership given that the New European Neighborhood policy includes the Mediterranean Arab countries and Israel in common plans towards the year 2010. The EU position on Middle East peace process states that its main objective is: “ A two-State solution leading to a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on implementation of the Road Map, with Israel and a democratic, viable, peaceful and sovereign Palestinian State living side-by-side within secure and recognized borders enjoying normal relations with their neighbors in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, 1397, 1402, and 1515 and on the principles of the Madrid Conference” . However, the EU does not react to the double standards in the implementation of international laws and resolutions related to the Middle East conflict, particularly to the rights of the Palestinians. It also ignores the need to introduce radical political, economic and social reforms in the region as a whole. Accordingly, it is evident that the European initiative does not aim at spurring reform, but at buying stability and avoiding massive illegal immigration. The Barcelona process started by focusing almost exclusively on aid and trade ; this is still reflected in today’s European policies towards the region.
About MEPI
MEPI was launched in 2002 as a US presidential initiative and with support from its Congress. It is operated through the United States Department of State. MEPI set in motion more than 350 programs in 15 countries of the Middle East and the occupied Palestinian territories. It works through partners including local and international non-governmental organizations, businesses, universities, international institutions, and in some cases, the governments of the region. According to the official website of the program, to date, the U.S. Congress has committed around $300 million to MEPI over four fiscal years. MEPI's funding comes in addition to the bilateral economic assistance that the United States provides annually to the Middle Eastern countries.
MEPI channels funds into projects tackling four main pillars; democracy covering democratic elections, free media, and independent judicial systems; economics including foreign direct investment, local investments, and job creation; education covering trainings, improving curriculum contents, and promoting employable skills; and women empowerment.
The US strategy was initially aiming at tackling democracy issues within the framework of the ‘Broader Middle East Initiative’. While the initiative re-divides the region and brings in Israel as part of one framework along with Arab countries, its strategy neglects the need for stability and development, whereby it does not tackle core issues that could serve peace building. It maintains the bias towards Israel, and neglects the provocations caused by the Israeli occupation. It also maintains the double standards in implementing international laws; for it is obvious that many UN resolutions were forced to be respected and implemented using all tools including military action, while others have been suspended for decades without implementation.
‘Partnership for the Future’ which is the US initiative adopted by the G8 with modifications, obviously lacks the real sense of local participation especially from civil society organizations. Furthermore, it, fails to address core issues aiming at fighting poverty and development. For the US funding directed towards civil society organizations, unlike other foreign funding, creates a significant level of tension among these organizations in the Arab region. This is evident in certain Arab countries more than others. This situation is related to the belief by some groups that the funding received from the US does not serve the priorities set by Arab civil society groups, but leads these groups to be implementers of an agenda set according to US priorities in the region. In this context, the funding administered to civil society groups via the G8 initiative is leading towards de-fragmentation of local civil society participation to various parallel initiatives in partnership with civil society organizations from the G8 countries. These initiatives focus on governance and transparency issues, dialogue for democracy, participation of women, judiciary reform, etc. Coordination lacks among these initiatives. Moreover, local civil society groups are becoming mere implementers of policies set by the funding groups without a local and participatory consultation process. This raises issues related to the relevancy of capacities and expertise of local civil society entities implementing the proposed programs and activities. Consequently, this puts serious questions on the effectiveness of the outcomes and expected results of this work.
The Connection of Aid to Militarization and Terrorism
The US was the first to draw upon the connection between militarization, terrorism and aid. It imposed upon countries and institutions that benefit from its aid programs a condition whereby the beneficiary must commit not to work with organizations and individuals that are judged by the US administration as linked to terrorism.
The EU is also linking aid to fighting terrorism, with European ministers warning countries that their relations with the economically powerful bloc will suffer if they fail to cooperate in the fight against terrorism. An EU official was quoted to say, “Aid and trade could be affected if the fight against terrorism was considered insufficient”, leading to accusations of “compromising the neutrality, impartiality, and independence of humanitarian assistance” . It is worth mentioning that in May 1995, the European Union developed a democracy and human rights clause governing relations with third countries that stipulated the suspension of aid and trade in the event of serious human rights violations (COM 95(216)23 May 1995) . In practice, these two approaches could come is serious opposition to each other as will be explained later in this section.
The categorization used to link aid to terrorism is not based on a specific, clear and objective definition of terrorism and terrorists. It is thus of a high importance to call upon the United Nations to adopt a fair definition that take into account all the factors, realities and circumstances that generate terrorism. Not only are the links between terrorism and development not fully explored or explained by the US and the EU, but also the definition currently adopted by the UN focuses on individual terrorism and neglects state terrorism; it focuses on the violation of human rights and the international and domestic laws at the individual level, but does not talk about the violation of the international rights and laws by the states.
What Anti-terrorism measures mean to the Arab region?
The work on fighting terrorism in the US has been reflected in measures that were judged as restricting civil liberties and individual freedoms and thus impacting civic and political rights of American citizens. Now, the US and EU are trying through their aid programs to their partners, which include the Arab countries, to impose counter-terrorism measures as “key elements of political dialogue”. This was stated in the declaration that resulted from one of the EU Foreign Ministers meetings in Brussels in March 2004.
As judged by several development and humanitarian NGOs, this could impact the EU’s aid policy, risking having aid as a tool in the war on terror (as stated by Howard Mollet, policy analyst at the British Overseas NGOs for Development). Through trying to achieve coherence between development policy and foreign policy, the EU is not able to guarantee boundaries against co-optation and subordination and there are no guarantees that these purposes will not be financed through existent development funds .Arab governments, with their long track record of human rights violations will use the security demands of the US and the EU to continue and impose additional restrictions on individual freedoms, including freedom of association and expression in the Arab region. The EU’s and US’s current policies bolster Arab government’s ability to violate basic human rights of their citizens. The EU has indicated that counter terrorism concerns will be integrated into “all relevant external assistance programs.”
On the other hand, countries as Turkey, Jordan, Pakistan, Indonesia, and the Philippines, which are considered critical in the ''war on terror'', see significant increases in credits and aid, some of it from the Economic Support Fund (ESF), a category of security assistance used during the Cold War to give support to key geo-political allies . The increases in military and ESF funding come largely at the expense of humanitarian and development assistance, whose core programs, such as education and child and maternal health, were estimated to be reduced by about 400 million dollars in 2005, according to a budget analysis by Inter Action, a coalition of 160 U.S. relief and development groups.
All these measures are being implemented with little attempt to examine the root causes of terrorism and the factors that generate it. This will never lead to win the war against terrorism. Moreover, reducing social and economic aids will increase the lack of basic needs and poverty which is a main factor behind criminality, delinquency, and terrorism.
Aid and Relations with Israel
For the United States, the concept of 'opening-up' (to neighboring countries) goes hand in hand with a resolution of the conflict with Israel. The relation with Israel is an indicator for the relation with the rich and ‘civilized’ world. Following their peace agreements with Israel, economic aid to Egypt and Jordan increased dramatically. Israel and Egypt remain the largest bilateral recipients, accounting for nearly five billion dollars in aid. It is worth noting here that most of the three billion dollars earmarked for Israel goes to military credits.”
In the Palestinian case, within the negotiations milieu of an 'agreement at all cost', Palestinian moderation is rewarded with a lot of promises, but trickles of support. This has created an atmosphere of intimidation and doubt following any attempt for an independent position on the peace process . The double standards and subjectivity of the processes and aid mechanisms were clearly reflected in the latest developments after Hamas was democratically elected by the Palestinian people, while the US and EU have been threatening to stop the flow of aid to Palestine due to that result. Although the US has always been an advocate and a preacher for democracy, the Palestinian elections did not gain its recognition due to Hamas’s obvious conflict with Israeli interests.
The 2007 foreign aid bill approved by the US House of Representatives Appropriations Committee includes $2.46 billion for Israel, of which $2.34 billion goes to military aid and the rest to civilian aid. US aid for Israel is calculated according to a formula set in the late 1990s which aims at eliminating US civilian aid to Israel. This is based on assumption that the US Congress would not support civilian aid for long to a country with a developed economy like Israel’s. Under this formula, US military aid for Israel would increase by $60 million a year to a ceiling of $2.4 billion a year, beginning in 2009. Israel will receive its last $60 million of US civilian aid in the 2008 US fiscal year. Egypt will be receiving the second largest aid amount from the US, including $1.7 billion of which $1.3 billion are dedicated to military purposes. It is worth noting that the US House, whose foreign aid will total $23.1 billion in 2007, will dedicate a limited amount of $3.4 billion to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria; $522 million for stabilization efforts in Iraq; and $962 million for Afghanistan .
The Impact of Aid Flow as Currently Administered
Monterrey equally stressed on three pillars that serve financing for development; (1) more free trade including foreign direct investment but with a more democratic transparent and fair trading system, (2) more aid, with main focus on quality of non-conditional and non-tied official development assistance, and (3) sustained debt relief. However, through a quick analysis of the aid policy towards the Arab region, one can easily conclude that it is highly linked to strategically-calculated political decisions and it focuses on enhancing free trade that remains one of the main objectives for any aid channeled to the region. This aid policy is hardly conducive to development because trade alone cannot guarantee growth and sustained development. It is worth noting that trade policies, conducted by the US and the EU, do not reflect any serious willingness to help developing countries since they insist on subsidizing agriculture, misusing antidumping measures, abusing intellectual property rights, and modifying the rules of trade in services. This was reflected in the trade negotiations in the consecutive Ministerial and mini-Ministerial meetings of the World Trade Organization in Doha, Cancun, Hong Kong, and Geneva. Moreover, economic reforms being tied to much of the ODA flow is perceived by different governmental stakeholders and decision makers, whether foreigners including international financial institutions or even local governments, as a matter of economic and trade liberalization and more privatization. This assumption highly limits the role of the state in economic regulation and reduces the available policy options. Moreover, it shrinks social reforms to the mere establishment of safety nets to face the negative effects resulting from these economic reform policies. Furthermore, ODA is increasingly being conditioned by the ’War on Terror’ and the reaction to the results of the elections in Palestine is an interesting example. Moreover, the debt issue was never seriously negotiated; it remains, like in the case of Lebanon, a way to exert more conditionalities towards liberalization and privatization.
The United Nations General Assembly repeatedly stressed the inter-linkage between security, development, and human rights particularly in the September 2005 World Leaders’ Summit. The correlation between security and development is the basic principle of modern political and sociological thought. Problems of security and development can only be tackled together, in a comprehensive effort to face conditions that, on one hand, cause stability and instability, and, on the other, stimulate or hinder development .
The areas into which aid is being channeled by the donor society do overlap with several areas that civil society organizations in the Arab region are concerned about and work to change and strengthen, such as good governance, freedom of expression, sound electoral systems, the independence of the judiciary, legal environment, empowerment of women and several other areas. However, the surrounding environment being enhanced by the donor countries themselves is hampering the process of change in the Arab region. Three main factors have a direct and negative affect on the impact achieved by aid flows for the purposes of financing for development in the region. These are:
1. The double standards of the US and the EU with the UN resolutions addressing the rights of the Palestinian people and the decision of the International Court in 2004 are maintained. Moreover, Israeli nuclear weapons remain a taboo, while the insecurity in the region and the tendencies towards militarization and enhancing defense policies persist
2. The link between aid and terrorism is weakening the ability to sustain an efficient and effective flow of aid based on the national needs and not on foreign policy demands of rich countries. This is also finding new explanations for the prioritization of defense and security policies at the expense of development and social security, which has been for long the main dilemma in the Arab region.
3. The undemocratic regimes in the Arab region, which continue to repress freedoms, violate rights, and limit the space of civil society organizations are continuously being supported by various donor countries for reasons related to energy and oil sources or military bases located in several of the Arab countries
All efforts will not help the Region unless the rights of all people are protected according to the international rights, laws, and the UN related resolutions. Change necessitates the introduction of radical reforms at different levels, political, economic, social and cultural. Any reform agenda that could lead to success and be effectiveness should be comprehensive and should take into consideration all the three above-mentioned dimensions. These reforms should lead to establish regimes which respect human rights and democracy and adopt policies leading to social justice. From the perspective of Arab civil society organizations, there is no opposition to the content of any initiative calling for democracy and the respect of human rights. Peace, security, and adequate socio-economic policies in addition to democracy and the respect of human rights will be the main factors behind their success. Moreover, change needs the implementation of a fair and comprehensive solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and a real and effective end of any form of foreign occupation in Iraq.
Accordingly, aid should complement local development plans. This requires addressing 'national' obstacles hindering these plans, such as lawlessness, the absence of democracy, and the prevalence of corruption, in addition to the lack of expertise and scarcity of technology. If conditionality is on issues such as the freedom to vote, the right of expression and belonging, and the independence of the judiciary, rather than being on privatization and the removal of subsidies that support basic services, then, the aid regime could become the developmental lever needed badly by poor countries. Local development plans should answer the needs of the majority of the population that live below the poverty line in most countries of the Region. Foreign aid to these plans will contribute to raising the living standards of real people, and not merely raising general economic indicators that, effectively, only serve a minority in the upper classes, mainly because of the lack of a fair redistribution of wealth. It is essential to stress that foreign aid should be related to poverty reduction policies, dependant on the harmonization of the development assistance agencies’ policies, practices, and procedures, and dependant as well on the national public capacities in absorbing, managing and distributing this aid.
Thus, in all the abovementioned, the role of civil society would be a crucial factor in the process of reforming aid mechanisms, guaranteeing their outreach, and making them more adequate to local and national needs, and, accordingly, more sustainable within the development policies of developing countries.
